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Abstract 
Across the globe, economic developers and policymakers are building “innovation 
districts” –master planned developments with the aim of concentrating the actors, entities, inputs, 
and physical infrastructure considered essential to process and product innovation. Promoters 
have repeatedly hailed Barcelona’s “22@bcn” (est. 2000) and Boston’s “Seaport Innovation 
District” (est. 2010) for their success in attracting talent, increasing jobs, scaling startups, and 
transitioning regions into a high-tech economy. Built within the city and the urban-periphery 
alike, innovation districts point to a new spatial layout for capitalist production. 
This dissertation is an in-depth comparative case study of five innovation districts: 
Boston, Detroit, Park Center (North Carolina), St. Louis, and Dublin (Ireland). I engage a 
qualitative approach that includes on-site observations and semi-structured interviews with over 
100 key supporters of innovation districts–from residents and workers to the university affiliates, 
developers, incubator owners, venture capitalists, non-profit managers, private executives, 
elected officials, and consultants driving growth decisions. In developing a more robust 
definition of innovation districts than the strategy mobilized by growth coalitions, I situate the 
emergence of innovation districts and their extractive logics along a historic trajectory of 
capitalist production from manufacturing material goods to new forms of immaterial production. 
Relying on content analysis of primary documents, maps, legal statues, and architectural 
renditions, I document how the planning process for each innovation district encloses public 
space and lived experience within that space, relinquishing it for private profit. 
Through detailed case studies I argue that economic developers and policymakers 
opportunistically used innovation district strategy to trigger real estate development after the 
2008/2009 global financial crisis. The allure of the innovation district concept –that of an 
entrepreneurial haven for science and design breakthroughs and the acceleration of discoveries to 
the market—succeeded in selling the innovation district strategy for financial, political, and 
popular backing during a time period of complete construction standstill. However, in places 
with robust entrepreneurial ecosystems, supporters lost sight of the benefits of the innovation 
district as a support for startups and entrepreneurs in favor of more established companies 
seeking proximity to talent. Using census data, I trace the changing demographic makeup of each 
  xii 
innovation district from its date of inception to its current state to demonstrate how innovation 
district strategy contributes to the splintering of resources. Lastly, I conclude the dissertation 
with a theoretical discussion gesturing how innovation districts might exacerbate issues of 
precarity for the entrepreneur who sits at the center of this experimentation and is increasingly 
interpellated by a state-led ideology that eagerly encourages self-provisioning. 
  1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
On June 2014, Detroit’s Mayor Mike Duggan officially declared and designated the 
Detroit Innovation District, a 2,750-acre designation for the Downtown, Midtown, and New 
Center neighborhoods (see figure 1). The event launch, held in TechTown, a business innovation 
hub located in Midtown Detroit, included prominent community leaders from anchor institutions 
and supporting foundations in Detroit. Bruce Katz, previous vice president and director of the 
Metropolitan Policy Program at the Brooking Institution in Washington D.C., was in attendance 
as an invited speaker. Only three days earlier, Katz, and his colleague Julie Wagner, released 
their report, “The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New Geography of Innovation in America”, a 
now widely cited policy paper directly influencing innovation district policy. Anticipating 
success for the Detroit Innovation District, Katz, who featured prominently in the strategic 
design of Detroit’s implementation stated, “What’s going to happen is we’re going to have a two-
plus-two-equals-five effect. Collaboration and synergy in this district are going to have 
unanticipated discoveries for the market” (Broda, 2014, italics mine). 
 
Figure 1: Promotional brochure used for Detroit’s Innovation District 
 
Source: New Economy Initiative (“Detroit Innovation District brochure,” 2014) 
 
Amongst economic and urban developers, innovation district strategy has exhibited a 
type of viral tendency. While the term is slippery and ill-defined, most scholars and policy-
makers look upon “innovation districts” as designated sites to cluster the network of people, 
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institutions, resources, and activities frequently cited as integral to the innovation process 
(Audretsch, 2003; Feldman, 1994; Malecki, 2010; Shearmur, Carrincazeaux, & Doloreux, 2016). 
Inspired by seeming successes in Barcelona (est. 2000) and Boston (est. 2010), economic 
developers and policymakers enthusiastically promote innovation districts as a mechanism for 
generating entrepreneurship, job growth, and urban redevelopment. 
Within the urban sphere, key participants with a stake in innovation are designating 
sections of the city, typically post-industrial sites, to create these live-work-play laboratories. 
Similarly, outside of the urban sphere, individuals are revamping suburban office campuses and 
research and science parks to replicate the density and connectivity of the city. The wide 
promotion and adoption of this model points to the emergence of a new spatial form. Regardless 
of location, this new productive utopia invokes the romantic ideal of the city and the 
entrepreneur as catalytic to the innovation process. Today, in 2018, there are over 90 innovation 
districts in the United States (Talkington, n.d.).1 The proliferation of this strategy is evidence that 
urban and regional actors are investing considerable resources to build innovation districts.  
This dissertation interrogates the rhetoric undergirding innovation district strategy to 
contextualize why innovation districts elicit a feeling of “more than”, that is, a two-plus-two-
equals-five effect. In other words, what precisely is it about this particular economic 
development strategy that facilitates its policy mobility (McCann, 2011; Temenos & McCann, 
2013; K. Ward, 2017) and leads both its implementors and the public to see it as a panacea for 
regional wealth and prosperity? In answering this question, I reach three conclusions, which 
structure of the dissertation. First, though my analysis of innovation districts begins with the 
definition and strategy formulated by Katz and his colleagues, I am not bound by it. Instead, I 
develop a more nuanced definition of innovation districts and provide a critical analysis of 
innovation district strategy that highlights detrimental aspects of this form of development that 
current policy prescriptions omit. Second, I frame innovation districts along capitalist trajectories 
in advanced Western economies. By reading their emergence from a perspective on the capitalist 
production of space (see for example Gottdiener, 1994; Harvey, 2001; Lefebvre, 1992), I point to 
the ways that innovation districts facilitate the extractive logics of capitalism through land rent 
and people rent. I demonstrate how innovation district strategies leverage political mechanisms 
to increase land values for investment capital and how this transformation succeeds in converting 
public spaces into spaces of production. Lastly, I critique innovation district strategy for 
                                               
1 These figures do not account for various cities around the globe in European, South American, and Asian countries. 
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opportunistically leveraging entrepreneurial activity to reinvigorate development and point to 
ways that the strategy manifests in a normative stance on the responsibility of entrepreneurs to 
foster regional wealth and competitiveness.  
 
Innovation Districts: A Brief Definition 
Innovation district strategies are modeled off the successes of Silicon Valley, which 
represents the prime destination for entrepreneurs in search of venture capital funding and 
expertise, as well as a tech-culture of embracing failure, willingness to experiment, and focus on 
accelerating products to the market (Kenney, 2000; O’Mara, 2005; Rao, 2013; Saxenian, 1996). 
However, to counter the negative externalities of Silicon Valley, that is, the lack of affordable 
housing, traffic congestion, and the monotony and lack of “authenticity” of a suburban office 
park (Packer, 2013; Saxenian, 1983; Zukin, 2009), innovation districts strategies leverage the 
role of design to convert the designated space of the innovation district into an amenity-rich, 
transit-oriented community attractive to younger, high-skilled workers and the firms that employ 
them (Clark, Lloyd, Wong, & Jain, 2002; Florida, 2002; Lloyd, 2008). Innovation district 
designs incorporate a density of entertainment, retail, and housing amenities in close proximity 
to work, fiber optic cables embedded in the infrastructure to enable continuous public access to 
wireless connectivity, and the physical structures that support entrepreneurial activity, such as 
incubators and accelerators, research hospitals and universities, and legal and financial services. 
In addition to the material elements, innovation district strategies highlight the importance of 
networking opportunities to encourage spontaneous interactions. As a result, new staff positions 
have emerged to program space and ensure constant networking and interaction. Collectively, 
these new fixtures facilitate the around-the-clock work mentality made amenable by 
sophistications in ICTs and mobile technologies (Davis, 2016; Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 
2000; Mazmanian, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2013) and the belief that today’s innovation is best 
supported by an open and connected environment (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough, 
Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006). 
Boosters publicly laud innovation districts as a tool to transition post-industrial 
economies to a knowledge-based economy (Bell, 1973; Machlup, 1973; Porat & Rubin, 1977) 
supportive of research heavy endeavors often associated with a hospital and/or a university 
(Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Feldman, 1984; Feldman & Bercovitz, 2006), creative workers 
(Florida, 2002; Markusen & Schrock, 2006), service jobs for low-skilled workers (Sassen, 2001). 
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Spatially, this knowledge-based economy includes infrastructure and amenities that support the 
demographic preferences of what Florida (2002) termed creative class workers. Increasingly, this 
class of workers are mobile (Martin-Brelot, Grossetti, Eckert, Gritsai, & Kovács, 2010; 
Shearmur, 2007).  
In addition to creating pathways toward a knowledge economy, the presence of an 
innovation district serves as a branding mechanism to attract real estate development. Branding 
serves the purpose of rendering a place ‘safe’ for investors (Cuthbert, 2006; Klingmann, 2007) 
and also demonstrates an awareness of  know the “right” elements needed to make a city a hot 
spot (Eisinger, 2000; Hannigan, 1998; Loughran, 2014). This succeeds in directing construction 
in places where investors and developers might have previously refrained from investing. Even 
when slated outside of the urban periphery, the declaration of an innovation district serves as an 
opportunity to approximate the highest and best land use in accordance to market logics 
(Chappel, Markusen, Schrock, Yamamoto, & Yu, 2004; Mark, Grissom, Liu, & Pearson, 1990).  
Raising land values and real estate investment became apparent from how the adoption of 
the strategy took off after the 2008/2009 recession. Though earlier attempts at innovation-led 
development existed in cities before the recession, innovation district strategy helped jump start 
development after construction was halted and large companies paused on their intentions to 
develop property in the city. Growth coalitions representing public and private interests shifted 
their attention on entrepreneurs and small startups to generate growth. Focusing on these flexible 
workers with low real estate demands, both in terms of need for space and in terms of power to 
request tax subsidies (Clive, Simmons, & Trumble, 2007; V. Gibson, 2003), innovation districts 
served to generate nominal income for the city and create pockets of activity. As I demonstrate in 
my cases, in economies with a robust talent pool and entrepreneurial ecosystem (i.e. Dublin and 
Boston), the strategy worked up until a certain point. As the economy picked back up, the same 
practitioners who implemented innovation district strategy under the guise of supporting budding 
entrepreneurs went back to favoring the larger established companies no longer constrained by 
borrowing term limits.  
In practice, different actors adopt the strategy for different purposes. The state of the 
region in which the innovation district is embedded plays an important factor in the potential 
outcomes of the innovation district. In some locations, adoption of the policy might displace the 
very people and inputs that make a place “innovative.” However, even this statement necessitates 
careful consideration as different supporters of innovation districts operate under different 
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conceptions of the definition of “innovation” and thus implementation strategies compete for 
different objectives.  
Amongst the innovation district decision makers I interviewed there existed a 
disagreement on the definition of “innovation”.2 Stakeholders harbored conflicting expectations 
and misperceptions on what the innovation district represents. This discrepancy is evident in a 
variety of ways, from a definitional understanding of innovation to issues of governance and 
battles over the boundaries of the district. As a stand-alone concept, innovation refers to the 
process that leads to a novel outcome, be it a new object or a new way of doing something that 
did not previously exist (Benoit, 2008). Trying to understand the connection between the city and 
innovation further complicates the definition of innovation. Within economic development 
circles, the term innovation can take on a variety of meanings and encompass a broad range of 
activities (Shearmur, 2012). This is evident in responses from respondents when asked to define 
innovation and to discuss the purpose of an innovation district. For some respondents, the 
definition is purposely broad to encompass a novel approach to problems in a wide variety of 
sectors and/or situations: 
 
Non-profit executive: “We look at innovation broadly” (personal communication, 
2015). 
 
Foundation head: “Innovation is about the birth of ideas, not limited to tech, [it is 
about] moving forward powerful ideas” (personal communication, 2015). 
 
                                               
2 The wide-spread use of the term has prompted rigorous scholarship. Combing through historical archives and texts that date 
back 2500, as well as cataloguing how often the term innovation appears in academic writing, scholar Benoit Godin (2008) 
deconstructs the term and concept of innovation. The impetus for the study was to examine the culture force of the term across 
time and the impact it had on social, political, and economic thought. His is a critical account of the term and a way to understand 
its normative application. Godin finds that for 2500 years innovation was pejorative and subversive. Individuals who sought to 
open new potentialities and challenge the status quo through political dispositions were considered innovators. To be called an 
innovator was an insult deriving from the inability of the individual to conform to cultural and religious mores. The emphasis on 
detracting from (religion) was acutely prescient during the Reformation where anyone introducing innovations to an established 
doctrine was considered a heretic. The role of time plays an important element across centuries. 
 
An innovation (as opposed to an innovator) that reformed earlier traditions and ways of life was considered a slow and gradual 
process; it denoted aspirations to return to earlier and purer orthodoxy. In this configuration, an innovation was not associated as 
something entirely new. In the 18th century that the term was tied to progress and modernity, thus also efficiency, and by the 
20th century, as a result of the industrial revolution and tech innovation, the term is connected to economics. It is during this time 
period that the concept is instrumentalized as something that needs to be “done” by public policy and government agents. 
However, as we approach contemporary times, tracing the changing nature of innovation the concept, the term, the innovator 
versus the innovation, innovation studies, as well as terms connected to it, such as social innovation versus tech innovation, 
deconstructing the word in its ubiquity becomes challenging. It can be said that today to be an innovator is embraced, whereas 
historically, as Godin demonstrates, it was a term, or a practice, rejected by the populace. 
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Private company executive: “The ideal innovator is not restricted by any one 
definition; innovation cannot be constrained within one demographic” (personal 
communication, 2015). 
 
For others, it is specifically and purposefully limited: 
 
Tech consultant: “Innovation is the commercialization of a tech economy” 
(personal communication, 2015). 
 
State-level representative: “It is about entrepreneurs with a global orientation” 
(personal communication, 2015). 
 
Sometimes, it reflects the aims of the innovation district as a convener of people and ideas: 
 
Economic developer: “Innovation is working together to solve problems to 
challenges, solve problems in a new and different way, a new way of looking at 
how to solve a problem” (personal communication, 2015). 
 
University executive: “Innovation is about creativity; it fits with the creative class. 
It is more interaction, more team sport than solo practice, [it is] collaboration” 
(personal communication, 2015). 
 
Or, the aim of the innovation district as a way to try out new policies that can later be deployed 
to spaces outside of the district: 
 
State-level consultant: “It isn’t just high tech, but perhaps innovative policies” 
(personal communication, 2015). 
 
Here we see the definition relating to a new way of solving problems: 
 
Private company executive: “Innovation is the same as idea generation, 
innovations are the things that change the landscape of a product of a service, the 
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way you do business, the way you experience things going forward” (personal 
communication, 2015). 
 
Non-profit executive: “Innovation is different from invention; [it is] making 
something better and different” (personal communication, 2015). 
 
The various definitions of innovation shape the aims, intentions, and outcomes of 
innovation district strategy. For each of my case sites, a fixed or agreed upon definition for 
innovation to direct the implementation of each respective innovation district and the economic 
development policies never materialized. The ambiguity of the term purposely leaves open space 
for interpretation. Individual actors can strategically position the definition of innovation and the 
purpose of the district relative to their own personal interests so to marshal people and resources 
to achieve particular goals. At the same time, the flexibility in how the term is interpreted and 
how it is meant to indicate a welcoming of novel ideas or approaches is actually constrained in 
practice because the lack of agreement keeps the strategy at a standstill.  
 
Theories Introduced 
Rather than provide full histories of each of my case sites, I break down the history and 
the planning process for each innovation district into two thematic chapters. The first theme, 
techniques of territory, details the planning, policy, and legal techniques used by supporters to 
clear pathways and finance the development of each innovation district. This is the process of 
extracting land rent. Following the work of scholars such as Elden (2006, 2007), Hannah (2009), 
Mitchell (2002), and Scott (1999), I discuss the process of securing land as the process of 
securing “calculable territory” (Hannah, 2009) and sovereignty over the territory (Elden, 2007). 
This translation facilitates the investment of capital in what was earlier considered uninvestable 
land allowing the innovation district to become a wayfinding mechanism for a certain 
demographic, sector, and capitalist logic. 
The second theme, facilitating production, discusses is the role of the innovation district 
in concentrating a type of immaterial labor (Lazzarato, 1994). This is the process of extracting 
people rent. Following the work of the Autonomist Marxists and scholarship on creative 
workers, I discuss how entrepreneurs and their activities activate space, and through this, trigger 
additional capital investments. My interest is in creating a link between the scholars writing on 
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power/knowledge relations – particularly emergent studies at the intersection of territory and 
subjectivity  (Elden, 2006, 2007; Hannah, 2009 ) to the scholars debating new forms of 
subjectivity with my added focus on updating the work to the contemporary digital realities 
(Lazzarato, 1994; Scholz, 2016; Terranova, 2000, 2004). I put these bodies of literature in 
conversation with each other to derive perspectives on the emergence of innovation districts and 
their effect on the people working within them. 
 
Research Design 
The factors that marked an innovation district for me and that qualified it for this study 
were: 1) the use of political boundaries to enact innovation district strategy; 2) efforts by an 
assemblage of actors –rather than one single entity—to implement an innovation district; 3) the 
public declaration of master planning an innovation district. I selected cities that purposely 
adopted the term ‘innovation district’ to guide their economic development strategy. This 
decision removed other attempts to accommodate changing forms of production in the city –
attempts such as those seen in Austin, Texas, for example, or Denver, Colorado.3 The reason is 
to analyze what the term ‘innovation’ does and to ask three questions: How do urban actors 
define innovation? What forms of production are included in the term? How does a focus on 
innovation drive their decisions?  
Through a comparative case study of three primary cases (Detroit, Michigan; Dublin, 
Ireland; and Park Center, North Carolina) and two supporting cases (St. Louis, Missouri and 
Boston, Massachusetts), I empirically demonstrate how supporters and developers of innovation 
districts conceive, build, and fill the innovation district. I ask and answer questions about how 
specific ideas of innovation are generated in practice, how they are put to use, what effects the 
produce, and what they end up doing.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 In some instances, these places rebranded their strategy as an innovation district strategy. 
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Table 1: Innovation District Case Sites 
 
Location Name Founding Acres 
Boston, Massachusetts 
U.S.A. Boston Innovation District 2010 1,000 
Detroit, Michigan, 
U.S.A. Detroit Innovation District 2014 2,750 
Dublin, 
Republic of Ireland Silicon Docks 2012 163 
Research Triangle Park,  
        Raleigh-Durham North Carolina 
U.S.A. 
Park Center 2012 100 
St. Louis, Missouri 
U.S.A. Cortex Innovation Community 2002 240 
 
Figure 2: Scaled comparison of innovation districts 
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Many innovation districts are in the early stages of their development, if not existing 
solely as aspirations and imaginaries. Case study qualitative research provides local context 
where conventional economic evaluation of these spaces cannot. I opted to study them primarily 
through interviews with stakeholders, residents, and supporters. What did they envision for the 
innovation district? Who were they targeting? What models were they following? What would 
the space look like in five years? Ten years? These were the types of questions I asked in my 
interviews (for my interview guides see Appendix A). 
From March 2015 – April 2017 I visited each case site, some twice, and interviewed over 
150 individuals (for a list of the positions held by individuals interviewed see Appendix B). I 
engaged in three levels of interview recruitment and observation. The first level required 
identifying key players of growth coalitions and city administrators offering incentives for these 
developments. These people were the ‘culturally specialized informants’ (Bernard, 2011) 
intimately familiar with the history and politics of the local setting, also seen as the ‘informal 
gatekeepers’ (Seidman, 2012) routinely providing neatly packaged answers to “outsiders” while 
also protecting insiders from unwanted outside attention. Once I obtained their consent, I was 
able to access the individuals in the second phase –the less public individuals working inside the 
major anchor institutions and driving the majority of the decisions shaping innovation district 
strategies. The third stage of the interview process involved interviewing workers and/or 
residents of the innovation district.  
I recorded and transcribed all interviews, coding and recoding based on emergent themes 
that helped me derive a pattern recognition (Luker, 2008). I supplemented interviews and 
triangulated findings with content analysis of architectural renderings, newspaper accounts, 
Internet media sources, promotional material, webpages promoting the innovation districts, and 
government documents regulating the planning, financing, and governance mechanism of each 
innovation district. For the more advanced cases, I was able to find policies supporting their 
development and marketing material promoting them. For others, I dealt mostly with 
architectural renderings, site plans, and machetes. This content analysis helped me assess the 
discourses surrounding innovation district strategies. 
My research is grounded (Charmaz, 2006). I started researching innovation districts out 
of curiosity of how they could succeed. I saw them as exclusionary and could not understand 
how they would actually help to increase innovation output. My experience in each location, the 
people I spoke with, the literature I read, and courses I took served to shape background and 
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disciplinary assumptions and pointed me in various directions. The placemaking, programming, 
and branding, themes that consistently emerged from interviews (see #3 in the Appendix), led me 
to draw parallels between innovation district designs and today’s big tech companies. From there 
I started questioning the experience of the individuals working inside these companies and inside 
the incubators. Interviewing them I grew to learn that there was both an excitement to work in 
these places, but also negative aspects related to anxiety, stress, isolation, long hours, and the 
disappointment of not having the necessary venture capital and mentorship supports available in 
Silicon Valley—the latter sentiment was repeatedly expressed by the Dublin startup community 
and this is relevant considering the marketing attempts by growth coalitions to brand Dublin as 
the Silicon Valley of Europe. 
I cannot categorize my cases along a continuum of failed innovation district versus 
successful innovation district. As mentioned above, different actors adopt innovation districts for 
different reasons. Therefore, measuring outcomes would require a comparison against initially 
intended goals. To complicate matters, even amongst scholars of innovation, there is no agreed 
upon decision on what constitutes as innovation nor what are the inputs of innovation (Benoit, 
2008; Welz, 2003). As it relates to the innovation district, does innovation mean accelerating a 
product to the market? Does it mean creating a space to try out innovative policies, such as form-
based codes in a city without prior experience using this type of zoning, or smart city 
applications for city government and private corporations to collect data on the everyday 
experiences of the people traversing through the space? Does an “innovation district” serve as a 
code word for the transition into a new kind of economy with a new workforce and firm 
organization structure scholars are still trying to understand? 
Instead of categorizing each case as failed or successful, I use a different categorization: 
strong market economies (Dublin and Boston), weak market economies (Detroit and St. Louis), 
and non-city (Park Center). ‘Strong market economies’ stands for cities with a robust 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. The cities of Dublin and Boston are replete with universities and have 
an abundance of talent in the form of skilled tech workers. These cities do not struggle from 
‘brain drain’ from university graduates leaving the city. In addition, though the cities do not 
compare to the level of venture capital or C-suite experts (i.e., Chief Executive Officer, Chief 
Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Technology Officer, Chief Innovation Officer4, 
                                               
4 It has become common for tech companies and startups to develop a Chief Innovation Officer position. Interestingly, 
government offices are now also creating Chief Innovation Positions. This indicates how expertise from the technology sector is 
influencing government and governance (Shelton, Zook, & Wiig, 2015). 
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etc.) available for advice and for fostering networks available in Silicon Valley, funding is 
available and a long history of firms in the city translates to ease of mentorship from founders 
and executive managers. 
 
Table 2: Dublin and Boston Startup Cities Global Rankings 
   Salary Social Security & Benefits Cost of Living 
Quality of 
Living5 
   Project Management Tech Marketing       
Ranking 
City 
Startup Ecosystem
 
Y
oung Professionals  
(0- 3 years experience) 
W
ith M
ore W
ork Experience  
Y
oung Professionals  
(0- 3 years experien ce) 
W
ith M
ore W
ork Experience  
Y
oung Professionals  
(0- 3 years experience) 
W
ith M
ore W
ork Exp erience 
Incom
e Tax 
Q
uality of H
ealth System
 
H
olidays 
Cost of Living
6 
Equal Rights 
S afety 
23 Dublin, Ireland 4:41 $31,717 $83,491 $38,004 $66,756 $26,843 $67,600 2:59 4.7 4:05 3:48 4.81 2.94 
27 Boston, USA 4.6 $49,430 $110,341 $71,532 $104,937 $47,401 $80,549 3:52 4:34 2:05 2.65 2.88 3.89 
Source: (Start-up Cities Index, 2017) 
 
The term ‘weak market economies’ stands for cities with a historically industrial base 
struggling to transition into a wealth-generating economy (Audirac, 2018; Beauregard, 2013; 
Mallach, Haase, & Kattori, 2017). To be clear, proponents of Detroit and St. Louis innovation 
districts worked hard to dispel the notion of the unavailability of venture capital. Whereas 
Boston and Dublin consistently appear in indexes and scorecards as the best places for 
entrepreneurs to thrive (see table 2), Detroit and St. Louis rarely make the cut. This does not 
mean that these supports are devoid in these cities. Detroit Entrepreneurial Study (2017) boasts 
of 35 venture backed startups representing 25% of the startups in the state, a 50% increase over 
the last three years in Detroit-based startups, and over $62M in venture capital investments for 
Detroit startups (2017 Detroit Entrepreneurial Study, 2017). Similarly, the St. Louis Regional 
Chamber’s 2017 Investment Capital Report lists $373M in venture capital investments, a 0.55% 
of the US total shares, ranking in 19th among the US metro areas, with the average deal size of 
$7M (Smith, 2017). Still, the amount of venture capital, local expertise, and, importantly, talent, 
is not nearly as attendant as in Dublin or Boston. 
                                               
5 Quality of life incorporates a safety score based on the perception of safety felt by residents and publicly available 
data on crime rates obtained from police departments. Quality of life also incorporates gender equality calculated 
using the 2017 Global Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum. 
6 Cost of living takes into account local prices of groceries, street food, restaurants, public transport, clothing, and 
rent for a one bedroom apartment in the city center. 
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The term ‘non-city’ is a term I use to categorize efforts of the Research Triangle 
Foundation (Foundation), the non-profit governance organization of the Research Triangle Park 
(RTP), to create an innovation district in a rural environment. Like Dublin and Boston, the 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill Triangle area is a thriving entrepreneurial ecosystem. There is a 
great abundance of talent, venture capital, and C-Suite expertise. In 2017, Triangle-based 
companies raised $408M through 140 deals (2017 Innovators Report, 2018). In many respects, 
the Triangle region suffers from the same negative agglomeration externalities as Dublin and 
Boston, such as a lack of housing and massive traffic congestion (Rohe, 2012). However, there 
are three specific reasons why I categorize Park Center as a non-city. First, Park Center sits on 
land already managed by the Foundation (“Research Triangle Foundation Records, 1955 - 1999,” 
n.d.). This means the Foundation did not have to resort to political mechanisms to acquire public 
land for development. Second, though the Foundation adopted an existing building when IBM 
moved their operations from the particular parcel of land on which Park Center is built (Terry, 
2014), most of the Park Center is greenfield development. Third, I use the term non-city to point 
to how a narrative on the contemporary inputs of innovation lead to urban-visions guiding 
development on pastoral landscapes. This discourse is also evident from efforts to revamp 
suburban office parks to prevent them from obsolescence (Spivack, 2017). 
Importantly, the decision to bring in Dublin as a case is not to create a comparison 
between national and international cases. Innovation district strategy and economic development 
policies today are global phenomena that travel across national boundaries (McCann & Ward, 
2011; Temenos & McCann, 2013; K. Ward, 2017). This is not to say that I do pay attention to 
variations in local policies and differences in governance structures, but I do find the comparison 
between weak market and strong market economies more compelling than national versus 
international comparisons. 
 
Case Sites Contextualized 
To begin, it is helpful to provide a visual description of each case site and to provide a 
brief history of important events leading up to the declaration of an innovation district. 
Importantly, it helps to remember that, except for Park Center, the innovation districts in my case 
sites are all situated over land previously occupied by industry. Innovation districts are bringing 
forth new post-industrial landscapes and that often translates to two types of urban fabrics: 
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repurposed industrial infrastructure and new build, which often translates to high-rises with glass 
facades built out of contemporary material. 
 
Strong Market Economies 
Silicon Docks, Dublin, Ireland 
 
Figure 3: Silicon Docks 
 
 
The Dublin Docklands, or ‘Silicon Docks’, the nickname used by major branding 
mechanism to promote Dublin as the Silicon Valley of Europe is located to the East of Dublin’s 
city center. Industrial architecture of harbor installations, warehouses and storage depots have 
given way to material expressions of new economic, social and cultural realities. Class A office 
buildings with expansive glass walls contorted to exposed steel frames, creatively refurbished 
luxury offices, and open floor plans ripe with amenities dominate the cityscape. Coffee shops, 
boutique condominiums, and neon light displays reflecting on the Liffey River illuminate the 
night sky. The Silicon Docks is home to many notable global technology firms such as Google, 
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Facebook, Airbnb, and LinkedIn, to name a few, that established their Europe, Middle East, and 
Africa headquarters in Dublin on account of their business-friendly tax policies.  
The progression from de-industrialization, to Celtic Tiger, to recession, and now to a 
post-crisis hub of the technology sector has been vividly on display in the cycles of development 
in the Dublin Docklands (Kayanan, Eichenmüller, & Chambers, 2018). For decades, the 
Docklands were consigned to decline and dereliction. The struggle for investment and the turn to 
entrepreneurial urban growth led to a dependence on local authorities to oversee development. In 
Dublin, in the late 1980s, this took the form of the Custom House Docks Development Authority 
(CHDDA) created to incentivize development on the western most portions of the Docklands 
(Moore, 2008). The CHDDA succeeded in developing a financial district centered on the 
International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) but critiques of their myopic focus on commercial 
and speculative growth negated regenerative development promises of housing and employment 
opportunities for all (Moore, 2008). Consequently, the Dublin Docklands Development 
Authority (DDDA) supplanted it in 1997. The DDDA expanded their remit to a 1300-acre 
development zone. This new border included the IFSC catchment area, in addition to wastelands, 
brownfields, and old-industrial sites (see figure 4). The DDDA remained lead developers of the 
new boundary until 2012, when planning powers shifted from An Bord Planeála, the national 
planning body, to Dublin City Council (DCC). This was coupled with the creation of a 163-acre 
Strategic Development Zone (SDZ) overlaid on the North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock Planning 
Scheme (North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock: Planning Scheme, 2014) (see figure 5).  
 
Figure 4: Dublin Dockland Development Authority, 1997 boundary 
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Figure 5: Strategic Development Zone, 2012 boundary 
 
 
The Silicon Docks concept extends beyond this 163-acre boundary to a larger layer that 
seeks to envision Dublin as a global tech-hub, but I confine my analysis of the Silicon Docks to 
the SDZ as a way to discuss how visions of a technologically advanced future influenced 
planning policies –particularly after the 2008/9 financial crises.  
Development authority over the SDZ belongs to Dublin City Council (Lawton, 2017). An 
Bord Pleanála, the national planning body, transferred the authority with the designation of the 
SDZ. However, this does not mean that the growth of the area is solely attributed to Dublin City 
Council. As I demonstrate, two national organizations, the Industrial Development Authority and 
the National Asset Management Agency are gatekeepers to the SDZ’s development (Byrne, 
2016b, 2016a). 
During on-site visits in 2016 and 2017, the development of Silicon Docks remained work 
in progress with most of the sites in early phases of construction (i.e., pile driving, cement 
pouring) (see figure 6). An enforced building height restriction of seven to nine floors visually 
translates to cranes as the dominant skyscrapers of the space (see figure 7). Though construction 
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remains on the rise, the idea of Silicon Docks is more established than the reality would suggest, 
though the aesthetic in place foreshadows what is to come. 
 
Figure 6: Construction of the Silicon Docks south of the Liffey river 
 
 
Figure 7: Construction of the Silicon Docks south of the Liffey river 
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The Dublin case demonstrates that, at least in advanced capitalist economies, national 
boundaries do not limit innovation-led development. A case outside of the United States 
demonstrates the importance of calculable territory for the seamless flow of global networks 
(Hannah, 2009). A second reason for including Dublin as a case site is because of their progress 
in smart city infrastructure and governance. As I argue in the dissertation, calculable territory 
clears pathways to track all human transactions and interactions within the ordered space. 
 
Boston Innovation District, Boston, Massachusetts 
 
Figure 8: Boston’s Innovation District 
 
 
The Boston Innovation District is located on the South Boston Waterfront, on a peninsula 
slightly south east of the financial district and the downtown. Over two decades in office, 
Menino had exhibited the long-standing desire to “leave his fingerprints all over the Seaport” 
(McMorrow, 2014). Prior to targeted development, marine industrial activity and ground floor 
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parking were the dominant fabric of the South Boston Waterfront. The completion of the Big Dig 
and the extension of the Silver Line provided direct and quick access to prime real estate 
opportunities in the South Boston Waterfront. Located between the downtown and Logan 
International Airport, the South Boston Waterfront was an obvious place for the city to grow. 
The city allocated billions of public dollars to open up the peninsula and connect it to the airport 
prior. This brought forth a few prominent buildings such as the Institute of Contemporary Art, 
the Boston Convention and Exhibition Center, the US District Court, and the World Trade 
Center. Growth seemed promising until the recession froze all development. Menino needed a 
new plan. 
On January 4, 2010, kicking off his fifth term with a bold initiative, Boston’s Mayor 
Menino delivered an inaugural address promising to unlock the potential of Boston by 
converting the South Boston Waterfront into an innovation district (“The Honorable Thomas M. 
Menino Inaugural Address,” 2010: p. 4). “A new approach is called for on the waterfront,” he 
proclaimed, “one that is both more deliberate and more experimental. Together, we should 
develop these thousand acres into a hub for knowledge workers and creative jobs…Years of 
financial engineering left us with a sub-prime crisis in housing. It’s time to get 
back to “engineering engineering” (ibid: p.4-5; emphasis in original). 
Menino had approached his staff before announcing his intentions to build an innovation 
district with the purpose of soliciting ‘big ideas’ to mark his final term (personal interview, 
2016). Andrew Feiberg, then an advisor to the Mayor, now the COO and Co-Founder of a virtual 
reality application, suggested the idea of an innovation district. Feiberg’s exposure with 
Barcelona’s innovation district led him to proclaim that the environment for innovation-led 
development was ripe in many respects: college graduates who wanted to stay in the Boston area 
could not find jobs; budding entrepreneurs did not have space to locate their startup; and Venture 
Café in Cambridge was running weekly events targeting entrepreneurs demonstrating a healthy 
resurgence of energy. If MIT’s experience with Kendall Square and large-scale innovation 
driven development exceeded expectations and was completely built out, why not direct 
construction to the blanket of parking lots that covered much of the South Boston Waterfront? 
(personal interview, 2016). 
Feiberg’s idea was not a hard sell. Leveraging innovation-led development made sense. 
The success Route 128, the Boston-Cambridge area has a long history of targeting science and 
research development (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenia, 1996). More recently, Massachusetts Institute of 
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Technology’s involvement in Kendal Square development around their campus highlighted the 
strengths of innovation- and transit-oriented-led development (Bertolini, 2000; Miara, 2012). 
Seeking to replicate the Kendal Square model, in 2010 on the heels of the recession, Boston’s 
late mayor Thomas Menino launched the Boston Innovation District, an initiative to redevelop a 
1000-acre swath of land into an urban laboratory of innovation and knowledge production.  
Located on the South Boston Waterfront, and encompassing seven subdistricts (see figure 
9) the Boston Innovation District is the first official innovation district in the United States.  
 
Figure 9: Subdistricts of the Boston Innovation District 
 
Source: (The Seaport Public Realm Plan, 1999; p. 12) 
 
Eight years into its development, the Boston Innovation District today features a 
fragmented urban fabric. Waterfront development on the north side features manicured lawns, 
protected walkways along the water, high-end, brightly lit and open Class A office 
developments, and condominiums with store-front first floors. Open parcels are slated for 
development and protected with fenced barriers that proudly display architectural renditions of 
what is to come: glass, and silver steeled high-rises, with luxury accommodations, pools, 
workout facilities, and boutique ground-floor retail (see figure 10).  
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Figure 10: Urban fabric of Boston’s Innovation District waterfront development 
 
 
Throughout the day, particularly during the weekend evenings, luxury cars are seen 
driving around the Boston Innovation District or parked on premise. On the east end of the 
peninsula, the urban fabric represents low-rise warehouses, administrative offices, and vessels 
that make up marine industrial activity. New forms of industry and changing cultural preferences 
are slowly displacing this sector and creating a new morphology, as evident from the arrival of 
high-end eateries, food stalls, bike lanes, and open entertainment venues. The southwest side of 
the innovation district is where the former industrial Fort Point neighborhood is located. The 
urban fabric of this neighborhood features older mid-rise, red-brick structures, and growing 
cultural amenities such as the Children’s Museum. On account of General Electric’s arrival, I 
expect this neighborhood will experience a drastic change to its landscape and urban fabric. 
Connecting these three main sites, the waterfront, the Marine Industrial Park area, and the Fort 
Point Neighborhood, are wide thoroughfares built to accommodate truck traffic transporting 
products from the port to the remainder of the region. Commuters have also found these arteries 
helpful leading to congested streets (and honking traffic) during rush hours (see figures 11 & 12). 
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Figure 11: Urban fabric of the Marine Industrial Park 
 
 
Figure 12: Expansive parking lots in the Boston Innovation District 
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Mayor Menino led initiatives for the Boston Innovation District using his power over the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority and his favoritism for certain developers  (McMorrow, 2014). 
As I demonstrate, considering its central location, the South Boston Waterfront was always 
slated for high-end and luxury development, which it prominently features today. A few years 
after the crash, when development picked up, innovation district efforts for inclusive 
development and affordable housing were discarded (Logan, 2017b).  
As the first publicly declared innovation district in the United States, Boston’s Innovation 
District is a strong case for my study. In addition, unlike the other cases, it is not anchored by a 
university—though the region is replete with universities and is prominently featured as a region 
with one of the largest concentration of knowledge workers (Berube & Holmes, 2016). Like 
Dublin, Boston’s initial efforts focused on smaller scale startups but their prime location in the 
heart of the city and quick real estate development interests shifted the strategy to benefit large 
established corporations.  
 
Weak Market Economies 
Detroit Innovation District, Detroit, Michigan 
 
Figure 13: Detroit Innovation District 
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From Henry Ford’s Detroit, a city bustling with industrial activity and an influx of labor 
that reached a population peak of 1.85 million in 1953, to its current population, which hovers 
below 700,000 and more than 40% of the residents living in poverty, the history of Detroit’s 
founding, its rise during industrialization, bankruptcy, and its ultimate “death” is well rehearsed 
(Bomey, 2017; Galster, 2018; Manning Thomas, 2013; see also special issue Sugrue, 2014; 
Tabb, 2015). A wide variety of scholars discuss the factors that contributed to this Detroit’s 
decline, some concentrating on larger global forces, others focusing on changes at the local level. 
Numerous retellings simplify Detroit’s growth and its demise to the reliance on a single industry: 
the automobile. The story is more multifaceted and complex, which makes it challenging to 
pinpoint the reasons that led to the adoption of an innovation district strategy and shaped its 
scope.  
Like many other cities seeking investment capital and global recognition not as a 
bankrupt city, over the past several decades, Detroit has embraced a long string of fad-driven 
economic development strategies. The innovation district is no different. Mayor Mike Duggan 
publicly declared the Detroit Innovation District in the summer of 2014 (Broda, 2014), but 
foundational elements of a renewed interest in the city appeared over a decade earlier with the 
arrival of Compuware World Headquarters in 2003 in the heart of Downtown Detroit, Dan 
Gilbert’s, one of Detroit’s largest property owners, decision to relocate Quicken Loans in 2010, 
and the work of Midtown Inc., formally known as the University Cultural Center Association, to 
revitalize Midtown.  
The presence of university and hospital research centers anchor institutions within the 
designated location, as well as an established incubator and a college focused on creative studies 
played a major role in the decision to overlay an innovation district in the downtown core (The 
Detroit Innovation District: Recommendations for State Alignment and Investment, 2013). At 
2,750-acres, Detroit Innovation District is largest in the United States encompassing the New 
Center, Midtown, and Downtown neighborhoods. The borders of the Detroit Innovation District 
remain in contention, but generally, the Detroit riverfront creates the southern boundary, 
interstates 75 and 375 form the eastern boundary, and interstate 94 the northern boundary, with 
an additional northern extension to include the Henry Ford Health System just north of Grand 
Boulevard. M-10 forms the western border with an extension to include the Corktown 
neighborhood. 
  25 
Detroit’s domination by the automobile industry and related spin-offs is as relevant today 
as it was during the height of industrialization, though for different reasons. In the early 1900s, 
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, the ‘Big Three’ formed Detroit’s economic base and had a 
tremendous effect on the urban landscape (Ryan, 2008). The presence of the oligopolistic giant 
automakers had a tremendous effect on the urban landscape. At the height of industrialization, 
the automotive sector dominated the urban landscape with their superblock factories and 
suburban-type housing for manufacturing labor (B. Ryan, 2012; B. Ryan & Campo, 2013).7 To 
alleviate the increased presence of automobiles on the road, street facing store fronts were 
pushed back to widen streets (Ryan, 2008). What was once a city with smaller parcels of land 
and concentrated populations, was slowly consumed by the super-block factory footprints, roads, 
highways, and parking lots that broke up the density and transit-oriented development on which 
innovation district strategy depends.  
The departure of automobile factories and operations from the city center is also an 
important contribution to the challenges of implementing the Detroit Innovation District. The 
large abandoned factories certainly affect density, but in addition, the outcome of companies 
moving their operations away from downtown to the outskirts of the city (Garreau, 1992; 
McCarthy, 1997), and later to greenfield sites in the suburbs (Hyde, 1982; Neill, 1995), resulted 
in the decentralization of people and large demographic changes. Edge cities grew to become 
self-sufficient, with commuters traveling between edge cities, rather than from the edge to the 
core (McCarthy, 1997). Despite the slight resurgence of the central business district, this is a 
pattern that persists today with commuters holding 70% of the jobs in Detroit (Detroit Future 
City: 2012 Detroit Strategic Framework Plan, 2013). In addition, two of Michigan’s largest 
research campuses, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) and Michigan State University (East 
Lansing) reside outside Detroit, meaning that any spin-offs from these universities are more 
likely to remain in Ann Arbor or Lansing rather than relocating to Detroit. 
Despite the loss of the automotive manufacturing and direct competition with other cities 
and countries in the vehicle market, the automotive legacy continues with this sector seeking to 
corner the market in automated vehicle technologies. In addition, the legacy of the automobile 
industry remains present not only in the amount of blight caused by decentralization, not only in 
                                               
7 Ryan and Campo (2013) argue for the importance of preserving the automobile heritage to ensure the city of Detroit and its 
inhabitants remain connected to their historic path. In this article, they state that the contemporary landscape is not reflective of 
its automotive past because many of the automobile factories have been demolished. I differ from this perspective in that I focus 
on the ways the automobile industry affected the density of the city, the creation of highways and parking lots. 
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the abandoned factories that take up massive amounts of space, or in their demise that left gaping 
swaths of derelict land, but also in an innovation district strategy that captivates the imaginaries 
of the Detroit stakeholders. The respondents I interviewed believe in the capacity to tap into the 
innovative energy that existed in Henry Ford’s Detroit and to compete against other regions on 
the cutting edge of autonomous vehicle technologies. 
Detroit’s trajectory cannot be separated from the role of race in its formation and racism 
in its decline (Benyon & Solomos, 1987; Darden, Hill, Thomas, & Thomas, 1987; Newman & 
Safransky, 2014; Sugrue, 2014). During the decentralization of Detroit, racist policies preventing 
African Americans from moving into the burgeoning white suburbs forced segregation and 
resulted in the concentration of African Americans within the city center faced with employment, 
housing, and police treatment discriminations (Neill, 1995; Sugrue, 2014; Vose, 1959). The 1967 
rebellion, which killed 41 people and destroyed 1,300 buildings, further exacerbated white flight. 
By the 1990s, 78% of Detroit’s population was African American (Neill, 1995). As of the US 
Census 2010, African Americans make up 83% of Detroit’s population. However, in the Greater 
Downtown, which encompasses the Detroit Innovation District, black residents account for 69% 
of the population, down 5%, with whites accounting for 22%, up 3% from the 2000 Census (7.2 
SQ MI: A Report on Greater Downtown Detroit, 2015). The increased racial diversity of the 
Greater Downtown is not in itself negative, but it is necessary to question the reasons for the 
decline in black residents and the connections between innovation district strategies that cater to 
higher skill sets that black residents may not possess.  
The Detroit Innovation District is an important case to draw comparisons between earlier 
landscapes of productions and the efforts to convert a blighted landscape focused on 
entertainment-led economic development strategies (i.e., stadiums, casinos, place-making) to 
serve today’s contemporary form of production. That the Detroit Innovation District strategy is 
no longer a leading economic development effort is not necessarily a negative conclusion of the 
research. The experiences of the leaders guiding its implementation and the challenges they 
faced speak to the importance of local context. The excitement for the innovation district strategy 
held particular sway in Detroit as Katz and Wagner publicly featured the city’s innovative 
potential in their national report, in addition to personally consulting Michigan and Detroit 
leaders on the implementation of the Detroit Innovation District strategy. From the onset this 
mounted the pressure to implement a successful strategy. At the same time, among locals there 
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existed a concerned undercurrent of an exclusionary strategy focused on a growing central 
business district surrounded by severely declining neighborhoods. 
 
Cortex Innovation Community, St. Louis, Missouri 
Figure 14: Cortex Innovation Community 
 
The St. Louis Cortex Innovation Community is a 240-acre development owned by 
Cortex, a legal 501c3 (“Cortex Innovation Community,” n.d.). The Cortex Innovation 
Community, located in Midtown, is made up of eight staff members and 18 board members 
representing public and private institutions invested in the district. The board members represent 
members from area universities, the Botanical Gardens, the Mayor’s office, and private 
businesses. Cortex holds the designation Master Developer for the Cortex District through the 
establishment of a tax increment finance boundary (St. Louis Innovation District Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF) Redevelopment Plan, 2012). 
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For two decades, Missouri growth coalitions worked together to grow Missouri’s 
reputation as a hub for plant and bio-sciences. In 2002, in the city of St. Louis, this took shape in 
the form of real estate development efforts to remove the blighted spaces in the stretch of land 
between St. Louis University and Washington University. Today, this industry is slowly 
developing the region as a hub for plant and bio science. As the urban node within this network, 
the Cortex Innovation Community has seen considerable growth. On account of demand, the 
Cortex Foundation is continuously updating their master plan to expand beyond its boundaries 
(Feldt, 2018). Plant- and bio-sciences are no longer Cortex’s only focus. Following the 2008 
recession, the Cortex Foundation expanded its remit to focus on smaller startup enterprises and 
these too have flourished within the boundary of the innovation district. However, they only 
represent a small percent of exits in the startup community with plant- and bio-sciences 
dominating venture capital funding (A. G. Smith, 2017). 
Cortex Innovation Community is my second case located in a weak-market economy. 
Like Detroit, St. Louis is faced with a declining population, diminishing resources, large tracks 
of blighted land, and a heavy racial divide (Gordon, 2009; Hollander, Pallagst, Schwarz, & 
Popper, 2009). The urban fabric of the Cortex Innovation Community and its surroundings is 
visual evidence of this divide. Much of Cortex Innovation Community is concentrated along two 
buildings, called Cortex I and Cortex II in planning documents. These buildings house the 
administrative offices of the Cortex Foundation, small offices for startups and a more established 
businesses, university incubator space, and the Cambridge Innovation Center, an incubator based 
out of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Surrounding each building are large, overfilled, parking lots. 
In many respects, with its low-rise development, Cortex Innovation Community resembles an 
office park built in the city (see figure 15). This perception is buttressed by the presence of an 
IKEA on the east side of the Cortex Innovation Community (see figure 16), though remnants of 
an industrial past are also evident due to the presence of a grain elevator on site (see figure 17), 
and a few remaining structures that served a community faced with declining working-class 
opportunities such as a Goodwill retail store and outlet, the Salvation Army, Planned Parenthood, 
and Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, an organization dedicated to providing legal services to 
low-income communities. 
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Figure 15: Parking lots in the Cortex Innovation Community 
 
 
Figure 16: View of IKEA from within the building overlooking expansive parking lots 
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Figure 17: Grain elevator in the Cortex Innovation Community 
 
 
The Cortex Innovation Community case study provides a strong opportunity to analyze 
longer attempts by growth coalitions to establish a space for knowledge production within the 
urban sphere. This longer period affords the ability to document the various technical means 
used by stakeholders for ownership over a territory. It also offers a comparison between a 
focused strategy on a predetermined sector (i.e., plant and bio-sciences in St. Louis) versus 
opting to refrain from determining the target sector (i.e., Boston). 
The origin story, as told by the founders, as well as the current leadership of the Cortex 
Innovation Community, prominently centers the development as mission driven (Smart People. 
Cool Places. The Story of Cortex, 2017). It is not uncommon to read in media accounts or hear 
from respondents in interviews that William Danforth, founder of the Cortex Innovation 
Community, and John Dubinsky, president and first CEO of the Cortex Innovation Community, 
are altruist visionaries primarily concerned about the welfare of St. Louis’ residents. One 
interview respondent gloriously attributed the work of these leaders as ‘god’s work’ (Cortex 
Innovation Community executive, personal interview, 2016). Undergirding the desperation for 
such charitable work are divinations such as a comment from Robert Calcaterra, president and 
CEO of Nidus Center for Scientific Enterprise in St. Louis County, commenting on the growing 
plant and life science sector in St. Louis: "In the next century, the advances in the life sciences 
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area are going to be the most dramatic things to occur worldwide. There's a very dramatic impact 
if you can feed people who are starving" (Goodman, 1999).  
Since its inception, the Cortex Innovation Community has created jobs. However, the 
question of who stands to benefit from the changes to the built environment development that 
generates these jobs is important. The case of the Cortex Innovation Community demonstrates 
what the powerful rhetoric of mission driven work combined with the imagery of a progressive 
scientific future can do: it can completely transform a landscape for a particular demographic.  
 
Non-city 
Park Center, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 
Figure 18: Park Center 
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In early 2014, the Research Triangle Park Foundation, the non-profit charged with 
managing North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park’s (RTP) strategy, acquired 100 acres of land 
along the I-40 for $17 million and designated the space as Park Center. The goal of Park Center 
is to accommodate 100,000 new jobs, build in $2 billion worth of residential and retail amenities, 
and construct a rail path connecting Park Center to Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill, the three 
surrounding cities that make up Research Triangle Park (Kroll, 2014; Ohnesorge, 2014). The site 
plan features an array of amenities to create the appearance of city life. These include street-level 
retail and entertainment, designated open recreation spaces, and housing in walkable proximity 
to work all within a pedestrian and bicycle friendly environment. Creating a density of people 
within their physical environment is the primary focus. 
Within the 100-acres, the Foundation intends to locate firms representing science and 
technology, sectors that have always been associated with RTP, as well as firms representing the 
arts and humanities. According to their website, “Creating a place where collaboration can occur 
between industry and academia, nonprofits and corporate titans, entrepreneurs and government is 
our goal. We want to create spaces for people to gather, meet, hang out and be inspired.” 
(http://www.rtp.org/about-us/park-center/). 
This comment contrasts with the initial ideology behind the development of RTP, which 
is well detailed in many scholarly accounts (for a few examples, see O’Mara, 2005; Rohe, 2012; 
Saxenia, 1996). In the late 1950s, RTP was conceived as a 7,000 acres science and research 
campus overlaid on the seven counties that make up the Raleigh-Cary and Durham-Chapel Hill 
metropolitan statistical areas in North Carolina (see figure 19).  
 
Figure 19: Map of counties of the Research Triangle Park 
 
Source: Research Triangle Region (“Counties,” 2018) 
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The layout and space between the various firms was purposely expansive in order to 
prevent employees from competing firms from fraternizing with each other. In addition to 
providing ample space for firms to develop their own campuses within RTP, zoning provision 
established an eight-acre minimum lot size, building set-backs of at least 150 feet from the road, 
and set-backs at least 100 feet from the side and back property lines (Rohe, 2012). The efforts of 
the RTP Foundation are focused on changing the silo-like attitude of the science and research 
park, the idea on which the RTP was originally designed, to a newly collaborative ideal that 
includes targeted amenities to attract and retain entrepreneurs and young professionals (“Park 
Center: This is not your grandfather’s RTP,” 2015). 
The imagery of the future Park Center certainly features compact development, 
consumption-led entertainment, and vibrancy in the urban design connecting buildings and 
structures. In reality, because of its early stages, at the moment, Park Center exists as a single 
building known as the Frontier. Essentially, the Frontier is a concept built into the basement of 
an abandoned IBM building. It is open to the community, wired with high-speed connectivity, 
and offers opportunity to rent space for those that want to establish a permanent residence for 
their startup business. Though the inside of the Frontier is colorful and inviting (see figures 20 & 
21), the outside of the building does not indicate the activity occurring inside (see figures 22 & 
23). The surrounding fabric of the Frontier building resembles the older vision for Research 
Triangle Park: manicured lawns, boxed, low-rise office buildings, and parking lots.  
 
Figure 20: Lobby of the Frontier 
 
Figure 21: Open workspace in the Frontier 
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Figure 22: Outside view of the Frontier 
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Figure 23: Main entrance of the Frontier 
 
 
 
Park Center provides an opportunity to compare logics between urban and non-urban 
redevelopment. What this brings to fore is the underlying operating perspective on the needs of 
21st century industry at the cusp of automation and the growth of high-tech entrepreneurship. 
However, the challenges posed by the urban sphere do not directly translate to the 7,000 acres of 
land operated by a single 501c3 as a type of home owner’s association. Park Center is an 
important case for a variety of reasons. Principally, it is interesting because of its historic 
precedent and conscientious planning efforts by university, industry, and government relations to 
embrace a new spatial logic for innovation capture. In addition, it is important because it is the 
only case outside of the urban sphere and, as such, there are overlapping districts that make up 
the 100-acre site. In many respects, the attempt to create a brand new concentrated urban-like 
development where the arts and culture industries can intersect with science and research, a place 
  36 
where residential, retail, and occupation are closely connected via public transportation mirrors 
the rhetoric on agglomeration benefits of the city. Yet, Park Center is not an urban environment 
in the traditional sense and, in fact, the innovation district strategy seeks to create an urban 
environment with the balance of a pastoral environment to appease long-standing and in-coming 
companies that still find that the spacious environment meets their needs and provides them with 
space to grow (personal interview, 2015). 
Unfortunately, during the on-site visits to Park Center and by the time of this writing, the 
development of Park Center was still in early phases. For this case, I rely on interviews with the 
Foundation members and neighboring supporters of the innovation district. However, beyond the 
Frontier, an old IBM building converted into smaller offices and a ground floor open workspace 
(Terry, 2014), there is little to observe in this case site. For this reason, much of my analysis of 
Park Center is based on architectural renderings and images that portray the ambitions for a 
future Park Center. 
 
Conclusion 
The changing landscape of the innovation district presents an ideal object of analysis to 
assess the role the technology and economic development policy nexus play in reconceptualizing 
relationships between urban form, technological innovation, and our daily social life. Anna 
Klingman (2007) writes, architecture is not about where we work and live, but where we imagine 
ourselves to be. If this is indeed the case, speaking with the individuals who are driving the 
development of the innovation district and assessing the discourse around hopes and objectives 
for the innovation district provides rich insight into the societal aspirations of contemporary 
growth machines. 
While the object of analysis is the innovation district, the changes I observe are not solely 
confined to the space of the innovation district. There is a long history of enclosing public land 
for private profit. With the shifting demographics in the urban core of a young, professional, 
educated, and technologically-skilled individual and the ensuing development to accommodate 
their work and living cultural preferences, the reality of growing private citadels becomes 
starker. In the final chapter I document the changing demographics and the rise in real estate 
prices within the spaces of all five innovation districts. As these urban laboratories concentrate 
populations of constantly productive entrepreneurs and a wealthier residential class, difference 
and diversity are slowly displaced. This is problematic for the prospect of innovation from the 
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perspective of the scholars who argue that innovation requires input from a wide variety of 
sources and encounters with different forms of being (Benoit, 2008; Shearmur, 2012; Welz, 
2003). But it is also problematic when the ordering of space is considered from the perspective 
of Foucauldian biopolitics. Following this line of inquiry, I argue in the closing chapter that the 
emergence of innovation districts points to a shifting of risk on to the entrepreneur. The thesis of 
the entrepreneurial turn in relation to the built environment is present in Harvey’s (1989a) work, 
particularly his highly cited piece, “From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The 
transformation in urban governance in late capitalism.” What innovation district strategy 
demonstrates is an overreliance on the entrepreneur to accrue regional benefits. This is a 
continuation of Harvey’s entrepreneurial turn from the state, to an assemblage of actors, to the 
precarious entrepreneur. It is the entrepreneurs who are bearing the burden of an ideology on the 
importance of innovation for regional wealth and the role of the entrepreneur as the catalytic 
actor that stems from a group of individuals representing the state, the public, and the private 
sector. 8 
In all five cases, after the global financial crisis of 2008, entrepreneurs became the central 
focus of innovation district strategies. When large development corporations halted construction 
and firms froze moving considerations, mobile entrepreneurs and their minimal real estate 
requirements proved to be the best candidates to generate some form of economic activity. Much 
like the artists that started the first wave of development in documented studies of gentrification 
                                               
8 The use of the term “precarity” elicits a longer literature on informal workers in the developing countries, care workers—
primarily women, working-class women, and migrant workers for whom work has always been precarious (Kern, 2013; 
McDowell, 2009; McDowell, Batnitzky, & Dyer, 2009). My use of the term “precarity” is in reference to the middle-class 
workers of the tech economy, many of whom string along a series of tasks to make a living. In addition, scholars studying 
creative labor draw the connection between the rise of policy prescriptions that centered the creative worker as part of a state-led 
agenda to dismantle labor disputes and prevent the formation of unions (Gill & Pratt, 2008; McRobbie, 2002; Neilson & Rossiter, 
2008).  
 
This scholarship is useful for my research in that it pinpoints and explains the role of culture as the raw material for contemporary 
production (Lloyd, 2002). However, research on innovation districts differs from this literature in that elements of affect and care 
work are not central to innovation district strategy. In using the term precarity I am signaling the precarious aspect of non-steady 
work. Within the past decade, the term precarity has been increasingly adopted in an attempt to explain effects of contemporary 
capitalism. However, it is important to stress that, as Rossiter and Neilsen (2008) argue, precarity has always been a component 
of the capitalist project. Within the ideology and the rhetoric that stems from it, it is important to disentangle fact from myth. In 
1995, Zukin argued that the flexible workers in the cultural industries without a clear upward trajectory engaged this form of 
labor because “real identity comes from activity outside of the job” (13) Here, Zukin was referring to the willingness of 
individuals to take on these types of positions as it afforded them the opportunity to participate in the culture of the space, a line 
of argument closely associated with Florida’s (2002) economic development prescriptions. 
 
In my reading of the literature, the rise of policies that center the tech-worker are no so much a different strand of study as they 
are a continuation of this earlier literature on precarity. Ultimately, the transition from affect labor, to creative labor, to tech labor 
all point to what Lorey (2015) discusses as a governing logic of insecurity. The state, removed as a provider of welfare and 
support, in addition to the firm that can rely on contract labor instead of paying benefits to permanent employees, benefit from 
the individualized workforce less dependent on the state (McRobbie, 2016). 
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(see for example Lloyd’s (2010) work on the Wicker Park neighborhood of Chicago), this time 
around it was the tech entrepreneurs who moved into the warehouses converted into incubators 
and maker-spaces in Boston, Dublin, and Detroit. In St. Louis and Park Center, where the 
innovation district strategy is primarily dominated by a governing 501c3 foundation, it was a 
post-recession decision to switch the strategy from targeting large companies to concentrating on 
smaller firms. The decision to focus on entrepreneurs and their startup companies translated to 
active marketing strategies, which I document. 
Innovation district strategy served to generate development activity when the economy 
was at a standstill. Supporting my argument on entrepreneurs bearing the burden of risk, as the 
market began to turn and banks started lending out money for development, the focus on 
supporting entrepreneurs shifted to accommodate market logics and the desires of larger firms to 
develop over the parcels of land used by entrepreneurs. In both Boston and Dublin, my strong 
market economies, entrepreneurs can no longer afford to live in the innovation district. In 
Boston, much of the startup activity is relocating to the abandoned buildings that the legal and 
financial firms are leaving behind as they move their offices to the high-end Seaport Innovation 
District, though branding efforts to call it an innovation district have ended (Martin, 2016; 
McMorrow, 2012). In Dublin, the new space for startup activity is in Dublin 8, on the west side 
of town. In addition, the Startup Commissioner position, a position created by Dublin City 
Council in 2014 to create networking and support opportunities for entrepreneurs, was 
eliminated in 2017 (Kennedy, 2018). Detroit, St. Louis, and Park Center continue to focus on 
entrepreneurial activity within the space of the innovation district, but, except for Park Center, 
these are weak market economies that continue to struggle with attracting investment capital. As 
for Park Center, because it remains in young stages of development, there remains plenty of 
space to grow and, thus there is no need at the moment to exclude entrepreneurs from their 
strategy. 
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Chapter 2: Landscapes of Production 
The perpetual quest for process and product innovation is inexorably linked with distinct 
spatial landscapes. My particular fascination with innovation districts is to interrogate underlying 
economic structures in the production of their particular physical form. A landscape survey does 
not reveal actual levels of activity, only the social aspirations we ascribed to them. Yet, 
landscapes do represent the institutionalized production of certain kinds of ideas that 
consequently affect structural change. This is true of today’s innovation district as well as earlier 
landscapes of production.  
It is not possible to fully understand contemporary attempts to create spaces for 
innovation capture without first deconstructing the two most prominent landscapes of production 
that came before: concentrated industrial districts and the decentralized research and corporate 
campuses. This trajectory is based in countries of the advanced capitalist world, namely the 
United States and Europe. There are of course nuanced variations between the transitions and not 
all cities in the United States or Europe fall within such a clean typology. However, these two 
periods of production share enough similar features to develop generalizations to describe their 
spatial geographies.  
My research begins with the industrial districts because the connection between the 
productivity of this time period and its spatial layout features prominently in contemporary 
economic development strategy for innovation districts. In other words, research and policy 
continuously references the positive externalities on innovation as a result of the density, 
diversity, and concentration of the industrial districts of the late 19th and early 20th century and 
it is important to disentangle the reasons why. 
 
Industrial Districts 
The Industrial Revolution of the late-19th century and early-20th century had a 
tremendous impact on the exponential growth of cities located along rail- and water-
transportation nodes (Hall, 1998). These arteries, which connected nodal cities, transported raw 
materials and material goods. Cities experienced considerable population growth with the 
expansion of factories and the demand for cheap unskilled labor. Our collective conscious of 
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how industrial districts looked ranges from the powerful photography of humans operating heavy 
machinery (Seixas, 1987) to the haunting images of working class immigrants famously 
portrayed by Jacob Riis (1890). The cramped living and working conditions of the 
manufacturing era were products of the massive amount of manual labor required to maintain 
factory productivity. Housing the influx of immigrants was challenging and in these densely 
packed industrial cities, labor lived in cramped quarters alongside management and livestock, 
and people resided in close proximity to work (Engels, 1892; Mumford, 1961). 
Industrial capitalism, the main mode of production in western capitalist economies of this 
time period, was marked by individual craft labor (Marx, 1977). This shift in relationship 
between an individual and his means of production and the role of technology in achieving 
additional surplus capital prompted the struggle between the factory worker and the capitalist, 
the capital-labor relation (ibid). Innovations in technology were both in relation to the machinery 
used in the factory space, as well as assembly line production and Taylorist principles of 
scientific management to ensure a productive and compliant workforce (Braverman, 1998; Saval, 
2014; Taylor, 1911).   
This time period is important in marking an era of scholarship where the city and its 
inputs are connected to economic growth—beginning with the work of Alfred Marshall (2007 
[1890]) on attempts to explain agglomeration economies and urban externalities. Marshall 
concentrated on the localization of industry from the economy of production as well as from the 
perspective of the customer. The advantages of proximity, the availability of specialized 
machinery, the skill and tacit knowledge spillovers, the flow of ideas, the availability of skilled 
labor, and the growth of subsidiary trades were the factors that contributed to agglomerations. 
These elements, Marshall theorized, led to industry remaining in one place for a long time (ibid., 
p 225). Disadvantages, such as a single-industry focus that over-exerts availably labor and can 
depress a region if raw materials deplete or lack of demand are best countered in places were 
supplementary industries cluster and there is a presence of diverse industries (ibid., 226). 
Marshall attributes the localization of skilled artisans to the will of customers willing to travel for 
expensive and choice objects, as opposed to shops that provide ordinary domestic needs that do 
not need to congregate in one location (ibid., 227). What Marshall witnessed from his research in 
Manchester, Leeds, Lyons, London, Paris, Philadelphia was that the clustering of industry, 
customers, and skilled artisans also meant the growth of government, education, cultural 
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industries, health services, and the service class (ibid., 230). These concentrations lent a 
competitive advantage to the cities where they were located.9  
The Industrial Revolution helped economic developers and policy makers understand the 
importance of attracting an industrial base to the city for generating wealth. Incentive packages 
to lure manufacturing firms into respective jurisdictions became an integral part of the bidding 
process. These “smoke stack chasing” developers focused on firm location decisions, such as 
access to transportation, site improvements, subsidies for land acquisition and building costs, 
property tax abatements, regulatory, permit, and environmental rules and regulations, recruitment 
and attraction of facilities and firms (Porter, 1990). 
 
Science and Research Parks 
The rise of suburban corporate estates and science and research parks marks the second 
era of productive landscapes. As a visual descriptor, this was the era of what Louise Mozingo 
calls “pastoral capitalism” (2011). Following WWII, cities underwent significant structural 
changes. The rise of suburbia, the affordability of automobiles, the GI Bill, the Highway Act, as 
well as urban tensions, racism, and the breaking up of union activity all contributed to urban 
decentralization. The most distinguishing features of the post-WWII spaces designed for 
innovation activity were central open manicured space, low-rise buildings, and large spaces for 
parking (ibid). This holds true for corporate estates and science and research parks.10 
The corporate campus was modeled after the American university campus (ibid). Central 
open space surrounded by laboratory buildings and administrative offices built as separate 
entities connected to research facilities through landscaped pathways. Highways adjacent to 
these complexes provided not only easy access to employees, but also served to prominently and 
proudly display the campus. Evidence of industrial infrastructure necessary for efficiency and 
productivity was strategically kept out of sight of highway view, usually relegated to the back of 
the buildings, or underground if possible. 
                                               
9 Additional scholars expanded and continue to expand on Marshall’s theories. For example, the Italian variant of Marshall’s 
industrial district based on the successful expansion of mature industries in the Emilio-Romagna region (Dawkins, 2003; 
Markusen, 1996; Piore & Sabel, 1984). The difference between Marshall and the Italian variant is that the Italian version 
incorporates social networks as necessary factors of any analysis (He & Fallah, 2011). Markusen (1996) sought to address the 
deficiencies of the Italian model for a U.S. context. The focus of her models was to understand how a dominant state or global 
corporation anchor institution results in creating “sticky” environments that glue small firms to their locale. Markusen’s models 
work in the context not only of the US, but also in describing the concentration of activity outside of an industrial district. 
 
10 Though Marshall (2007 [1890]) discussed factories relocating to the outskirts of large towns on account of cheaper land rents, 
this was a phenomenon more prominent during the period of city decentralization (p. 226). 
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By the early 1950s, corporate estates built on 200 acres or more were the suburban 
alternative to urban skyscrapers (ibid). The typical corporate estate featured the same layout as 
the corporate park but extended over larger swaths of land. These complexes were not as 
welcoming as their corporate park counterparts. Long winding driveways lined by greenery 
ended in gated entrances. Landscaping strategically obscured the campuses from the general 
public but was also used to conceal parking structures necessary to house hundreds of 
employees. 
What distinguished the science and research park from the corporate estate was the 
presence of more than one corporation and the anchor of a research university (O’Mara, 2005). 
Roots of the first science and research park are evident prior to WWII, but the first actual science 
and research campus was the Stanford Industrial Park, built in 1951 in Palo Alto California with 
Stanford University as its landowner and anchor (O’Mara, 2005; Saxenian, 1996). Almost a 
decade later, a group of individuals in North Carolina organized themselves as a non-profit and 
opened up the North Carolina Research Triangle Park to attract research and development 
(R&D) and boost their southern economy, with the help of area universities. 
Pastoral capitalism also describes an important element about the mode of production 
during this time period. Whereas the manufacturing era was primarily fueled by the production 
of goods, knowledge production as the dominant economic development paradigm started to be 
the main focus (Castells, 1992; Krugman, 1991; Piore & Sabel, 1984). Scholars have termed this 
paradigmatic shift in production by various terms such as cognitive-cultural capitalism (A. J. 
Scott, 2014), cognitive capitalism (Boutang, 2011), creative economy (Florida, 2002; Markusen 
& Schrock, 2006), and knowledge economy (Etkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997). The transition 
from industrial capitalism to the focus on knowledge production, does not mean that goods are 
no longer produced, but that it becomes more cost effective to offshore manufacturing processes 
and to focus on harnessing knowledge production (Moretti, 2013).11 
Automobiles, airplanes, shipping containers, and the transport lines on which these 
modes travel expanded the geographic range of industrial activity. Suppliers and other entities 
are located on the outer periphery and connected to a central “hub” through ‘wheel spokes’ could 
exist once the rural frontier was accessible for development (Markusen, 1996). Or, the Satellite 
                                               
11 However, there are growing debates on the decline of material products and increased financial and regulatory tools that 
succeed in capturing rents despite the production of goods (see for example Birch, 1990, 2017). The rise of platforms also 
challenges traditional understandings on the production of goods (see for example Boutang, 2011; Langley & Leyshon, 2017), 
though the machinery used to create platforms are still tangible products. 
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Platform District model, which is a heterogeneous collection of branch locations with corporate 
R&D headquarters located in different locations, can exist because of advances in methods of 
communication where non-proximate headquarters can maintain close communication ties with 
branch locations (ibid). The distance between headquarters and satellite entities demanded new 
forms of command and control. The managerial capacities of the firm expanded, teams of 
salaried employees were tasked with executive decisions, growing the bureaucratic arm of the 
firm. This period of managerial capitalism prevailed for much of the 20th century (Chandler, 
1977, 1984; Mozingo, 2011)  
 
Debates on agglomeration economies within economic geography 
Theories of cluster dynamics backed by empirical examples of spatial layouts informed 
scholarship on the inputs of agglomeration economies (Asheim, Boschma, & Cooke, 2011; 
Saxenian, 1996). The focus of much of this literature is on determining where, why, and how 
certain regions witness concentration of economic and activity (Dawkins, 2003). For many 
decades, economists and geographers dominated the field. Increasingly, other disciplines 
engaged the discussion resulting in an ever-growing body of work incorporating a wide variety 
of methodologies to understand the anchoring and concentration of certain activities. 
The lack of definitional clarity on what constitutes as innovative complicates a simple 
taxonomy of which concentrations classify as innovative and which do not. One critical question 
to ask is what the role of innovation in the production of goods and services versus the 
production of knowledge (Malecki, 2010). If the definition of innovation is not solely based on 
product development but also on knowledge production, what types of knowledge processes are 
considered innovative? The traditional linear view of innovation, (i.e., the transition from basic 
research, to applied research, to development, to production) implies that tech progresses only in 
a linear fashion (Godin, 2006; Kline, 1985; Massey, Quintas, & Wield, 1992). Therefore, the 
final outcome, as measured by patents for example, is the only part of the chain that is valued. 
This negates other measures of innovation such as tacit knowledge, for example, which is central 
to innovation learning process (Malecki, 2010). The linear model, a model that centered research 
and development on the university or laboratory is no longer applicable in an era where research 
and development take place within dispersed networks. From this emerges the need for new 
forms of acquiring, transmitting, and transforming knowledge (ibid). 
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The interjection of the creative industries as part of the innovative sector further 
complicates the definition. By all means, creative activity can foster higher rates of creativity and 
innovation (Scott, 2000) but what parts of the creative industry should be considered innovative? 
One way to answer this question is to consider the various terms used by scholars to describe the 
current economy and to see what sectors they included in their definition. For example, Florida’s 
(2002) Creative Class index measures the concentration of scientists, engineers, professors, and 
think thank employees. Scott’s (A. J. Scott, 2006; Storper & Scott, 2009) cognitive cultural 
economy includes high-tech, neo-artisanal manufacturing, business and finance, and cultural-
products industries. Moretti’s (2013) innovation sector includes clean technology, information 
technology, software, Internet services, life sciences, new materials such as nanotechnology, 
digital entertainment, parts of finance and marketing. The increased focus on the creative 
industries, especially the merge between creative industries and science and technology 
industries forces a reconsideration of what constitutes an innovative sector.  
Deciding which sectors are considered innovative is the first step, the second step is 
determining how to measure their output. This is a challenging endeavor. Regional science has a 
long history of tracking the role of science and technology industries because these sectors have 
a proven record of driving long term growth (Spencer, 2015). Patents, patent citations, and 
business starts are common indicators measured. Despite the healthy debate that exists on 
measuring activity in these sectors (see for example Malecki, 2010; O hUallacháin, 2012), 
methods for measuring science and high-tech activity are somewhat established and 
standardized. The increased focus on the creative industries, especially the merge between 
creative industries and science and technology industries poses new challenges. For one, the 
creative industries rarely rely on patents and patent citations (Lee & Rodríguez-Pose, 2014; 
Miles & Green, 2008). Secondly, the creative industries rely on different forms of knowledge 
and transfer knowledge differently than the science and technology sectors (Drake, 2003; 
Malecki, 2010).  
Setting aside the differences between the sectors, innovation is also measured through a 
region’s resiliency, that is, the ability to respond to rapid transitions in technologies, exogenous 
economic shocks, and market fluctuations (J. Clark, Huang, & Walsh, 2010; Markusen, 1996). 
Empirical data point to the resiliency advantages of a variety of innovative small firms over large 
dominant firms. Marshall (1890) correctly identified the presence of small firms as a positive 
externality for regional competitiveness. The presence of small firms is considered by some an 
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indicator of innovation because small firms represent the creation of new ideas, developments, 
and entrepreneurial spin-offs (Jacobs, 1969). However, this does not mean that large firms 
should not be considered innovative or that the presence of large firms indicates lack of 
innovative activity in a region. Whereas some argue that large firms squelch diversity, cause 
repetition, and result in lesser probability of entrepreneurial offspring into similar or non-related 
sectors (ibid), others see them as advantageous to innovative growth in the service sector 
(Moretti, 2013). 
The above discussion serves to highlight the complication in defining innovation and in 
measuring its activity. It remains an important area of research because innovation is recognized 
as fundamental to our economic growth. As innovation demonstrates the tendency to concentrate 
(i.e., it is not evenly distributed across the landscape) (Malecki, 2010), this has spatial 
implications. The purpose of creating a taxonomy is to have a tidy framework to assess the 
economic capacities of each model. However, the complication is that firms within clusters 
mature (or fail to thrive) and shift from one taxonomy to another. In a study of 15 high-tech real 
world clusters, He and Fallah (2011) find that clusters rarely feature any single type of typology. 
One reason is that clusters mature and/or decline over time causing them to shift from one 
typology category to another. Too, the make-up of local economies plays a larger role than the 
scale of agglomeration (Lee & Rodríguez-Pose, 2014; Rodríguez-Pose, 1999). Existing or 
institutionalized webs of social relations and business networks that cross cut at different scales 
and reach are an important necessary for entrepreneurial activity to occur (Boschma, 2005; 
Phillips & Wai-chung Yeung, 2003; Saxenian, 1996). 
The role of proximity and constant interaction, though important for branding the 
innovation district, might be less important in relation to innovative output. This line of argument 
parallels the economic geography literature on the importance of clusters. Cluster thinking's 
genesis comes from a critical school of urban and regional economic geography, for example, 
Allen Scott (1988), Susan Christopherson and Michael Storper (1986) (both Scott and Storper 
cited in Gibson & Brennan-Horley, 2016). These scholars were interested in innovation and 
cultural/creative industries. They wanted to capture analytic insights of the post-Fordist era of 
flexible accumulation and the emergence of new spatial configurations of production not in the 
fading rust belt cities.  
Scott recognized that innovation was unstable and unpredictable and continually evolving 
and that frequent access to a large variety of skills was paramount to and encouraged 
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agglomeration. Face-to-face interaction and issues of proximity were of critical importance. 
These factors were discussed early on by Alfred Marshall, but were later studied in greater detail 
by French economists (Ferru & Rallet, 2016). Highly cited work in this vein is also the work of 
Venables and Storper (Storper & Venables, 2004). The benefits of clustering vary depending on 
the types of knowledge producers and recipients. Distance need not only be measured in physical 
proximity. Two firms in close physical proximity may see diminishing benefits in proximity as 
they mature or the industry life cycle progresses (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996). 
Gibson and Brennan-Horley (2016) argue that the work of the critical scholars was later 
co-opted in an unintentional way by neoliberal policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see 
Gibson & Klocker, 2004 for a more in-depth critique). Michael Porter and Richard Florida were 
amongst those that pushed the benefits of clustering and agglomeration and profited from it, and 
these were shorn of much of their political grounding (Gibson & Brennan-Horley, 2016). The 
focus was more on market forces and urban construction to generate economic activity. 
Furthermore, cluster theory promotes an urban bias. This is a problem of the empirical 
work that favors research in the city, but it is not the case that clustering does not exist outside of 
the city. Innovation also occurs in peripheral regions (Shearmur, 2015). Based on work in 
Darwin, Australia Gibson and Brennan-Horley (2016) empirically demonstrate that activity did 
not simply cluster in the inner-city and that the suburbs were not merely dormitories for the 
inner-city workers, but that mobility to the suburbs and beyond is vital to the functioning of the 
innovation economy. Within the same study, empirical work in El Paso, Texas demonstrates the 
global value chain of a local boot making industry. Acquisition of leather, marketing online or 
in-person, expanding new markets all demonstrate an historical embeddedness forged earlier 
during the mass manufacturing era. This, to them, demonstrates the importance of the imprint of 
history in shaping a contemporary concentration of firms than the need to locate in close 
proximity for subcontracting or networking purposes (ibid; pg 251). This resonates with Massey 
(1995) on the importance of understanding the contemporary dynamics and how they intersect 
with uneven geographies of growth and decline from earlier eras. The point is not to fully 
discredit theories of cluster dynamics. Existing empirical work demonstrates that clustering 
dynamics are at work. However, it is important to broaden the discussion to prevent factors 
sometimes overlooked in the rush to embrace simplistic urban development policies (Shearmur, 
2015). 
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Economic development policies 
In terms of shifting economic development policies, it was not until the 1980s, when the 
successes of the abovementioned efforts were taking effect, that economic developers recognized 
the role of science and the importance of universities as anchors (Plosila, 2004). Gradually, 
economic developers started to include access to talent, higher education, and the building of 
entrepreneurial cultures into their incentive packages. This was also the time period where the 
role of the state was significant in bridging science and technology efforts with state economic 
development. In accordance, states created new agencies to house advisors in science and 
technology or to institute an advisory board and a state science and engineering foundation. 
Even the architecture of the post-WWII laboratory reveals that the suburbanization of 
science created new ways of conceptualizing knowledge (Rankin, 2010). The role of the scientist 
transitioned from an individual capable of producing pure knowledge to an individual charged 
with knowledge production. The spatial layout of the laboratory, one that allowed for autonomy 
yet always under the auspices of a managing body, was purposely structured to capture profit. At 
the same time, corporate managers recognized capitalism’s dependence on the productive 
capabilities of the individual. In other words, corporate managers did not want to stamp out 
individuality and were cognizant of this in their design decision. The architecture of the suburban 
laboratory and its campus had to create new spatial geographies that were different from the 
university and different from the factory. The suburban campus demonstrated that traditional 
planning knowledge had to be discarded to allow new innovative forms of design to emerge. 
Whereas the corporate campuses and early science and research parks were spaces 
designed only for firms and research institutions, residential and commercial amenities (both as 
stand-alone restaurants and evening retreats and as the access to food and services) were not 
incorporated. Landscape amenities such as playfields, allotment gardens, parks with pavilions 
and clubhouses were used to for aesthetic and recreational purposes as well as to attract 
employees and reduce labor turnover. These were included primarily to quell employee 
dissatisfaction and keep disputes down to a minimum (Mozingo, 2011; Rankin, 2010). Adopting 
the narrative that residential, commercial, and entertainment amenities are necessary in order to 
attract and retain talent, are part of a more recent phenomenon entangled with today’s innovation 
district. In comparison with how design is used in today’s landscapes of production, the design 
of the industrial districts of this era was more a product of the economic activity than of active 
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design efforts (Biddulph, 2011; Gospodini, 2002; Knox, 2011). But the outcome for informing 
design prescriptions is relevant in innovation district strategy. 
 
Global Capitalism 
More contemporary scholarship, still within economic geography, but increasingly in the 
field of sociology and organizational studies, is grappling to understand the new mobile 
workforce and changes to firm dynamics due to increases in ICTs (Davis, 2016; Mazmanian et 
al., 2013). The onset of globalization brought about changes occurring at the global level. The 
mobility of capital elevated the question on the role of place. A key debate on the role of place 
surged in the 1980s and early 1990s with the introduction of Computer Mediated Networks 
(Pratt, 2002) and Virtual Communities (Doheny-Farina, 1996; Rheingold, 1993). These new 
technologies removed the spatial constraints on individuals and networks, meaning that larger 
swaths of territories were accessible in near, or real-time communications, removing the need for 
face-to-face meetings. New work arrangements such as ‘tele-cottaging’ (Toffler, 1984) and 
virtual organizations (Castells, 1996) were postulated to replace the need for people in the 
workplace, or even the need for many people together in one place at one time. From the 
perspective of the firm, Amin and Thrift (2002) argued that cities no longer competed against 
each other, but that footloose firms competed with each other. This was yet another reason for 
local competition as place bound to be rendered obsolete. 
However, scholars such as Sassen (2001) and Friedman (1986) demonstrated that though 
ICTs did indeed cause a decentering of the local, certain cities in the global system emerged as 
control nodes. In these ‘global cities,’ New York, London, and Tokyo in Sassen’s view, are 
crucial for the production of knowledge. The global city is a strategic site where multiple global, 
highly specialized information loops intersect and produce a dense, thick, “enabling 
environment” for the production of higher order information. This leads to a growing demand for 
professional talent. Because of the diversity of people in the city and concentrated pockets of 
continuous wealth, global cities have niche markets, which open up opportunities for 
entrepreneurship. Infrastructurally, cities provide the service inputs required of companies and 
individuals. These also become increasingly specialized. Cities were also spaces for the influx of 
both high and low skilled immigrants who provide the necessary labor for economic growth (A. 
J. Scott, Agnew, Soja, & Storper, 2001). Furthermore, scholars such as Venables and Storper 
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(2004) quantitatively demonstrated the continued importance of face-to-face communication for 
building trust, screening people, and rapid communications. 
Cultural shifts were also occurring. People disenfranchised with the homogeneity of 
suburban living and enticed by the lure of the city returned. Of course, many factors influenced 
and facilitated these decisions. The city’s entrepreneurial approach to urban growth opened the 
door for city actors to embrace place marketing as a way to break away from associations of an 
industrial past (Eisenschitz, 2010; S. Ward, 1998). Transitioning the primary mode of economic 
development to the suburbs brought about a set of challenges different from the unsanitary 
conditions and backbreaking work of industrial districts. The decentralization of cities devastated 
the fabric of inner cities and destroyed much of the American hinterlands, while accommodating 
the needs of the Anglo-American bourgeoisie (Fishman, 1987). White-flight, drops in 
employment figures, shortages of municipal services, were all examples of the overall 
disinvestment and neglect of the once economically vibrant urban sphere. As local governments 
looked to create pro-business friendly environments, it became necessary to portray an image of 
a city as tame, sanitary, and welcoming as opposed to a pro-union, working class, city of grit. 
The design of the post-industrial city relied increasingly on culture as a driver of economic 
development to attract tourists and investment capital. The city began to resemble what scholars 
have tried to capture through terms such as fantasy city (Hannigan, 1998), and city of leisure 
(Mommaas, 2004), city as entertainment machine (Lloyd & Clark, 2001), or have also tried to 
illuminate through processes such as the conversion of factory spaces to lofts (Zukin, 1989), 
waterfront development (Harvey, 1989a; S. Ward, 1998), and “Disneyfication,” or themed 
development (Zukin, 1993). 
City leaders strategizing how to attract people back to the cities through branding 
mechanisms demonstrates a shift from the focus on attracting firms to a focus on attracting 
people. Though scholars were already discussing the importance of attracting young, skilled, and 
educated individuals to the city, it was Richard Florida’s (2002) work on the creative class that 
popularized the idea and influenced a myriad of policy prescriptions. Using a wide variety of 
indexes [such as, explain further], Florida argued that cities exemplifying the three T’s 
(technology, tolerance, and talent) were the most likely to succeed as vortexes for fresh talent. 
Florida’s work triggered the response to a focus on attracting talent rather than attracting firms, 
increasing the focus on a new way for cities to differentiate themselves. One option was focusing 
on the creation of spaces of consumption. A second was to focus on spaces of production (Turok, 
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2009). Latching on to the idea of creating a competitive advantage by creating spaces of 
production meant focusing on attracting talent. Placed with the emphasis on science and 
technology policy, cities increasingly adapted government reports and policy statements to 
reflect strategies incorporating higher levels of innovation, more investment in science and 
technology, R&D, university connections and student graduates in science, technology, and 
mathematics, in addition to a flexible business environment (ibid). 
Today, the consequences on the sub-national level range from ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 
2012) to an intensification and expansion of inter-urban competitive logics. Spaces of exception 
–special economic zones, strategic development zones, and incentivized tax structures designed 
to attract FDI –are manifestations of such competition (Bach, 2011; Easterling, 2014). These 
zones follow replicable global formulas for policy and infrastructure. “Spatial softwares” of free 
trade and special economic zones, global technology parks, and other similar campuses of global 
commerce, are designed as sociotechnical regimes, which prioritize free and unrestricted flow 
and operation of capital. In line with methodically competitive agendas, these high-tech, capital-
intensive, low-tax enclaves are sites of exalted financial and economic activity. Aligned with 
grandiose architecture, zones are not just collecting stations of global capital and not just areas of 
good employment prospects, they also represent symbolical spaces where innovation and ideas 
presumably lay the tracks for future development.  
Mobile policies circulate the globe (see for example, McCann, 2011), particularly today 
in relation to economic and smart cities development (Cook, 2008; Crivello, 2015; K. Ward, 
2017; Wiig, 2015). The digital economy is an expansion of the cultural industries, they are part 
of a process of economic experimentation with extracting value out of knowledge, culture, and 
affect (Terranova, 2000). The focus on the tech sector emphasizes the work component in the 
live-work-play configuration securing a continuous cycle of productivity through the creation of 
seamlessly integrated environments (Stehlin, 2016). The literature on smart cities and urban 
laboratories demonstrates what Lauermann (2016) discusses in relation to advanced forms of 
entrepreneurial urbanism through the creation of spaces for experimentation. As digital labor 
increases and sophistications in information and communication technologies shifts work away 
from the firm in unbounded capacities, public spaces become sites of immaterial production, the 
type more closely aligned with Boston’s Seaport Innovation District and Toronto’s recently 
announced collaboration with Sidewalk Labs, a sister firm of Google. Latching on to the idea of 
creating a competitive advantage by creating spaces of production engenders a talent-attraction 
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focus (Turok, 2009). Florida’s (2002) popularized prescriptions for attracting a creative class, 
through what has largely amounted to a focus on placemaking, are evident in cities across the 
globe (see for example Van Winden, 2014; Yigitcanlar & Bulu, 2015; Zimmerman, 2008), as are 
efforts to adapt government reports and policy statements to incorporate higher levels of 
innovation, more investment in science and technology, R&D, and university connections within 
a flexible business environment. 
A bi-product of the second industrial divide resulted in the move of headquarters away 
from the city center to urban peripheries. In the wake of this massive shift of people, production, 
and financial resources were the cities that left behind. The convergence of a few factors brought 
renewed focus on the city. The first was the many efforts of local leaders seeking strategies to 
revitalize communities. The second was a similar attitude, but at the state or federal level with 
policy interventions to attract investment back into the city. The 1950s, for example, saw the 
creation of place-based financial deregulatory tools for urban revitalization starting with Tax 
Increment Finance (Briffault, 2014; Dye & Merriman, 2006) and moving on to federal programs 
such as empowerment zones and enterprise communities (Boyle & Eisinger, 2001; Hall, 1982). 
These economic development tools were created to bring development to underperforming 
neighborhoods. Or, at the very least, to signal to the private market that targeted the government 
supported development in these areas, often through tax and business incentive packages. These 
policies shaped a neoliberal approach to urban development defined in economic development 
by private sector growth, low taxes, heavy subsidies, low expenditures (see for example 
Hackworth, 2007). Within the urban sphere, the rise of economic productivity focused less on 
the manufacturing industries and more entrepreneurial management (Harvey, 1989a). It is 
against this backdrop that innovation district strategy emerged. 
  52 
Chapter 3: Brookings Institution’s Innovation District Definition 
It is important to recognize that a fixed definition for what an innovation district is does 
not exist. This is because different cities and regions will have different goals and outcomes. 
Still, the concept, popularized by Bruce Katz and supporters of the strategy (Katz & Bradley, 
2013, Katz & Wagner, 2014, Storring & Walker, 2016), does have some fuzzy contours that can 
be described.  
Research and policy prescriptions on innovation districts, using Barcelona’s 22@bcn 
innovation district and Boston’s Seaport Innovation District as a model, began at the Brookings 
Institution under the direction of Bruce Katz. Katz first mentioned the concept of an innovation 
district in his book, The Metropolitan Revolution (Katz & Bradley, 2013), though it was his co-
written report with Jennifer Wagner, The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New Geography of 
Innovation (Katz & Wagner, 2014), that catalyzed the spread of the concept. Due to its wide-
reaching success, in 2015 the Brookings Institution and the Project for Public Places partnered to 
create a dedicated research arm for the study of innovation districts: the Anne T. and Robert M. 
Bass Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking (“Brookings announce the Anne T. and Robert 
M. Bassa Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking,” 2015) In addition, the Bass Initiative is also 
working closely with the Center for London, the only think tank in London, through the 
Transatlantic Innovation Districts Partnership. The aim is to spread the concept in London and 
across Europe (“Innovation Districts Homepage,” 2018). 
It is helpful to quote at length Brooking’s full description of innovation districts and its 
strategy on their homepage (“Innovation Districts Homepage,” 2018): 
 
As part of the Bass Initiative, Brookings continues its work on innovation 
districts, dense enclaves that merge the innovation and employment potential of 
research-oriented anchor institutions, high-growth firms, and tech and creative 
start-ups in well-designed, amenity-rich residential and commercial environments. 
 
Innovation districts facilitate the creation and commercialization of new ideas and 
support metropolitan economies by growing jobs in ways that leverage their 
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distinct economic attributes. These districts build on and revalue the intrinsic 
qualities of cities: proximity, density, authenticity, and vibrant places. Given the 
proximity of many districts to low-income neighborhoods and the large number of 
sub-baccalaureate jobs many provide, their intentional development can be a tool 
to help connect disadvantaged populations to employment and educational 
opportunities. 
 
I group the Brookings Institution’s definition of innovation districts and the strategy for their 
development in the following categories: 
 
1. Cultural preferences toward the built and social environment  
2. Increased concentration around university and hospital research centers and anchors 
3. Collaborative, cross-sector, high-tech, open nature of innovation 
4. Economic development strategy focused on startups and entrepreneurship 
5. Focus on design and place 
6. Focus on growth 
7. Existence of disadvantaged populations in the city 
 
This categorization is based on Katz and his colleagues’ perspective on emergent trends. In 
the next chapter, through the use of empirical examples I will discuss elements omitted from 
Katz’s perspective. For now, I will contextualize, and critically comment, on Katz’s 
prescriptions. 
 
1. Cultural preferences toward the built and social environment 
Cultural trends altering the location preferences of people and firms play a central role in 
the emergence of innovation districts (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005; Barber, 2013; Moretti, 2013; 
Storper, 2013). Cultural trends and demographic shifts, particularly the shrinking household size 
that Fishman (2000) predicted would revitalize the city, resultant from people delaying marriage 
and starting a family, families having fewer children, and a rejection of the mundanity and 
homogeneity of the suburbs in search of more ‘authentic’ living experiences contributes to the 
rise of younger, educated, tech-savvy knowledge workers relocating to the city. As part of the 
‘authentic’ urban experience, these individuals are also opting to abandon their reliance on the 
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automobile and traverse the city using public transportation (The National Academies Press, 
2004). Scholars back compact living as a benefit to the environment and thus position the 
resurgence of the city through developments such as innovation districts as environmentally 
friendly (Kenworthy, 2006). That cities, or at least particular locations within cities, are growing 
in popularity among knowledge workers does translate to a focus on promoting the city as the 
prime location for development. Changing cultural preferences also explain why office parks are 
now revamping their obsolete models to incorporate urban-like amenities that cater to knowledge 
workers (Spivack, 2017). 
The factors listed above demonstrate choices people make to suite their cultural 
preferences. They are, to use Tiebout’s (1956) phrasing for households making residential 
choices based on public services, “voting with their feet”. However, it is also possible to explain 
these trends from a less positive perspective, such as the inability to afford a car that would allow 
one to commute from the suburbs, the lack of investment in regional transit forcing people to 
locate closer to the jobs moving into the urban sphere, and a recession that might force cash-
strapped young families to remain in the city (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005; Peck, 2005). In other 
words, it may be less that the emergence of innovation district is capturing changes in cultural 
preferences, and more that individuals are limited in their choices. 
 
2. Increased concentration around university and hospital research centers and anchors 
Katz’s innovation district strategy builds off of the claim that cities in western capital 
economies are seeing increased clustering around universities, medical centers, and anchors. The 
population growth around these anchors correlates with the resurgence of knowledge workers in 
the city. In other words, increased clustering around sectors might simply be a by-product of 
increased population in cities.  
More importantly, clustering around these anchor institutions is not a new trend. In the 
1980s, after recognizing the benefits of clustered geographies such as the Research Triangle 
Park, Silicon Valley, and Route 128, economic developers adopted strategies promoting 
clustering around research centers such as universities and hospitals with a research arm as a way 
for the market to absorb potential market spillovers (Feldman, 1984; Feldman & Bercovitz, 
2006; Plosila, 2004). Clustering around universities as a way to absorb spillovers was further 
incentivized by the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2001; 
Shane, 2004). The Bayh-Dole Act, a US policy initiative with facilitates the transfer of 
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knowledge from the university to the private sector through patent rights, contributed to the rise 
of entrepreneurial activity and the emergence of smaller R&D companies. Growth around these 
areas can be attributed to economic development policies that focused on clustering growth in 
close proximity to these spaces. What the emergence of innovation district strategy does point to 
are more elaborate and collaborative forms of engagement and entrepreneurial governance 
(Harvey, 1989a). Universities, the private sector, the public sector, foundations, and the civic 
realm are working together to drive the growth direction of the city.  
 
3. Collaborative, cross-sector, high-tech, open nature of innovation 
The previous Cold War era that marked the rise of landscape buffers between the science 
and technology firms contributed to a silo-like mentality. Cultural variations, particularly 
between Rout 128 and Silicon Valley also demonstrated the relevance in a regional culture 
shaping business organization (Saxenian, 1996). As the west coast model took over, other locals 
worked to adopt the Silicon Valley mindset and move away from the strict hierarchical model of 
the Route 128 or the siloed model of Research Triangle Park. 
Sophistications in technology have diminished the need for large building footprints to 
house oversized computers (Saval, 2014; Stringer & Ostafi, 2013). In addition, the affordability 
of laptop computers allows a larger contingent of individuals to own the means to access the 
market and in any location. Innovative firms and talent workers seek to congregate to share ideas 
and practice “open innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003). Open innovation fosters the ability for 
companies want to interact with researchers, inventors, entrepreneurs, and other firms to define 
new products and identify new markets. It also creates opportunities for entrepreneurs benefit 
from pooled resources. 
Despite Chesborough’s (2003) insights on the growth open innovation as a contemporary 
phenomenon, open innovation is not new. Open innovation was practiced even in the secluded 
science and research parks (Turner, 2006). This history is not as prevalent. More prevalent are 
the stories of cloistered workers separated from other companies. There is truth to this, for 
example, in the zoning codes of the RTP, at the same time, we must also question to what extent 
the zoning codes were used to increase the land mass of the companies in the RTP as a way to 
attract more workers. 
Open must also be deconstructed in terms of intellectual property regulations. How are 
these changing with these new environments? Are firms also willing to be open with their IP or 
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is there still a proprietary element that is not discussed in the narrative. Take for example the 
large tech campuses such as Google and Facebook. Though they champion the concept of open 
innovation through the removal of cubicles and the flattening of the hierarchical structure, their 
new campus are heavily protected and surveilled as are their employees (Lange, 2012). Thus, 
open extends only as far as their campus walls. When supporters of innovation districts talk 
about ‘open’ they refrain from interpreting the need for open collaboration by precarious 
employees who are dependent on a network to string along a series of gigs. Finally, there are the 
rhetorical elements espoused by growth coalitions to support the development of innovation 
districts. It behooves individuals to claim that innovation today is cross-sector, high-tech, and 
collaborative because it provides the rational for compact development. Particularly in the urban-
based innovation districts with restricted development boundaries, adopting a strategy that 
ensures the cramming of people and firms can help increase the rent profit margin. It is also 
necessary to question how open can be translated to profit making, particularly in relation to 
smart city infrastructure and the ability to create a repository of all human transactions within the 
space of the innovation district. What happens to any right for privacy? 
While it may be true that companies want to interact with individuals and firms of the 
knowledge economy to define new products and identify new markets, this does not necessarily 
hold constant to the other anchors, such as the research hospital or the university. There may be 
branches within these institutions created purposely to focus on research spillovers, but that does 
not mean the entire university and hospital faculty and administrators agree with the direction of 
the entrepreneurial management. Rather, as I discuss later, there is an active state ideology 
pushing universities and hospitals in this direction. 
From the perspective of the benefits derived by the entrepreneurs from the strategy, as 
these individuals are not centralized and organized under umbrellas that provide skills and 
training, they must seek these resources elsewhere. This has created an avenue for the growth of 
accelerators and incubators (see for example Gandini, 2015; Mian, Lamine, & Fayolle, 2016; 
Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, & Van Hove, 2016; Phan, Siegel, & Wright, 2005). These places 
charge entrepreneurs rent for the exchange of a working space and access to their services. 
Another form of collaborative exchange that explains why innovation is deemed collaborative 
and cross-sector is explained through the rise of the open source movement, which allowed 
computer programmers to informally exchange information (DiBona & Ockman, 1999; Levy, 
2001). 
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Leaps in innovation continue to transition the primary mode of production away from a 
heavy manufacturing economy. Light manufacturing has increased in popularity and there are 
signs of growing maker movements (Dougherty, 2012; van Holm, 2017). However, the 
equipment for light industrial remains expensive for individuals to purchase. Places like 
TechShop, which uses a gym-membership model for access to tech equipment, have grown in 
popularity. The creation of large spaces housing light manufacturing equipment points to the 
clustering of an activity and feed into the narrative that innovation is collaborative and cross-
sector. 
 
4. Economic development strategy focused on startups and entrepreneurship 
The Brookings Institution sees the strategy as an economic benefit based on their claim 
that young, high-growth firms represent the lion’s share of new jobs within cities. This fact needs 
to be put into a much larger context in order to understand how to problematize it. The 
organization of the firm is undergoing changes. More work increases outside of firm walls. By 
2050, more than 50% of the workforce will be contractual labor (Upwork & Union, 2017). 
Importantly, too, it is necessary to consider what this fact means. Does each transaction count 
towards a job? Are the jobs construction workers are taking as they rebuild the new landscape of 
the city considered in this statistic? What is the time-span of these companies? Are they able to 
scale and ‘graduate’ or is it more likely that they fail and take down every newly created job with 
them? Is this statistic accurate because young high-growth firms are increasingly locating in the 
urban sphere meaning that the loss of jobs in older firms is on account of those opportunities 
being pushed out of the urban sphere? 
 
5. Focus on design and place 
The definition of innovation districts does not specify the need for an urban environment, 
only the intrinsic qualities of cities. These are proximity, density, authenticity, and vibrancy and 
come about through a reliance on a physical realm that strengthens proximity and knowledge 
spillovers (Katz & Wagner, 2014). These positively spun urban characteristics are said to help 
the commercialization of ideas and creation and expansion of firms and jobs due to the 
collaboration that emerges from proximity. This same proximity presents denser residential and 
employment patterns. 
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The goal of the innovation district is to create a convergence between the economic, 
place, and human capital assets within a bounded space. Design is used to encourage face-to-face 
collaboration and ideation and to attract the firms and talent of the knowledge economy. Density 
and proximity, as discussed above, are seen as necessary for companies to interact with the new 
innovation ecosystem. Leadership and ‘lighter, cheaper, quicker’ programming of space are key 
elements to drive the success of the innovation district. On the whole, this strategy is seen as a 
way to support the evolution of the region by fostering job creation, economic opportunities, and 
revitalizing communities. 
The key asset in the economic, place, and human capital equation is ‘place.’ Economic 
development strategies previously considered these three assets, although not always in concert 
with each other. For example, the role of the economic and human capital received attention in 
the 1950s, beginning with principle models such as Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Research 
Triangle Park, with the growth of research and development and the importance of university 
connections, incubators, and entrepreneurial supports. Richard Florida’s (2002) prescriptions 
were hugely influential in the connection between place and human capital. The economic assets, 
in the case of Florida, were a positive spillover that occurred if the correct amenities were in 
place to attract the right human capital. The combination of place and the economy were front 
and center in tourist focused developments, stadium, museum, and convention center 
development, as well as larger infrastructural projects such as airports, highway projects, and 
regional transit that eased the flow between major nodes of production. Economic developers 
focused on place with the hope of elevating the status of a city. Innovation district strategy brings 
these three assets together and gives them equal emphasis. The debate is not focused on whether 
the firm bring the people, the people bring the firms, or the place brings the people and firms, but 
that all three are necessary for a region to thrive. 
Innovation district strategy emphasizes the importance of design and positions it as a 
disruptive aesthetic. Based on this new role of design, the Brookings Institution partnered with 
the Project for Public Spaces to develop the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Initiative on Innovation 
and Placemaking as a collaboration to derive policy prescriptions for city building. Their 
prescriptions favor open floor plans, greater amenities in the office, multi-use walkable 
environment, reshaping the relationship between buildings occurring at the district scale, 
breaking down of traditional boundaries, making process of innovation more porous between 
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public and private realms through wired public spaces, advanced shared work spaces, private 
tech tested on public streets (Wagner & Watch, 2017). 
Storper and Venables (2004) outlined the various reasons why the ability for face-to-face 
remains important today. Their points are relevant, yet sophistications in ICTs continue to 
advance increasingly making this line of argument less tenable. Among respondents, once cited 
reason for the importance of proximity was proximity to venture capital. A venture capitalist is 
less likely to commute over longer distances when investment opportunities exist within the 
locality. Comments such as these were made when comparing one city to another, and not the 
activity that exists at the metropolitan-scale. 
 
6. Focus on growth 
The innovation district is indeed a vehicle for revenue growth, particularly in terms of 
taxes and consumer spending. The innovation district provides an excellent revenue opportunity 
for development companies. In many respects, the slating of an innovation district, like economic 
development zones and tax increment finance districts, demonstrate that the state is willing to 
provide development incentives in a historically underperforming area. Thus, developers know 
they will receive favorable subsidies. To develop in an urban innovation district means the land 
is slated, even if not immediately, for high-end development such as boutique hotels, Class A 
office suites, and condominiums. These will cater to a wealthier class of individuals. Ultimately, 
revenue growth happens for the developers and current owners of the buildings within the 
innovation district. 
Revenue growth also happens in terms of taxes. Though, how much the firms end up 
paying in taxes depends on what deals were cut with the local and state government to relocate to 
the innovation district. As a destination spot with high-end boutiques, craft breweries, and 
specialty grocery stores, in terms of consumption, the innovation district is also a site for revenue 
growth. In terms of prosumption, agreeing that the individuals who live, work, and play in the 
innovation district contribute to both the consumption and production of the space, then the 
innovation district also succeeds in revenue growth from the activation of the space by these 
individuals for branding purposes. 
Making efficient use of existing infrastructure varies by case. In some situations, it is 
possible to reuse warehouse remnants and outer shells of historic buildings. However, in 
interviews developers expressed that older buildings were not well-equipped for the 
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infrastructure needs of high-tech (personal interview, 2016). In the case of Detroit, the existing 
infrastructure served to undergird the need for an innovation district to demolish the buildings 
with innovation district resources to build from scratch. Still in some other cases, existing 
infrastructure and existing industries are slowly pushed out, as is the case of the maritime 
industry in Boston’s Seaport Innovation District, and what I expect to be the case for the 
warehouse spaces in Detroit and Boston. There is one case in Dublin where AirBnB remodeled 
an old historic building protected by historic preservation restrictions. While I generally applaud 
these developments, I agree with Balibrea’s (2001) point that preserving the token smokestack is 
political strategy to node to the use of culture as a signpost to attract the individuals seeking a 
more ‘authentic’ experience on their terms. 
As an economic development strategy, Brookings claims that “innovation districts 
represent a radical departure from traditional economic development because it isn’t just about 
commercial aspects of development (housing, retail, sports stadiums) but also because they help 
the city move up the value chain of global competitiveness by growing firms, networks, and 
traded sectors that drive broad-based prosperity” (Katz & Wagner, 2014). What is also new, 
Brookings states, is putting in tandem the economic, physical, and networking assets within a 
supportive and risk-taking culture. 
The rise of the innovation district is certainly not a radical departure, but a continuation. 
Growth coalitions and supporters of innovation districts continue to leverage traditional 
economic development policies in addition to the production element. Sport stadiums, 
convention centers, and tourist development, have been developed in various cities under the 
guise of assisting the competitiveness of cities.  If innovation districts focused only on providing 
the material for the production related aspects of development, they would not succeed. These 
economic development strategies help to brand a city. The innovation district is one more 
element. Innovation districts provide an opportunity to attract investment capital to a particular 
area, rezone and redevelop derelict spaces of the city, and to spike real estate values. Housing is 
also a major component of the innovation district. The inclusion of housing provides the 
necessary factor for the innovation district to be considered a live-work-playground.  The same 
applies to retail. More importantly, it is not possible to separate one form of economic 
development from the other. They concomitantly operate. Success in the commercial aspects of 
development work to attract the inputs necessary for growing firms, building networks, and 
usher the intermediaries to trade sectors. In fact, the most that the innovation district can do is 
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create a receptacle for these interactions to occur and the way to fill the receptacle with the right 
people and firms is through the provision of the commercial aspects of development. It is true 
that innovation district strategy engages science and technology policies to encourage the 
colocation of research anchors with firms and entrepreneurs, but this is not radically new. These 
economic development policies have existed since the 1980s when the success of Silicon Valley, 
Research Triangle Park, and Route 128 reached a wider audience (Plosila, 2004). 
 
7. Existence of disadvantaged populations in the city 
Innovation district strategy purports to support the evolution of the city by fostering job 
creation, economic opportunity, and revitalize communities. It might accomplish this. The 
question, however, is for whom it opens these opportunities. Existing communities are 
revitalized for young, educated, primarily white, and predominantly male individuals and high-
skilled job openings skew to this demographic. For individuals taking lower-income jobs, 
whether it is the jobs in the service sector or the constant stream of temporary construction 
contracts, the evolution of the city moves in the direction of becoming uncoupled (Mallach, 
2015) so that low-income residents are pushed out of the city and removed from close proximity 
to their jobs. 
From this perspective, two issues arise. The first relates to issues of affordability. Despite 
innovation district strategy stating the importance of affordable housing, in practice, this 
condition is not necessarily met. For example, in Boston, developers are able to pay into a fund 
rather than meet the required 20% affordable housing requirement. The city can then use the 
money to fund development for affordable housing in any part of the city. In places like Detroit 
and St. Louis, real estate prices for housing units continue to rise and the service workers who 
are said to benefit from proximity to service jobs in the innovation district must commute. In 
many respects, advantaged populations are the populations that are removed in order to make 
place attractive for capital (Catungal, 2009; Donegan & Lowe, 2008; McCann, 2007). 
The second problem relates to the elevated status of service jobs. Service jobs, such as 
coffee barista, restaurant waiter, and bartenders are often filled by middle-class workers who can 
eventually spin the skills learned from these jobs into transferable skills for higher-paid jobs 
(McRobbie, 2016). This poses additional challenge for the lower-skilled workers who would 
have benefitted from jobs in the service sector. Any additional jobs, janitorial, for example, 
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might remain open, but the low-skilled worker might still face the obstacle of the first problem, 
which is proximity and accessibility to the job site. 
 
Other Spaces of Production 
Innovation districts, as bounded spaces for scientific breakthroughs, profit, and 
production are not new. These manufactured places for the frontiers of science have proliferated 
across time and across the globe in various permutations. 
In advanced capitalist nations, particularly in the United States, the company towns that 
date back to the early 19th century were one type of example. These were large-scale planned 
industrial spaces were equipped with the amenities necessary to function as complete 
communities. Some company towns, such as Lynch, Wheelwright, and Coal Run within the 
Appalachian coal country were built and run to ensure constant profitability. Others, such as 
Pullman, Illinois (home of Pullman railcars), and Scotia, California (home of Pacific Lumber) 
had more utopian aspirations, enforcing paternalistic attitudes towards their managers and 
workers, and provided civic structures, education, housing, and facilities for leisure (Green, 
2010; p 5). Arguably, the company town that produced wool in the early 19th century was 
scientifically advanced. In fact, the engineering and innovation behind Merrimack Companies 
first water wheel parallels the advanced science that the creators of science parks seek.  
Similar contemporary efforts include large tech-corporations, such as Google and 
Facebook, with their enormous campuses, provision of amenities, and interjection into the 
practice of urban planning by building housing for employees and influencing transportation 
infrastructure are today’s version of company towns. What differs between this model and the 
innovation district is ownership. Whereas these tech-companies singularly direct development 
decisions and house employees in residential units they own, innovation districts are ostensibly 
guided by a series of individuals representing various sectors (i.e., public, private, university, 
civic, etc.). 
What distinguishes the mills and coal mine company towns from the high-tech fantasy 
are the policy changes that occurred in the 1980s to support their developments. The origin of the 
science park, thus, is an outgrowth of the Stanford and Silicon Valley and Boston-Cambridge 
Route 128 model in which universities and the focus on scientific investigation and industrial 
innovation played a major role (Massey et al., 1992).  
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Another earlier type of innovation district is what Massey, Quintas, and Wield (ibid) term 
‘high-tech fantasies.’ The glossy and futuristic aspect of technology has always made 
constructing these high-tech fantasies alluring. But even Massey, Quintas, and Wield (ibid) in 
their study of ‘high-tech fantasies admit’ that any project studying science parks grows 
exponentially on account of the challenge of defining the science park (ibid., p 1). In their study, 
they bounded their research to the United Kingdom and the definition produced in 1985 by the 
UK Science Park Association (ibid., p 13).The UK Science Park Association defines these 
spaces as property-based with formal links to universities and research institutions, designed to 
encourage the growth of knowledge-based businesses, and with a management function actively 
engaged in assisting the organizations on sight with transfers of technology and provision of 
business skills (ibid., p 14 citing UKSPA, 1985). 
The science and research park model has proliferated in the US, in Europe, and in many 
parts of Asia –particularly east Asia from South Korean, down to Japan, and further down to 
countries in South East Asia (for an overview, see Komninos, 2011). Furthermore, along a 
similar vein, contemporary science park economic development policy increasingly merges with 
the concept of the smart city (Hollands, 2008). The Dublin case points to a few reasons why. For 
now, the point is to recognize the existence of a wide-variety of science parks. The convergence 
of these seven elements are what makes the innovation district stand apart from earlier and 
contemporary attempts to build spaces of production. 
 
Conclusion 
Shifts in economic restructuring have implications for the urban fabric. This becomes 
evident when adopting an historical view of spatial strategies seeking innovative output. Design 
prescriptions for contemporary urban innovation ecosystems are based on policy 
recommendations for a thriving innovative ecosystem (see for example Chakrabarti, 2013a; Van 
Winden, Berg, & Pol, 2007; Wolfe, 2014). The problem with these policy prescriptions is that 
they are under-theorized: they overly emphasize the aesthetic; overlook the amount of time it 
takes to foster entrepreneurial ecosystems; and fail to consider potential negative consequences. 
Reading the emergence of innovation districts along literature on the capitalist production of 
space, in the next section, my description of innovation district moves beyond the boosterish 
policy recommendation that economic developers, planners, policy makers, politicians, and other 
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supporters adopt. The purpose is to contextualize why innovation districts are proliferating in this 
particular time period. 
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Chapter 4: Comparative Analysis 
“It is by investigating the working methods and tools of architects—the lines drawn on plans, 
master plans, maps and aerial photographs—that the equation setting material organization 
against the abuse of power begins to unravel” (Weizman & Segal, 2003; p. 24). 
 
In this section I detail the origin stories for the five innovation districts as told by the 
stakeholders: the real estate developers, university heads, elected officials, representatives from 
the public and private sectors, board members, and the entrepreneurs or digital workers residing 
within the boundaries of each respective districts. I use examples from each of my cases to 
document the various obstacles practitioners face in attempting to steer development in a 
particular direction. Of importance is that consistently the protagonist in the narratives of the 
stakeholders is the eager entrepreneur. Development narratives highlight the needs of the 
entrepreneur and his–the tech-sector remains disproportionately male—high-tech playground. A 
second note of importance is that it does not require extensive digging to uncover real estate 
profit motives. 
A study on the evolving landscapes of the city reveals how political economies of scale 
under capitalism are socially produced and transformed. Like the production of space 
(Gottdiener, 1994; Harvey, 2001; Lefebvre, 1992; Soja, 1980), landscapes are socially 
constructed, constituted, and scaled in particular ways that reveal power dynamics (Cosgrove, 
1998). Examining the tools used shape the landscape and the motivation behind innovation 
district strategies demonstrates how architecture and urban planning are political practices 
adhering to dominant forces (Balibrea, 2001; Monclús, 2003; Segal & Weizman, 2003).  
The innovation district concept is by no means an innocent emergence. It is a strategic 
development that enables the new world of work serves the logics of capital. Innovation districts 
demonstrate how political economies of scale under capitalism are socially produced and 
transformed (Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010). They demonstrate the ability for capital to be 
most productive, productive in the building of cityscapes, as well as productive of life through 
the forming of subjectivities (Foucault, 2004; Lemke, 2001). A reading of innovation districts 
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from these perspectives suggests two emergent urban development trends: 1) techniques of 
territory and 2) facilitating production.  
 
Theme I: Techniques of Territory 
“You are lost if you forget the fruits of the earth belong to all and that the Earth belongs to no 
one.” -Jean-Jacques Rousseau cited in Elden (2013) 
 
One important contribution of this dissertation is detailing how the land is secured for 
each case site and highlighting how political mechanisms to target development within a specific 
area are strategically used to create territory. The use of the term “territory” is strategic. I 
purposely use the term “territory” because it is the act of converting land into one that is owned 
and managed by a now sovereign entity that converts land into territory (Elden, 2007, 2013). It is 
from territory that governance is enacted. As territory, the innovation district is a site of political 
contestation where sovereign authorities determine its ordering and the activity engaged within 
its border (Lefebvre, 1992). 
Whether or not the promise of the innovation district, a space for birthing inventions that 
will accrue regional benefits to grow the economy, is a fantasy matters less than the fact that the 
physical embodiment of the innovation district requires space and developmental control over 
land. For this reason, innovation district strategy depends on political mechanisms to create a 
bounded space for development. How the land and rights to development are secured matters. 
The development of the innovation district is facilitated through regulatory tools that 
allow for tax exemptions and tailored land use regulations. Each innovation district uses a 
defined boundary to enact policy measures, though how the determination of the borders is 
decided and the enforcement within the boundary varies. In addition, it is important to consider 
the experts shaping the strategy in each respective location. Carefully considering the actors 
involved allows us to parse who is crafting the rhetoric and how the rhetoric is strategically 
mobilized. Though each of my cases demonstrates variance in the political mechanisms used to 
isolate particular parcels of land for (re)development, one consistency across cases is the role of 
real estate developers. 
All four urban cases demonstrate how public land is converted into privately governed 
territory, (Christophers, 2018). The conception of an innovation district begins when growth 
coalitions want to derive more profit from land in accordance to its highest and best use (Finch & 
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Casavant, 1996; Wolf-Powers, 2005). In the case of the innovation district, the highest and best 
use is tied to increased rents (N. Smith, 1979). I am using the definition of rent related to 
increased land values within the space of the innovation district. 
 
Dublin 
A decade after the spectacular crash of Ireland’s “Celtic Tiger” economy, Dublin’s urban 
governance institutions have successfully facilitated the transformation of an area of formerly 
derelict warehouses into an innovation district, the so-called “Silicon Docks”, by now materially 
and symbolically a key site for Ireland’s post-crisis economic recovery (Kayanan et al., 2018; 
Newenham, 2015).  
The redevelopment of the Docklands following the crash involved bounding off 163-
acres of land into a strategic development zone—what I am calling their innovation district—to  
target development (North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock: Planning Scheme, 2014). This strategy 
was coupled with a marketing campaign that promoted the Silicon Docks and Dublin’s efforts in 
setting the pace for innovation-led development in Europe (Newenham, 2015). Three key 
institutions figure prominently in this transition: the Industrial Development Authority (IDA), 
Dublin City Council (DCC), and the National Asset Management Authority (NAMA).  
 
The Industrial Development Authority 
One of the most influential institutions in reinventing the image of the city and growing the tech 
sector in Ireland is the Industrial Development Authority (IDA). Since its establishment as part of the 
Department of Industry and Commerce in 1949, the IDA’s responsibility is to promote efficiency in the 
economy. While today the organization highlights FDI as its principal remit, historically this was not the 
case (“IDA Ireland: History,” 2018). Through organizational restructuring, including ceding from 
central government to become an autonomous state-sponsored organization, the IDA developed an 
exclusive focus on high-quality FDI. This positioned the IDA to take a broad view of industrial activity 
to incorporate the software and high-tech sectors (Sager, 2011).  
 
Prior to the 2007/8 financial crisis, efforts by the IDA to establish a tech presence in Ireland existed but 
were geographically dispersed. Google’s decision in 2003 to expand their European operations and base 
the company in the Docklands surprised IDA representatives, who worked hard to sell Google on the 
idea to settle in Ireland but did not expect the company to select the derelict space of the Grand Canal 
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Docks (Newenham, 2015; personal interview, 2016). Time and experience working with tech companies 
finessed the IDA’s strategies. As it became evident that technology companies favored downtown 
proximity and could claim prime real estate in the city, the IDA tailored its messaging to leverage the 
emergence of the Docklands as an attractive site for potential suitors from the technology sector 
(Kayanan et al., 2018). 
 
Dublin City Council 
Dublin City Council emerged as a critical institution with the dissolution of the DDDA and the 
approved transfer planning power from An Bord Planeála to Dublin City Council, now established as the 
Development Authority (North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock: Planning Scheme, 2014). This transfer of 
master planning power was coupled with the designation of the innovation district and fast-track 
provision. The fast-track provision streamlines development by ensuring a standard all firms must meet 
and speeds up the process of eradicating blighted structures to make the space desirable for potential 
new firms. It also strips locals of voicing discontent and appealing a plan beyond the initial two-week 
opportunity allotted to approve the innovation district designation (Byrne, 2016b; Lawton, 2017).  
The SDZ process in Dublin is a strategic deregulatory tool to encourage development in 
particular parcels of land, which are projected to increase economic activity and generate employment 
(Fox-Rogers, Murphy, & Grist, 2011; Sager, 2011). In Ireland, such governance techniques are 
necessary due to local level constraints on authorities, particularly in relation to payment structures that 
limit their funding sources to commercial rates and construction levies. Unless new techniques are 
innovated, local authorities are limited in their ability to influence economic policy directions and must 
instead heed to larger national objectives set by influential institutions (Bontje & Lawton, 2013). 
However, local authorities can influence planning decisions through zoning and the formulation of 
development plans (Lawton, Murhpy, & Redmond, 2010). Dublin City Council’s mobilization for the 
SDZ strategy demonstrates the intent for the future development of the Dublin Docklands.  
 
National Asset Management Authority 
The National Asset Management Authority’s (NAMA) principle remit to clear the massive debt 
accumulated during the financial crash is well documented (Byrne, 2016b, 2016a; Kitchin, O’Callaghan, 
Boyle, Gleeson, & Keaveney, 2012; Williams, 2014). Set up in 2009 by the government – with 
oversight from the Finance Minister – NAMA’s primary objective was the stabilization of the banking 
sector. As an asset management company, NAMA offered the Irish banking sector, rocked by the 
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financial crisis, an expedient solution to address the crisis at the nexus of finance and real estate. 
NAMA’s strategy included isolating problematic assets and replacing loans of a declining value with 
government guaranteed securities. It also provided direct liquidity and facilitated the availability of 
credit. NAMA’s attempts to revive the property market necessitated investment, however with Irish 
developers and financial institutions still overstretched by the crisis, capital could only be attracted from 
outside Ireland. Consequently, NAMA used its position to effect investment-friendly planning 
provisions, especially in the Docklands. SDZ provisions broke up the Docklands into 20 development 
blocks of which NAMA held interest in 15 blocks, representing 75% of developable land area of the 
innovation district. This positioned NAMA as a key player in the courting of global capital towards the 
Docklands. Its role as a dominant arbiter in Dublin’s urban development might be regarded as an 
unintended, yet considerable consequence of the crisis (NAMA annual report and financial statement, 
2017; NAMA annual report and financial statements, 2016). 
 
The Silicon Docks 
As discussed above, as the vested authority of the strategic development zone, again, what I am 
calling their innovation district, DCC can implement policies to facilitate and massage development in 
specific directions (North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock: Planning Scheme, 2014; personal interview, 
2016). The branding of Silicon Docks and the rapid transfer of land worked in tandem with planning 
tools and regulatory measures that facilitated the transformation of the space. The fast-track designation, 
not coincidentally set up in 2012, provided the most noticeable formula for a new place-based 
development strategy. Prior to the crash, entrepreneurial attempts to redevelop blighted land were 
evident from the development of the International Financial Services Center (Moore, 2008). However, 
post-crash, as banks were rescued, and debt was offloaded onto the public in the form of bailout loans 
and austerity programs, economic aspirations needed to be rephrased and reformulated. The Silicon 
Docks became this formula, and aspirations could now be ‘placed’ and put on display for everyone to 
see. These new regulations allowed DCC to take over the planning apparatus, thereby giving it a more 
interventionist role and adopting what Lauermann (2016) terms ‘municipal statecraft status.’  
Writing the urban development policy that supports the construction of a ‘tech playground’ 
affords DCC the ability to engage in close collaborations with the private sector, inviting the latter to 
shape location, construction, and design decisions while spinning these new collaborations as 
experimental, cooperative, and beneficial to urban residents (Kayanan et al., 2018). DCC also succeeds 
in intervening on a global level through the branding of Silicon Docks, which first appears as a label in 
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the master plan following the creation of the innovation district (Delaney, 2014). Signifying the intent to 
create a competitive environment that resonates on a global scale, these branding techniques facilitate a 
growth agenda under the guise of bottom-up, all-inclusive experimentation. As one academic explained, 
the language behind the plan for the Docklands strongly defines the space as innovative:  
 
If you look at all the economic development plans which designate Dublin as 
exemplar in terms of how innovation can be used to provide [a] competitive 
advantage for the city, and if you think that Dublin is a showcase for the country 
and the Docklands is a showcase for Dublin, then if you put the pieces together, it 
probably is understood very widely like that. – (university representative, personal 
interview, 2016) 
 
The special regulations of the innovation district, in tandem with branding efforts, and in 
addition to the policies that promote local technology-related developments, designate the Silicon Docks 
as a premium location for global players of the technology sector (Kelly, 2018; Newenham, 2015; 
Sweeney, 2012). The concentration of these technology companies is encouraged by the DCC through 
narrowing previous boundaries to a concentrated administrative delineation where tax exemptions and 
land use regulations can be legally actuated. DCC’s adoption of this technology-focused urban 
redevelopment strategy depoliticizes development through creating a space that is exempt from 
surrounding forms of governance, potentially including existing formulas of tax, redistribution and 
resource allocation policies. At the same time, the seductive appeal of an industry often affiliated with 
revolutionary and disruptive power, protects DCC and respective technology firms from critical 
scrutiny.  
 
Reviving real estate: NAMA’s role in increasing rents 
Since Google’s arrival in the Docklands the technology sector has steadily increased its footprint 
in the Docklands. Much less affected by the global financial and economic crisis, the technology sector 
was uniquely positioned to provide liquidity and contribute to NAMA’s efforts against the tandem of 
asset price collapse and dried-up credit. NAMA consequently set itself the objective of ‘facilitating the 
delivery of Grade A office accommodation in the Dublin Docklands SDZ’ (NAMA annual report and 
financial statements, 2016).  
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Why would it do this? According to the NAMA Annual Report and Financial 
Statements (ibid.): “Section 10 of the NAMA Act requires NAMA to obtain the 
best achievable financial return for the State, deal expeditiously with the assets 
acquired by it and to protect or otherwise enhance the value of those assets. That 
is the core of NAMA’s mandate.” 
 
Recognizing the mutually reinforcing cycle of credit and urban real estate, NAMA used its close 
relationship with the IDA in order to identify suitable properties for FDI (NAMA annual report and 
financial statements, 2016) and played a role in the appeal process of the innovation district in the 
Dublin Docklands (Byrne, 2016b). 
Emphasizing greater flexibility in terms of land use mix in the Docklands, NAMA’s subsidiaries 
have successfully removed planning provisions aiming at reference to a dominance of residential 
development and a 50:50 residential/commercial mix on the site (Byrne, 2016a). Once passed, planning 
decisions within the SDZ cannot be contested so as to ensure ‘planning certainty’ (North Lotts and 
Grand Canal Dock: Planning Scheme, 2014).  
Besides building and selling Class A office space, another lucrative business is the construction 
of student housing (Dublin Student Housing Report, 2017; GSA Annual Review, 2016). Culturally, 
student housing with high turnover rates and tech-savvy, well-educated residents, contribute to the 
Docklands’ modern urban imagination. Economically, building requirements for Class A office space 
and student housing both follow fixed templates. This ensures a quick and painless transaction for 
developers and international investors tied to global markets and transnational capital flows (real estate 
developer, person interview, 2016). 
The combination of NAMA’s attempts to kick-start Dublin’s property market and the presence 
of a technology sector largely undisturbed by the crisis, amplified the transformation of the Docklands 
into the ‘Silicon Docks’(Delaney, 2014; Newenham, 2015). Facebook, Google and other major tech 
firms have repeatedly expanded their use in office space, delivering necessary liquidity and, in a very 
literal sense, filling the void left by the crisis in the Dublin Docklands. In 2012, before the SDZ 
boundary, 12 firms were in the general area, while in 2017, the SDZ features over 69 tech related 
industries (see figures 24 & 25). 
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Figure 24: Tech related companies before 2012 SDZ 
 
 
Figure 25: Tech related companies after 2012 SDZ 
 
 
In line with these developments, institutions resources are allocated to attracting outside 
investors rather than on local populations necessitating attention. In the varied interviews, critical 
perspectives on technology sector-based growth strategies remained rare and, when present, 
interviewees uttered critiques mostly in the context of Dublin’s housing crisis. Dublin is facing the 
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largest housing crisis in its history (Action Plan for Housing and Homelessness, 2016; MacLaran & 
Kelly, 2014) yet, connections between a focus on the tech economy and an exacerbating housing crisis 
are for the most part not automatically recognized.  
As the December 2016 occupation of Apollo House (White, 2016), and the judicial standoff in 
subsequent months (Sheehan, 2017), have shown, NAMA and other public (as well as private) actors 
cannot shed their responsibility for social, political and economic fragmentations in Dublin. The efforts 
of protesters to temporarily turn the NAMA-administered office building into accommodations for the 
homeless, reveals shortcomings at the heart of NAMA’s mandate and speaks to the contested nature of 
urban space more generally. 
So long as technology sector-based growth strategies exert a price on local communities through 
their link with the mutually reinforcing cycle of finance and real estate, the question of class will remain 
a core struggle between the technology sector and local communities severely impacted by respective 
urban developments. Funneling local and national resources into the creation of spaces used primarily 
by a transnational professional class cannot be regarded as an equitable solution to the recent economic 
crisis. Vague promises of participation and inclusion of local communities will not suffice if that 
promise is in turn tied up with spending power. 
 
Attracting investments: IDA and the technology sector 
With the establishment of the SDZ and a revived real estate market emerging in the Docklands, 
the IDA was able to tailor its activities to a particular geography. Branding the Silicon Docks as prime 
destination, the IDA was working in tandem with urban governance institutions trying to turn the crisis 
into opportunity. As a DCC member stated, 
 
The whole country was just dying with economic recession, it created a huge 
opportunity effort [for] the IDA to go and sell Ireland as super competitive, great 
access to talent because people are looking for new jobs, and really cheap for 
office, it was, I think one of the most competitive sites for office. Gone from one 
of the most expensive to one of the most competitive in a very short period of 
time. (Dublin City Council, personal interview, 2016). 
 
Consequently, the new concentration of technology firms was hugely important for IDA efforts 
portraying the Docklands as the ‘Silicon Valley of Europe.’ The IDA sells Ireland’s tech story through a 
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heavy investment in marketing material. During the height of the recession, the IDA spent €2 million on 
a campaign to market Ireland as an innovation and technology hub. Two such targeted messages funded 
by the IDA that ran in a variety of business publications in Europe include: ‘Facebook found a space for 
people who think in a certain way. It’s called Ireland.’ ‘Google searched the planet for the perfect 
location for their business. They came up with Ireland’ (Newenham, 2015).  
 
Figure 26: Industrial Development Authority Facebook marketing campaign billboard 
 
Source: McConnells advertising agency (McConnells, 2009) 
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Figure 27: Industrial Development Authority Google marketing campaign billboard 
 
Source: McConnells advertising agency (McConnells, 2009) 
 
The IDA is not the only institution selling this narrative. In 2011, as the country dealt with the 
aftermath of the recession, Enterprise Ireland, a government agency formed as a split from the IDA in 
1994 to focus on indigenous and start-up activity, approved €10 million for an international start-up fund 
to encourage entrepreneurs to locate in Ireland. Expenses of this kind led one academic to claim, 
 
They [entrepreneurs] were seen as really important in getting us out of the 
economic crisis. It was that rhetoric going on that we needed start-up hubs. In a 
country that had no money, there was a lot of investment in entrepreneurs and 
start-ups. – (university representative, personal interview, 2016) 
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The focus on start-ups and entrepreneurs is easier to spin as a bottom-up narrative. The focus on 
innovation and corresponding emphasis on openness and new forms of participation, lends to technology 
sector legitimacy (Kayanan et al., 2018)– even while new forms of exclusion, marginalization and 
economic segregation are manifesting in the city. So far, efforts to attract foreign capital remain 
unimpeded by these considerations. 
The willingness to re-embrace an agenda built on competitiveness and FDI certainly deserves 
highlighting. Furthermore, there seems to be a complimentary logic between a ‘top-down’ approach 
hinging on the belief in trickle-down economics, evidenced by continuous efforts to attract FDI, and the 
‘bottom-up’ allure of technology as a participatory, inclusive, and future-oriented sector. One non-profit 
director states it this way: 
 
I don't think there is any backlash in the community if anything we're all anxious 
for that to grow bigger faster. I don't think there are concerns about money being 
funneled into it. I think there is awareness in the city being a tech city, there is 
awareness of the economy being more and more driven by digital enterprise, and I 
think people, particularly young people, but people in general are excited about 
that. The more that we can be, you know, on the crest of the wave of new 
innovation, and new types of jobs and education systems that are more integrated 
and open, a society that is more diverse and welcoming, we're for all of that. – 
(non-profit director, personal interview, 2016) 
 
Whether top-down or bottom-up, the events mobilized between the end of the recession 
and the contemporary have resulted in converting a waterfront location in Dublin into a highly 
ordered and governed space. The additional layer of smart censors, a topic I cover in the next 
theme, further contributes to a controlled governance of the territory of the Silicon Docks. 
 
 
Boston 
Like Dublin, Boston’s Seaport Innovation District, benefitted from a robust innovation 
ecosystem that included a large pool of educated workers, a plethora of universities, anchor 
institutions, venture capitalists, and what the startup industry calls C-Suite executive –corporate 
executives well versed in the various stages of the firm cycle and management who can provide 
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mentorship and coaching services. Boston’s efforts to create an innovation district in the South 
Boston Waterfront were quickly circumvented as soon as the real estate market bounced back. 
Small startups in Boston are now more likely to take over spaces in the buildings in the financial 
district that the financial and legal companies abandoned in their move to the luxurious South 
Boston Waterfront (personal interview, 2016).  
Today, the space of the Innovation District, more commonly called by other names rather 
than the moniker used by Menino, is an enclave for the wealthy: “the empty nesters, investors, 
and people who live there five months of the year” (architect, personal interview, 2016). Unlived 
in condos that sell for an average of $2,117 per square feet are flipped for at least $500,000 
above the original price (T. Logan, 2016a). Affordable housing is non-existent and rents have 
skyrocketed (McMorrow, 2013). High-end boutiques and destination restaurants line the 
waterfront and luxury vehicles navigate the streets.  
Considering the connectedness of the peninsula and the superior opportunity for real 
estate developers to command prices for waterfront property, high-end development was always 
the intended land use purpose. Menino’s embrace of the innovation district concept and his 
ironclad grasp of its branding served as a veil to trigger capital investment in the South Boston 
Waterfront. 
 
State of the land prior to the innovation district 
The first step in uncovering the development outcome of the Boston Innovation District 
is understanding the land use and planning mechanism that govern development on the South 
Boston Waterfront. As a coastal city, urban planning in Boston has always been closely 
intertwined with waterfront regulations. In 1991, the city of Boston developed a Municipal 
Harbor Plan for the downtown, North End, and Charleston areas of the waterfront and this 
document formed the basis for the South Boston Waterfront master plan. A second regulation 
stemming from the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection Public Waterfront 
Act, more commonly referred to as Chapter 91, is a public trust for access state tidelands and 
waterways (Environmental Permitting in Massachusetts, 2003: p. 35-36). Any plans for the 
South Boston Waterfront must adhere to Chapter 91, in addition to navigating the federally 
owned land at the Marine Industrial Park, a 190-acre dock previously used as warehouse space 
for the South Boston Army base. In 1983, the city created the Marine Industrial Park by 
purchasing the Bronstein Industrial Center, a massive complex to store military supplies, and the 
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neighboring properties from the U.S. Army and Navy, to create the Marine Industrial Park (“The 
Innovation and Design Building,” 2018). 
Menino’s proposed Innovation District was a 1,000-acre boundary that included four 
neighborhoods: Fort Point, Seaport Square, Fan Pier, and Marine Industrial Park. The Innovation 
District was not the first time these 1,000 acres were cobbled together. In 1999, the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority (BRA), under Menino’s orders and with the assistance of urban design 
firm Copper, Robertson, the same designers for Australia’s Sydney waterfront and Battery Park 
City in Manhattan, developed the Seaport Public Realm Plan. This was followed a year later by 
the South Boston Waterfront Municipal Harbor Plan. Both of these documents to guide 
development and land use on the 1,000 acres of the southern peninsula.  
Menino was explicit in his desires for new development to create a vibrancy unlike the 
after-hours dead zones typical of central business districts.12 Importantly for him, this would be 
accomplished through the inclusion of housing. The Seaport Public Realm and the South Boston 
Waterfront Municipal Harbor Plan outlined the importance of mixed-use construction that 
fostered a vibrant 24-7 community. The plan outlines guidelines for housing, open space, and 
height. Housing would be the dominant component comprising 40 percent of development 
activity and was to be affordable to prevent housing prices from rising in the adjacent 
neighborhoods. Punctuating this, Thomas O’Brien, director of the BRA, states, “The new 
housing to be developed must also have a sizable affordable component, and the BRA will not 
allow only the affluent to have the opportunity to live in this area” (The Seaport Public Realm 
Plan, 1999: p. i). 
Following the Seaport Public Realm and the South Boston Waterfront Municipal Harbor 
Plan, a wide variety of planning documents were generated and approved by the BRA for 
development of the Seaport, but none encompass the complete 1,000 acres of the Innovation 
District. Rather, each neighborhood now has its own sub-plan that build on the maiden 
documents: Fort Point District 100 Acre Master Plan (est. 2006), the Fan Pier Master Plan (est. 
2007), the Seaport Square Master Plan (est. 2010), and the Boston Marine Industrial Park, 
currently under progress. 
 
                                               
12 In 1999, the term ‘innovation’ was not the buzzword it is today in 2018 and thus this term does not appear in these 
master plans in the same way the word and concept of a 24-7 neighborhood overtakes later planning documents. The 
main emphasis is development targeting residential, commercial office, hotel, retail, and tourist industries. 
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Open Access: The Big Dig  
The single largest factor influencing development of the South Boston Waterfront was 
the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, a megaproject referred to as the Big Dig. Listed as the most 
expensive highway project in the United States, the Big Dig, was an infrastructure project that 
connected central Boston to the South Boston Waterfront through the construction of two 
underground tunnels (I-93 and I-90) and the extension of the Silver Line connecting the 
peninsula to the airport. The Big Dig, which broke ground in 1982 and was completed in 2006, 
was rife with cost overruns that inflated the project from $2.6B to $14.6B, continuously ran 
behind schedule, and was fraught by the death of an individual due to a ceiling collapse (Flint, 
2015).  
A report commissioned by the Massachusetts Transit Authority listed the following 
benefits for the South Boston Waterfront as a result from the Big Dig: an estimated $7 billion in 
private investment, more than 43,000 jobs, 7,700 new housing units, 1,000 affordable housing 
units, 10 million square feet in office and retail space, 2,600 hotel rooms, $5-6 million in from 
construction worker wages spent in state income tax and sales revenue, and between 9-11 
percent growth in property tax revenues  (Daniel, 2006). Commenting on the report, Richard A. 
Dimino, the president of the Artery Business Community, a coalition of business individuals 
developed with the sole purpose of guiding Big Dig development, stated that the efforts of the 
Big Dig, ''demonstrates a wonderful story about how Boston's new central highway system sets 
the stage for economic growth going into the next millennium” (Daniel, 2006).13 Of course, this 
could only happen “as long as development continues” (ibid). As a financial boondoggle, it was 
imperative that the city and the state recoup investments from the project and the South Boston 
Waterfront presented that opportunity. 
 
Menino and the BRA 
A second critical factor that influenced the development of the South Boston Waterfront 
was Menino’s relationship to the BRA. When Mayor Marty Walsh took over as the Mayor of 
                                               
13 The Artery Business Community, now known as A Better City (ABC), is a nonprofit with a governing board of business and 
institutional leaders.  Recognizing the benefits that would result from the new connection, ABC banded together to represent the 
interests of the business community and to involve themselves as key intermediary between project officials and the City of 
Boston, convening meetings on everything from construction mitigation to the number of highway ramps that would serve the 
downtown (“Our Origins: The Artery Business Committee,” n.d.).  To date, ABC continues to work with the Massachusetts 
Department of Transportation and the City of Boston and is in the process of working on a proposal for a long-term 
transportation plan that will alleviate some of the congestion issues already evident in the commute in and out of the South 
Boston Waterfront (Powers, 2013). 
  80 
Boston, one of his first initiatives was to “clean out” the BRA and reconfigure the organization 
under a new title, the Boston Planning and Development Agency. “Let’s face it. ‘Authority’ is so 
authoritarian,” said Brian Golden, director of the Boston Planning and Development Agency 
(cited in Clauss, 2016). And under Menino’s leadership, it certainly was. 
Created in 1957, the BRA controlled all economic development planning and real estate 
permitting in Boston. A board of five appointed by the Mayor run the organization, giving the 
Mayor full reign over its powers. Past Mayors opportunistically used the BRA’s power of 
eminent domain to raze neighborhoods and build signature sky-scrapers (McMorrow, 2014). The 
BRA owns its own land, collects its own revenues, and manages its own budget (ibid). 
Importantly, Menino used his power over the BRA to syphon development in the South Boston 
Waterfront. Any new development in Boston requires approval by the organization. For the 
Innovation District, development required a final sign-off by the Mayor himself. Furthermore, 
Menino played favorites. He facilitated development in the Seaport for his friends while rejecting 
applications from those not in his favor (Diesenhouse, 2015; McMorrow, 2014). 
 
Existing Developments: The Cyber District and other failed attempts to attract tech 
In 2010, when Menino declared the Innovation District, the peninsula was not completely 
barren. Commonwealth Pier, a working port built at the start of the 1900s underwent renovations 
in the 1980s and 1990s converting the port into the World Trade Center and the neighboring 
Seaport Hotel. 
Located farther east on the peninsula was the maritime activity of the Marine Industrial 
Park. While much of the South Boston Waterfront was projected for luxury development, the 
Marine Industrial Park was to be protected for marine activity. In the early 2000, development 
favored the maritime industry with thirteen seafood processors, and marine industrial terminals, 
dry docks, and warehouses located on-site. The Big Dig transformed the 35-60-minute commute 
into a 10-minute commute for transporting seafood. The maritime industry looked forward to 
freight rail service that would connect to the Marine Terminal. This was a center for skilled blue-
collar jobs and new innovations related to marine activity were occurring at the time. 
Commenting on their spectacular fortune, fish purveyor Roger Berkowitz said, “We'll be able to 
do things that we can't do at our other locations, like make chowder stock from fresh fish bones" 
(Diesenhouse, 2003). 
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For a while in the mid-2000s Menino considered selling off the Marine Industrial Park 
citing that there was not enough marine related activity to occupy the space. Under contention 
was the Bronstein Industrial Center, a 1.4 million square foot horizontal building spanning 
multiple blocks. Menino flipped back and forth on the appropriate use of this building. Initially, 
when he wanted to sell off the massive parcel, he stated that the Bronstein building on site was 
not suitable for industrial uses. The industrial sector wanted ground floor access, he opined, and 
not a building with multiple floors. Yet later, when an opportunity arose for Cargo Ventures to 
convert the building into office spaces, Menino rejected the proposal fearing that it would trigger 
office development across the South Boston Waterfront and stating that the proposal suggested 
using the building in a way that would not support industrial and blue-collar jobs (Palmer, 2008). 
Perhaps, undergirding the uncertainty was the push-back Menino received from South Boston 
politicians for not protecting blue-collar jobs. Regardless, as market forces take over the 
peninsula it becomes evident that the South Boston politicians’ concerns are discounted.  
Except for the uncertainty of the Marine Industrial Park, there was no reason to negate 
that eventually high-end development would overtake the South Boston Waterfront. Speculations 
on the benefits of the Big Dig had spurned development activity from private interests and from 
Menino. Menino was concerned that private interests were dictating the growth direction 
proposing high-rises and sport stadium developments. Considering that federal, state, and local 
government coffers funded $20B to prime the peninsula (i.e., cleaning of the Boston Harbor and 
construction of the Central Artery, the Silver Line Transitway, the Third Harbor Tunnel, and the 
Boston Convention and Exhibition Center), Menino felt it imperative that a doctrine protecting 
the public use of space and dictating private development was in order (The Seaport Public 
Realm Plan, 1999: p. i). This order also functioned as a way for Menino to ensure he had the 
final say on unfolding development. 
In 1997 Menino began promoting the idea of creating a Cyber District in the South 
Boston Waterfront. The Fort Point neighborhood, home to one of the largest arts communities in 
Boston featuring an older brick urban fabric and warehouses that were turned into galleries in the 
1970s, was starting to demonstrate the formation of a technology cluster. Dot-coms, new media, 
technology companies, web design shops, and internet consultancies were moving in. Even a 
Computer Museum was operating in the space.  There was reason for Menino to be hopeful. 
Development in Boston was flourishing. The office vacancy rate was 1.3 percent. Buildings in 
the South Boston Waterfront were leasing for $42 – 47 a square foot in the area while in the 
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financial district they were around $65 a square foot and the city (Krasner, 2001). The eventual 
completion of the Big Dig could only accelerate the development of the South Boston 
Waterfront. It seemed an opportune time to push development in the South Boston Waterfront 
until the tech bubble burst (Real estate consultant, personal interview, 2016). This was a definite 
set-back for Menino’s vision. 
The Institution of Contemporary Art (ICA) was also located on the peninsula. In 1999, 
the Pritzker family of Chicago, who owned 21-acres of the South Boston Waterfront intended for 
a $1B hotel, condominium, and office complex in Fan Pier, put out a bid for a cultural 
component of their development on a donated .75-acre parcel of land. Of the three proposals 
formally unveiled, Menino selected the ICA (Flint & Abraham, 1999). The ICA signed a 99-year 
lease for $1-per year and worked out a massive fundraising campaign for construction (Leblanc, 
2003). The 62,000-square-foot building designed by architects Diller Scofidio + Renfro opened 
in 2004. The building, which features a large public patio with contemporary bleacher-like 
seating prominently facing the water, is one of the few low-rise buildings on the site. Today it is 
towered by glass high-rises. 
In 2005, Fallon, president of Fallon Company, purchased the 21-acres of land from the 
Pritzker family of Chicago for $115 M for a $3B for a mixed-use development of office 
buildings, five-star hotels, luxury condominiums, and high-end retail. In 2006, John Hynes, a 
Boston millionaire, purchased 23-acres of to develop luxury, shops, condominiums, mixed-use 
development, and retail.  
In 2008, the recession hits and City Hall halts all construction and marketing on the South 
Boston Waterfront, once again challenging Menino’s visions of prosperity for the peninsula 
(state representative, personal interview, 2016). Yet, Menino was persistent. In 2009 he founded 
and chaired an organization called Boston World Partnership. The aim of the organization, run 
by Brian McLaughlin, the former marketing director of the BRA, was to promote Boston’s 
competitive advantage by connecting companies to an extensive network of “Connectors” 
invested in retaining growth-minded businesses in Boston. Boston World Partners was initially 
funded by $1M from the BRA and $400,000 in seed funding from Procter & Gamble (Psaty, 
2010). Later, Boston World Partnerships received an additional $170,000 from a foundation run 
by State Street Corporation and Fidelity Investments (Kirsner, 2010).  
In 2009, Boston World Partnerships claimed responsibility in generating a lead between 
the City and Retail Convergence, an e-commerce company, to convince the company to relocate 
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from Downtown Crossing to the Seaport (“Mayor Menino Welcomes 600 New Employees to 
Fort Point Channel,” 2009). Boston World Partnerships calculated that their connection 
translated to $14M in immediate salaries for the 100 new employees the company hired (Psaty, 
2010). When these connections were brokered, Fidelity was active in the Seaport and Procter & 
Gambel’s Gillette factory sat right on the edges of what was to become the innovation district 
boundary. State Street Corporation, though not located in the Seaport at the time, moved there 
soon after the announcement of the innovation district. These organizations had a vested interest 
in the ongoing development of the South Boston Waterfront as, at this point, they were still 
surrounded by parking lots and limited amenities.  
 
Menino’s Innovation District: Setting the Plan in Motion 
Whereas previous development was fragmented and saw a series of fits and starts, the 
innovation district was Menino’s opportunity to build a neighborhood wholesale. Menino 
achieved this concretely focusing on a handful of innovation related elements and then allowing 
the market to take over. 
After Menino publicly declared Boston’s Innovation District he insisted that the BRA and 
all efforts moving forward brand the neighborhood with the new name (developer, personal 
interview, 2016). The rebranding of the South Boston Waterfront is starkly evident in the 
marketing materials that followed his announcement. 
The initial master plan for the Seaport Square neighborhood was developed in 2008 by 
the New York based firm Kohn Pedersen Fox Associates (KPF) with Hacin + Associates acting 
as the local urban design consultant. Not once in the 1354 paged version of the 2008 master plan 
available on the Boston Planning & Development Agency website does the word innovation 
appear. However, in 2010, following on the heels of Menino’s public declaration of the 
innovation district, Hacing + Associates in collaboration with the real estate agency, Boston 
Global Investors, a new executive summary of the master plan is released. This document is rife 
with innovation district rhetoric.   
Adding to the momentum, Menino assigned his staff to continuously deliver 
presentations on his Innovation District. These documents, too, are filled with the promise of 
how space can fuel innovation (Hammar, 2010; consultant, personal interview, 2016). 
Providing a base for MassChallenge, an incubator that began in 2009 and now has offices 
across the globe, helped sell the brand of the South Boston Waterfront as a 1,000-acre cubicle for 
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innovation. When the recession hit, John Fallon could not advance on his $3B destination 
neighborhood vision. When Menino received the tip that MassChallenge was looking for new 
space, Menino negotiated with Fallon for free rent in the 14th floor of Fallon’s building on One 
Marina Park Drive in Fan Pier (state representative, personal interview, 2016). Venture capital 
firm, Spencer Trask & Co, and MassChallenge launched the start-up competition promising to 
award $25,000 for a business willing to locate in the Seaport Innovation District. This activity 
signaled that the new part of the city was going to be focused on innovation. It also signaled 
flexibility in the space and growth in creating a cluster.  
In an effort to include civic space to anchor the district, Menino commissioned the 
development of District Hall. District Hall, a $7 million, 12,000-square-foot, free-standing public 
innovation center, was built “to foster collaboration among the young businesses and 
entrepreneurs” providing a “place or them to gather, innovate, and create jobs”(Farrell, 2013) 
Unlike other innovation spaces in the district that are not easily accessible and guarded by 
private security, one of the benefits of District Hall is that it is open to the public and contains 
conference space, labs, and classrooms for budding entrepreneurs. The building was built by 
Boston Global Investors a part of its 23-acre development and is leased to the city for $1 a year 
for five years. After five years, the city could renew their lease (ibid.). 
Three years into its development, Menino recognized the need to meet the demands for 
affordable housing. To meet Menino’s vision for a 24-7 neighborhood inclusive of artists, 
Menino created new zoning ordinances approved for the development of houses called 
InnoHousing—much smaller in size than the average apartment and include shared kitchen and 
communal living spaces. Menino approved a $150M housing development with micro-units, as 
low as 300 sq ft dormitories with shared living spaces and elements for communal lifestyles 
(Casey, 2010). West Coast development firm Gerding Edlen Cos, agreed to build these micro-
units stating of the neighborhood that the area is “a unique place where art, creativity, and 
innovation all collide" ( Kelly Saito, president of Gerding Edlen, cited in Casey, 2011). The first 
units were designated for the Fort Point Channel neighborhood. They cost $150M to build and 
they replaced a 5-story warehouse. Of the 200 units to be built, 19 were to be rented below 
market rates. “They were designed for a startup crowd but are actually targeting a richer 
demographic, perhaps one that lives in the suburbs but may want a place to stay overnight now 
and again” (non-profit executive, personal interview, 2016). 
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Larger space needs for larger companies 
The innovation brand was a way to get momentum going. However, the reality of the 
location and the amount of open and available land for development meant that the Seaport 
required larger, more established legal and financial firms, such as those anchoring the district 
today, to bankroll the development.  
Large corporations wanted to be part of the energy and tap into innovation potential. 
Many of these companies have internal entrepreneur programs with successful products sold 
through their sales channels. They might not be innovative companies themselves, but they 
outsource innovation. Autodesk and GE are examples of large corporations that want access to 
what is happening in the marketplace in order to be more competitive and to retain their 
employees. Some of them build entire floors for companies not in their competitive space (state 
representative, personal interview, 2016). 
In 2011, Vertex’s move to the South Boston Waterfront served as a signal that Menino’s 
vision was coming to fruition. Vertex had recently received FDA approval for a new drug, which 
shifted their status from a funky creative R&D lab in Kendall Square to a major pharmaceutical 
company (Real estate consultant, personal interview, 2016). When Vertex had the opportunity to 
build, they could not find enough space in Kendall Square. They wanted to demonstrate to the 
world that they had a business model that could scale up. People taking off from Logan Airport 
could see a shiny building with the Vertex logo (Real estate consultant, personal interview, 
2016). Vertex received tax breaks for moving to the Seaport. Thus, when Menino declared the 
innovation district there was not much money in city coffers for additional development (non-
profit executive, personal interview, 2016). 
Moving to the innovation district served as a way for a company to rebrand their image. 
In 2016, GE was looking for a flagship location that aligned with their Internet of Things 
direction. However, moving to the South Boston Waterfront also made sense because there were 
still large open parcels for an established company to build. GE could now reside within the 
boundaries of a city as opposed to their prior suburban Connecticut location, breach a connection 
to P&G, while also gaining direct access to talent. The deal was sweetened by $150M in state 
and local incentives for its promise to bring 800 jobs (T. Logan, 2018). 
Procter & Gamble, the parent company of Gillette, agreed to sell GE 2.5 acres of the 44-
acre Gillette campus for GE’s move to the Seaport. The company will rehab two empty brick 
warehouses that used to house the New England Confectionary Company, and also construct a 
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new building. Since privately owned real estate does not qualify for state incentives, to secure 
these benefits for GE, the BRA agreed to own the buildings and lease them out to GE. GE could 
then occupy the buildings rent free for up to 20 years (T. Logan, 2016b). 
When Jeff Immelt, the CEO of the GE, was asked why he decided to relocate the 
company from the suburbs of Connecticut to the Seaport, he replied, "I want [employees] to walk 
out of our office every day and be terrified. I want to be in the sea of ideas so paranoia reigns 
supreme. To look out the window and see deer running across? I don't care about [that]" (cited in 
T. Logan, 2016b). This comment demonstrates a shift from the ideal of a pastoral and secluded 
environment to an open network. 
Amazon also moved offices to the South Boston Waterfront. In May of 2018, Governor 
Baker of Massachusetts said it would spend $20M to bring Amazon to the Seaport along with tax 
breaks of up to $5M from the city of Boston. In exchange, Amazon agreed to create 2,900 full-
time corporate office jobs (T. Logan, 2018). 
The market change led to a different type of development than what was initially 
projected. Parcels in the Seaport are already claimed and built to the maximum amount. Now the 
people scouting the place represent well established companies looking for new construction and 
floor plans that are big and well laid out and conducive to new construction, rather than trying to 
occupy smaller, multiple floor spaces (non-profit executive, personal interview, 2016).  
By square footage the significant majority of the office, residential, and hotel are not 
innovation economy. They are traditional business tenants, high-end condos, and high-end retail 
(Real estate consultant, personal interview, 2016). 
Today, it is almost impossible to find large parcels of land available. Whether that means 
the larger companies will buy out a series of smaller companies to expand their operations 
remains to be seen. Either way, companies needing larger footprints need to seek space 
elsewhere. This also applies to the larger manufacturing companies that resided in the peninsula 
before market forces took over but can no longer afford to renew their leases.  
 
Detroit 
The origins of the Detroit Innovation District strategy began at the state level. According 
to individuals driving the development of the Detroit Innovation District, Bruce Katz played a 
role in highlighting existing assets and resources that could be leveraged to create an innovation 
district in 2008, years before the 2014 official announcement (personal interviews, 2015-2016). 
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In December of 2013, the Brookings Institution, in tandem with Business Leaders for Michigan, 
a non-profit consulting and research arm of the state of Michigan; The Reinvestment Fund, a 
community development institution with offices in Philadelphia and Baltimore; Public Sector 
Consultants, a research and program management firm; and the Michigan Municipal League, a 
non-profit business management consultant organization, collaborated to develop firm aims and 
objectives for the district (Detroit Innovation District: Physical Place Working Group, 2014).  
The committee agreed that Governor Snyder would formally declare the district, 
determine a team to deploy the idea, and then officials in Lansing would step back to allow local 
Detroit leaders to implement the district. The committee selected Detroit as the location for the 
first innovation district because they feared that a faltering Detroit would negatively impact the 
remainder of the state. As one individual on the advisory committee expressed, “Detroit has to 
do well, or the rest of the state will not do well when it comes to international commerce” (real 
estate company representative, personal interview, 2015). 
The move of the innovation district strategy from the state level to the city level 
implicated local Detroit foundations. Foundations in Detroit already had a rich history of funding 
revitalization efforts in Downtown and Midtown. The New Economy Initiative (NEI), the 
strategic grant-making branch of the Hudson-Webber Foundation, has been instrumental in this 
respect investing over $50 million in the area since 2010 (Detroit Innovation District a New 
Economic Development Designation, 2014; foundation head, personal interview, 2015). Under 
the executive leadership of the mayor and with input from the NEI and Mass Economics, the 
organization hired by the NEI to consult on the development of the Detroit Innovation District, 
an advisory committee of 18 individuals was created as the public face and steward of the Detroit 
Innovation District. This star-studded cast represents home grown entrepreneurial initiatives and 
leaders of all the major public institutions and private corporations within the Detroit Innovation 
District boundary. Three working groups sit below this advisory committee, each focused on a 
specific area of development: 1) Physical Place, 2) Innovation and Commercialization, 3) 
Building Detroit’s Knowledge Economy. These groups, made up of ten to twelve people, are 
tasked with presenting concrete plans for their respective areas to the advisory committee.  
By May 2014, the local Detroit committee had revised the state-level draft to adapt it to 
local context. The overarching vision in this document is that the innovation district would raise 
the status of Detroit to “be a globally recognized center of ideation, commercialization, and 
talent that powers economic opportunity for the residents of the city and repositions Detroit’s 
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role in the national and global economies” (Lewis, Lynch, & Vey, 2014: p 8). This local draft 
aims to provide a firm governance structure and leadership platform to target reform within the 
district and calls for a Detroit Innovation District manager to oversee development in the district 
and to formalize economic, physical, and networking asset development while having a direct 
line to the Mayor, as the city is the lead actor in the Detroit Innovation District effort. 
Highlighting how revamping buildings is based on tech imperatives, in February 2015 the 
space commission presented to the Advisory Committee with the number one recommendation 
to focus on updating the building infrastructure. The recommendation was based off of a study 
that revealed only 4% of the buildings in the district were built after 1980 and the remainder are 
not conducive to current technology needs. This statistic signaled the need to reinvest in the 
infrastructure of the central business district. In addition, part of the work that emerged from 
these early meetings was deriving an asset inventory for Detroit. The assets highlighted as part of 
the Detroit Innovation District include (see figure 28).  
 
Figure 28: Detroit Innovation District asset inventory 
 
The concentration of these institutions in the downtown core and the inadequacy of the 
“right” infrastructure to support a knowledge-based economy played a major role in the decision 
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to overlay an innovation district in the downtown neighborhoods (The Detroit Innovation 
District: Recommendations for State Alignment and Investment, 2013). According to drafts for 
the innovation district, the decision to focus on the New Center, Midtown, and Downtown 
neighborhoods was also a result of the demographics. While most of Detroit was losing its 
population, in the May 2014 draft outlining the innovation district strategy, the targeted area 
comprised 3.1 percent of the city’s land area, a little over 3 percent of the city’s population 
(22,018), 52 percent of the city’s employment base, and 9 percent of its business establishments 
(4,700) (Lewis et al., 2014). Despite employment decline in the city, the Central Business 
District demonstrates growth. Investments were also concentrating in that area with over $880 
million invested in the Central Business District, Lafayette Park, and Rivertown areas between 
2010 and 2012 (7.2 SQ MI Report: A Report on Greater Downtown Detroit, 2013). 
Considering the upward trends in growth and investments already occurring in the 
downtown, accelerating revitalization became the central justification in labeling the space an 
innovation district. As one respondent at the state level stated when asked the purpose for an 
innovation district in Detroit:  
“[T]his should be something where we are unabashed and unafraid to say, we’re 
gonna double down in this area because it is important, because we cannot fail. 
And so, it doesn’t mean we’re screwing over the rest of the state, it doesn’t 
mean we are not going to invest anywhere else, but we are absolutely going to 
prioritize some commitments here” (consultant, personal interview, 2015). 
Though the innovation district declaration ignited excitement for a future Detroit, 
definitional issues of innovation quickly materialized in relation to what space the border would 
encompass: Does Corktown, the neighborhood with a high concentration of makerspaces, qualify 
as producing innovative activity? Is it contradictory to include Easternmarket, the public food 
market that provides fresh produce to the city, as part of the innovation district? On one hand, the 
crowds it generates displays the urban vibrancy innovation district strategy seeks to foster, on the 
other hand, it is zoned for slaughtering animals, not necessarily an innovative activity. Also, 
what is the relationship and responsibility of the innovation district, which encapsulates 
Downtown and Midtown Detroit, to the remainder of the declining city?  
Stakeholders harbor conflicting expectations and misperceptions on what the innovation 
district represents. This discrepancy is evident in a variety of ways, from a definitional 
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understanding of innovation to issues of governance and battles over the boundaries of the 
district.  
 
Figure 29: Detroit Innovation District border disputes 
 
 
In the 2014 public declaration of the Detroit Innovation District officials did not specify 
the exact geographic boundaries of the district, preferring instead to name general areas it would 
encompass. The Woodward Avenue corridor is highlighted as a focal point in all maps of the 
innovation district. The main differences between the various iterations are the fluctuations with 
the Corktown neighborhood line on the western border and the New Center neighborhood on the 
northern border. In all maps, Eastern Market remains outside of the district (see figure 29). 
Unlike the formerly bustling urban agriculture markets in Chicago and New York with 
warehouse structures now converted into trendy lofts or office spaces, Detroit’s Eastern Market 
maintains its economic vitality as an operating market in the heart of the city. Depending on 
whom you ask, Eastern Market sits either on the periphery or within the boundaries of Detroit’s 
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Innovation District. This is an important distinction. Proponents for its inclusion argue that urban 
agriculture is a growing sector with opportunities to demonstrate innovation through leadership 
and new conceptions of agricultural production. In addition, as a popular destination for a diverse 
array of people, Eastern Market epitomizes the type of spontaneous interaction innovation 
district boosters proclaim as necessary for innovation. In fact, in 2013, MIT recognized Eastern 
Market as a prime example of urban place-making (Silberberg, Lorah, Disbrow, & Muessig, 
2013). However, opponents’ concerns center on the health and sanitation issues posed by an 
industry that slaughters animals on site. This raises questions about the imaginary of innovation 
and if agriculture and livestock too closely connote an antiquated model of production not 
suitable for the tech economy.14 
The concept of an urban laboratory–what an innovation district seeks to become, 
mobilizes an aspirational imaginary of what form the district should assume and what activities it 
should house (Karvonen & Van Heur, 2014). Spatially, a tension exists in determining the hard 
lines between where the innovation district begins and where it ends. But this same tension is 
evident in terms of the types of knowledge that can exist within the space. Here is where 
individual sociotechnical imaginaries come into play. Whereby one individual adamantly 
believes that it is incorrect to target specific sectors because it will limit the possibility for new 
innovative and emergent sectors, another feels strongly that “[MSU’s] music school, isn’t 
necessarily helping in the innovation space” (Foundation head, personal interview, 2015). When 
asked what elements do not belong within the space, one respondent’s answer included the jail 
residing in the Downtown15, heavy manufacturing, and a single-family house on 50 acres 
enclosed by a white picket fence specifying: 
 
“So I think that there are a number of different things and not all of them 
negative, they just don’t belong in the area, if you define it as a dense, vital, 
connected environment, just intuitively as you go through the list, you say, ‘ok, 
                                               
14 Within the smart cities literature there is a strand focused on deconstructing future-oriented imaginaries. See for example 
Rabari & Storper (2015) and Shelton et al., (2015). For an excellent spatial discussion on ascribing problematic values to a space 
as a type of government rationality, see Huxley (2006). 
15 On April 2016 Dan Gilbert unveiled a plan to build a soccer stadium at the 15-acre jail site in Downtown Detroit. This is not a 
formal plan since Wayne County still owns the site and expects to proceed with development of the jail. However, Gilbert’s 
influence in Detroit is significant. MLS Commissioner Dan Garber was present at the announcement, which was held at Rossetti 
Associates Inc.’s Detroit headquarters as they are the architectural firm behind the 500,000-square-foot soccer stadium and 
500,000 squared-feet surrounding area design (Shea & Pinho, 2016). 
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this makes sense and this doesn’t” (private company executive, personal 
interview, 2015). 
 
Another respondent said, “I think that there are innovative things that are going on in the 
craftsman side as well that probably don’t fit most people’s definitions, but they do from an asset 
building perspective for us” (venture capitalist, personal interview, 2015). 
Fundamentally, the disagreement is based on disagreements at the leadership level on the 
role of the innovation district, as well as what constitutes as innovation. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to pin down innovation to any one location. A few elements remained consistent 
regarding the understanding of what an innovation district would mean for Detroit. The first is 
that the district would function as a special zone for funding priorities at the state, as well as 
justification for federal asks for additional financial support in that concentrated area. It is also an 
area where the Mayor would support and advance changes in zoning regulations. These priorities 
highlight the preference for securing territory. 
 
St. Louis 
Detroit and St. Louis both share the complexities and challenges of shrinking 
populations, struggling economies, and a diminishing resource base (Beauregard, 2013; 
Hollander et al., 2009). In addition, both cities have a legacy of racial conflict and securing 
housing for black populations (Farley, 2005; Sugrue, 2014). One major difference between the 
Detroit Innovation District and St. Louis’ Cortex Innovation Community is the concentrated two-
decade long effort by the St. Louis growth machine to develop a regional strength in bioscience. 
On account of this, the Cortex Innovation Community has undergone many iterations. Still, 
mechanisms to secure territory were evident in the mid- to late-1990s and continue to the present 
day with Cortex’s latest phase, what they are calling Cortex 3.0. 
The origins of Cortex are fragmented with respondents pinpointing different start dates. 
One reason for this is that the assembly of parcels and buildings that now form the Cortex 
Innovation Community were added through a piecemeal process. Another major reason is due to 
the way Cortex is conceived. Leadership views Cortex as an “idea, and organization, and a 
place” (An ord. approving the development plan for Cortex West Redevelopment, 2006: p. 6). For 
some, Cortex began when the idea of building a science park was conceived. For others, it is 
when a group of leaders incorporated as Cortex. Still for others, it is when the purchase of a 
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building marked a physical location where Cortex could exist. Despite variations, the shared 
commonality across origin stories is a culture of service, marked by powerful leadership, and 
financial contributions. 
The legally recognized beginning of Cortex is in 2002 when founding members from the 
area institutions and civic realm incorporated as a tax-exempt 501(c)3 under the name the Center 
of Research, Technology, and Entrepreneurial eXpertise, known as Cortex for its acronym.16 
However, to begin in 2002 is to gloss over earlier efforts by the St. Louis growth coalitions to 
develop a science-centric rhetoric that assisted in the clearing out of the large swath of land on 
which Cortex both exists and owns.  
Cortex stakeholders influential in its inception refer to four catalytic reports that cleared 
the path for economic development policies focused on growing the plant and science sectors. 
The first study was commissioned in the 1980s by the Science and Technology Committee of the 
St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association (RCGA). This report identified the land 
between Washington University’s and Saint Louis University’s campuses as the ideal location 
for the development of Technopolis, a high-service corridor to connect the campuses (Winter, 
2006), but with the added emphasis on technology.17 The second report, a weeklong series of 
articles published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in March of 1997 collectively called the Peirce 
Report, elaborated on the idea of Technopolis envisioning it as a 1,000-acre urban research park 
connecting the two campuses (ibid.). The Battelle Memorial Institute, an applied science and 
technology development company based out of Ohio with an office in St. Louis, commissioned 
the third and fourth reports. Both Battelle reports highlight St. Louis’ regional potential for 
national recognition as a business hub for the plant and life sciences, designated by the name 
BioBelt (Life Sciences & Missouri’s Economic Future: An Opportunity to Build “One 
Missouri,” 2003).  
The four reports influenced growth coalitions to target development in the land between 
the WashU and SLU campuses and to focus on the plant and life science sector. However, 
considering funding sources, some question the legitimacy of the reports wondering whether “the 
reports are valid or simply a case of a hired consultant telling biotech boosters what they want to 
                                               
16 The X in Cortex was later changed to ‘Exchange’ to give it its present name: Center for Research, Technology, and 
Entrepreneurial Exchange. At a later point, CORTEX changed its logo from the all-caps CORTEX to Cortex. For consistency, I 
use the contemporary spelling ‘Cortex’. 
17 The concept of “technopolis”, high-technology based economic development, began in the 1960s and 1970s as a regional 
development strategy that aligned with the growth of suburban office and research parks. The strategy appeared around the globe 
in places such as Japan, Southern California. For a good review see Preer (1992). 
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hear” (Melcer, 2005). Bolstering this sentiment is the long-term management (1994 – 2011) of 
the RGCA by Richard Fleming. Prior to his arrival in St. Louis, Fleming was involved in 
Denver’s downtown revitalization. Fleming forced conversations on the economic development 
of the region (Winter, 2006), first through the Peirce Report, and later by commissioning a trip 
for Cortex leadership to visit the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), a university with 
an established reputation for actively investing billions of dollars executing the reimagination of 
its bordering neighborhood Kendall Square. 
The concept of building a Technopolis in St. Louis caught on. The University of 
Missouri-St. Louis was the first to attempt executing the Technopolis vision through an incubator 
called the Center for Emerging Technologies (CET). A joint endeavor between the University of 
Missouri-St. Louis and the Missouri Department of Economic Development founded the CET in 
1996 as a 501(c)3 with representatives from the major institutions, government, and the private 
sector. In 1998, spurred by the Technopolis concept and the growing interest in downtown 
development (Winter, 2006), the leaders of the CET decide to relocate the incubator in the space 
the RGCA reports pinpointed for Technopolis. Thus, the city of St. Louis, using the CET as the 
legal entity, purchased an abandoned warehouse on Forest Park Avenue for $500,000. Using 
$1.5M in tax increment financing, Paric Corporation gutted and remodeled the abandoned 
warehouse (Kurtovic, 2013). In June of 1998, CET opened its doors for the first time at 4041 
Forest Park Avenue. In multiple media reports celebrating the opening of the CET, Marcia 
Mellitz, president of the CET, hails the foundational importance of CET as the first step in 
achieving the Technopolis vision: “We haven't begun to tap the potential that is here," she said. 
"It is well beyond a couple of buildings" (Goodman, 1999). The arrival of CET is the first 
indication of escalating land prices in the section of land between the Washington University and 
Saint Luis University campuses, an important fact that is later glossed over in a 2008 Missouri 
Supreme Court decision to approve Cortex under Chapter 353 status, which bestows them with 
the power of blight removal and eminent domain (Walter, 2008).  
 
Financial Backing 
Washington University was also heavily invested in the success of CET and the idea of 
Technopolis. The CET board was comprised of representatives from Washington University. 
Their interest was in the proximity of CET to their campus and the potential for their alumni to 
use the CET as an incubator. Prior to the legal 2002 Cortex designation, William Danforth, then 
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Chancellor Emeritus of Washington University but still heavily invested in the university’s 
success, asked John Dubinsky to oversee the development of Technopolis. Having held notable 
executive positions as Chairman of the board of Barnes Jewish HealthCare, President and chief 
executive of Westmoreland Associates LLC, presided over Mark Twain Bancshares and 
Mercantile Bank, president emeritus of Firstar, in 2001Dubinsky agrees to Danforth’s request 
(Tucci, 2002). By 2002, five are institutions (Washington University, the University of Missouri- 
St. Louis, Sant Louis University, Barnes Jewish HealthCare, and the Missouri Botanical 
Gardens) formed the anchor of Cortex, in addition to civic partners RCGA, Civic Progress, and 
the City set up Cortex as an entity to develop a biotech corridor in midtown St. Louis. In May of 
that same year, the Cortex backers publicly listed include: Harvey Harris, John Dubinsky, Lewis 
Levey, William Danforth; Danforth Foundation, McDonnell family foundations, and Monsanto 
Fund (Bolhafner, 2004). 
By this point, Cortex comprised a group of individuals interested in growing the plant 
and life science sectors but did not yet exist as a developer nor as a place. Shortly after 
incorporating, Richard Fleming, of the RCGA, the same man who orchestrated funding the 
Peirce Reports, bankrolled a trip for the Cortex leaders to visit Kendall Square in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts (elected official, personal interview, June 17, 2016). It is at this meeting, which is 
held at MIT, where Cortex leaders learned about the $600M contributed from MIT endowment 
money to revitalize the area surrounding the MIT campus. In addition, they also learned about 
the importance of university anchors and their role in funding innovation. This trip proved 
catalytic in provoking the replication of the model in St. Louis (incubator executive, personal 
interview, 2016; Smart People. Cool Places. The Story of Cortex, 2017). 
For some, this trip, and the events that followed it, form the true beginning of Cortex. The 
popular story is that upon returning from Massachusetts, Bill Danforth, convenes an impromptu 
breakfast, held at the executive conference room of Barnes Jewish HealthCare, with a handful of 
the most influential leaders in St. Louis. Danforth commanded a lot of respect in the community. 
Of Danford’s leadership, one responded stated, “Bill is the kind of person you just don’t say ‘no’ 
to” (real estate developer, personal interview, 2016). As some insiders tell it, the night before the 
breakfast, an unnamed source tipped off Danforth that a private developer wanted to acquire a 
large track of derelict land on the Central West End (ibid.). Recognizing the importance of that 
parcel of land, at 10 pm that same night, Danforth started a series of phone calls to invite key 
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individuals to an emergency breakfast. This was a breakfast purposely designed to raise enough 
funds to purchase Cortex’s first official building. 
Prominent individuals from the business community were present: the Mayor, university 
and hospital executives, the heads of the Missouri Botanical Gardens and Civic Progress. At the 
meeting, Danforth stressed the need to raise money to acquire the property. The trip participants 
discussed findings from their trip to MIT and proposed the idea of assembling land to create a 
district. Coming into the meeting, Danforth hoped to raise enough for the estimated assessed land 
value of $60M. By the end of the breakfast meeting, Danford had raise $175,000 toward the 
purchase of land (Smart People. Cool Places. The Story of Cortex, 2017).  
Collecting $175,000 was only the beginning of how much money Cortex leadership 
would secure for their vision, though now singularly called Cortex rather than Technopolis. 
Following the catalytic breakfast, Cortex leaders held private individual meetings with leaders 
from the five area institutions to procure funding with the agreement that after twenty years the 
investment would be returned with interest. The first person they approached was Mark 
Wrighton, Chancellor of Washington University. Wrighton, who was previously professor and 
Provost at MIT, committed $15M to support the Cortex initiative. Once Washington University 
demonstrated willingness to back the development, the other institutions agreed to follow suit. 
Barnes Jewish HealthCare contributed $5M, Saint Louis University $5M, and the University of 
Missouri-St. Louis contributed $4M. The Missouri Botanical Garden enthusiastically supported 
the initiative but could not help in financing it.  
Adding to the venture, in October 2003, the Missouri Finance Board voted to provide 
$12M in tax credits over five years to buy land for Cortex, plus the Danforth Foundation, one 
McDonnell family foundation, and Monsanto Fund pledge $2.5M.18 The $12M funding package 
represented the first time the state of Missouri used public money to fund a project that extended 
beyond a single building to creating a “long-term, revolving fund supporting a general idea in a 
geographic zone” (Melcer, 2003; italics mine). As discussed in the next chapter, this is the power 
of selling an idea, of selling something that moves beyond the tangibility of a material entity and 
it succeeded in soliciting funds. It also releases any protection or potential public good over the 
increased value of an area, which, prior to Cortex ownership, was public land. Slowly, over the 
course of almost two decades, Cortex would take over the rights for eminent domain in 2006, 
                                               
18 This was initially meant to fund BioGenerator’s proof-of-concept fund, but since Cortex decided to fund BioGenerator’s 
efforts, the $2.5M were instead used to acquire land through the use of tax credits 
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and then again in 2012 through a TIF designation giving them full control the area within the 
legally approved Cortex boundary. 
 
Securing Chapter 353 and its implications 
Around 2003, media reporting on Cortex picks up. Whereas before, Cortex worked 
behind the scenes as a group of individuals interested in the growth of St. Louis, 2003 marks the 
period where the entity secures funding from federal, state, and local government coffers and 
begins land acquisitions.  
Having secured a sizeable sum of money and support from the City of St. Louis and 
anchor institutions, Cortex was prepared to acquire land and develop it. To do so, Cortex decided 
to seek Chapter 353 R.S.Mo 2000 status. The Urban Redevelopment Corporations Act, 
commonly called Chapter 353, is a Missouri statute established in 1945. This statute allows 
private developers to acquire and redevelop blighted land and authorizes the entity eminent 
domain (Mo.Rev.Stat §§ 353.010-353.180 (1986 & Supp. 1988). On July 2, 2004, Cortex 
incorporates under the legal title CORTEX West Redevelopment Corporation with Chapter 353 
status (“Ordinance #66985,” 2006).19 On July 22, one year after becoming a legal redevelopment 
corporation, the Board of Aldermen approves the ordinance finding and declares the parcel 
Cortex is interested in developing as blighted as defined in Chapter 353 (“Ordinance #66847,” 
2005). Soon after in September of 2005, CORTEX West Redevelopment Corporation submitted 
their detailed development plan (“Ordinance #66985,” 2006). On January 4 of 2006, the 
Planning Commission submitted a recommendation for approval of the plan based on findings 
from an independent study and investigation that the area is indeed blighted and that the 
redevelopment plan is both in the public interest and serving a public purpose. On February 16, 
2006, the redevelopment plan is approved and Cortex, vested with full development authority, is 
allowed to execute their plan. 
Through its use of maps, geographical layout, and parcel inventory, the Cortex 
development plan is certainly the type of plan an urban planner would comprehend. The Cortex 
development plan outlines two redevelopment areas: CORTEX West and CORTEX East. The 
CORTEX West 353 Redevelopment Area comprises of 180 acres between the Washington 
University medical Center with Barnes Jewish Healthcare headquarters and flagship facilities 
and the Frost Campus of Saint Louis University. The designated area extends from Newstead 
                                               
19 Here I use the all caps CORTEX to match the legal documents submitted to the State of Missouri. 
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and Taylor Avenues on the west to Vandeventer Avenue on the East and from Forest Park Ave 
and Laclede Avenue on the North to US 40/ I 64 on the south. The CORTEX East 353 
Redevelopment Area comprises of 73 acres located immediately north of the Saint Louis 
University Health Sciences Center and focused on the intersection of Chouteau Avenue and 
Grand Avenue. 
 
Figure 30: Cortex planned development area 
 
Source: (“Ordinance #66985,” 2006) 
 
Each development is formalized under two wholly-owned private, limited dividend 
redevelopment corporations, CORTEX West Redevelopment Corporation and CORTEX East 
Redevelopment Corporation. To complicate matters, the Cortex leaders created an affiliated for-
profit entity called the St. Louis Land Company, LLC, to conduct land transactions. In addition, 
each building that Cortex develops directly becomes a single-asset LLC. For example, Cortex’s 
first building, Cortex I, is legally CORTEX West Development I, LLC (“Ordinance #66847,” 
2005). 
At many points throughout the document, the Cortex redevelopment plan invokes the 
normative sentiment that the Cortex vision is the shared responsibility of all: 
 
“Successful area redevelopment will require that the residents of the city and the 
broader business community share the vision and that a wide array of financial, 
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corporate, and public resources be committed to a process of redevelopment 
designed to make sites available for new life sciences-related businesses and 
institutions” (“Ordinance #66985,” 2006: p. 4). 
 
The document claims that many of the existing parcels:  
 
“[A]re in conflict with and stand in the way of efforts to take advantage of the 
opportunity to capitalize on this key area adjacent to the Washington University 
Medical Center and St. Louis University by attracting new jobs and employers 
that will raise the city’s economic fortunes and generate revenues necessary to 
provide the public services and facilities so desperately needed by its citizens” 
(“Ordinance #66985,” 2006: p.8).  
 
Justifying the need for eminent domain and the need to control development in the area, 
Dubinsky argues it is best for Cortex to lay the first marks:  
 
“CORTEX is viewed as a 20- to 25-year project…We hope to foster millions of 
square feet of biotech space. We decided we were better off developing the first 
building ourselves to set a quality standard and a tone for the entire development" 
(Jackson, 2004). 
 
 Cortex does indeed set the tone. In terms of land use, the document states that the current 
use of the land is for industrial, warehouse, and distribution uses, uses that do not align with the 
new Cortex vision. The businesses that current use the land in this way, the document states, 
“can prosper again if relocated to other areas of the city or region that can better accommodate 
their operations” (“Ordinance #66985,” 2006: p.8). Accordingly, the redevelopment plan 
proposes demolishing 52 structures. This includes the 43 dwelling units on site, 38 of which are 
occupied. Of the 43 dwelling units, only five are deemed in poor exterior condition. The 
remainder are either in fair condition (7) or good condition (31). Yet, the recommended action 
for all 43 units is demolition (“Ordinance #66985,” 2006: p.16 & p.30). 
Joe Stickler, president of St. Louis Metallizing Co, facing the ordinance that would force 
his relocation, summarized the development as such, “The message is that they don't want me to 
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be here because I don't fit their bio, life-sciences criteria… What this is doing is grabbing land 
from me so that somebody else can profit” (cited in Heisler, 2005). Bob Brauer, a business 
owner of a heating and cooling equipment company whose business fells within the Cortex 
boundary and was targeted for condemnation, expressed the following sentiment in a 2006 article 
documenting Cortex securing Chapter 353 status, "I think all of us agree that bringing in new 
jobs is a good thing for the city…We just don't think we should be the ones to pay for it," he 
said. "Why should I, as a good corporate citizen, be subject to peril just because they want my 
place?" (Heisler, 2006). Finally, another active building purchased by Cortex housed 
Employment Connection, a non-profit organization that connects ex-offenders to employment 
opportunities and provides services (Desloge, 2004). The tone set by Cortex on the type of 
activity that will exist within the borders is clear. 
In the 1990s, criticism of the lax blight requirements was prevalent with media reporting 
on the displacement of residents and unjustified claims on the status of the buildings under 
question. Chapter 353 was criticized for three main reasons. The first related to the 
administration of the program and the inability for the government to ensure developer 
compliance with redevelopment plans. The second was the failure to protect the residents and the 
neighbors of the redevelopment area. The third was the questionable blight determination and the 
use of Chapter 353 in areas that do not demonstrate blight (Shultz & Sapp, 1990). 
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled over a case between Station Investments 
#10 Redevelopment Corporation and CORTEX West Redevelopment Corporation. Station 
Investments argued that the Cortex redevelopment plan was fatally deficient and that the findings 
of blight were not supported by substantial evidence. In the Development Strategies, Inc. study, a 
study conducted by a private company hired by Cortex to assess the land, the study concluded 
that the total taxable assessed value of the area declined nearly ten percent in constant dollars and 
that the assessed value of the area increased only seventeen percent. The 17% was compared to 
34% increase for similar properties. The plaintiff argued that the 34% increase was derived from 
commercial properties in the city. If the comparison would have been against other industrial 
uses, then the 17% increase is substantial for the area. Barry Hogue, an expert hired to review the 
blight study prepared by Development Strategies, Inc., stated that “if the area's assessed values 
were compared with other industrial areas; it was outperforming the industrial properties within 
the city as a whole” (Ahrens, 2008).  
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That this point was dismissed by the court demonstrates the power of the technological 
vision in quieting dissent. What began as Technopolis and is now being fulfilled by Cortex. First 
of all, CET’s arrival in 1998 had already begun to ‘prime the pump’ (Droog Jones & Beggs, 
2005). Additionally, by 2003, residential rates in the city and inner suburbs were already on the 
rise. The St. Louis Association of Realtors were reporting home sale prices up 35% since 2000 
(“City to the Core,” 2003). Plus, in June of 2004 Cortex purchased sites at Markwort and 
Laclede at rates at a slight premium to the market for $25 and $29 per sq ft. signifying their 
recognition willingness to wager on the increased land value (Desloge, 2004). A report by the 
Gundaker Commercial Group speculated that rentable space would be comparable to specialty-
use buildings in suburban markets (ibid.). 
As it relates to the court case, Pacific Legal Foundation, the Show-Me-Institute, and the 
Missouri Ombudsman submitted an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff. Their brief argues 
that the site analysis compiled by the CORTEX West Redevelopment Corporation to give them 
Chapter 353 status and the right to eminent domain was of a “Drive-By Blight” nature. They 
contended that the Missouri Supreme Court should reject ‘windshield surveys,’ where a 
consultant is hired to assess the state of blight from the comfort of their car (Sandefur, 2008): 
 
“Given the fact that Missouri courts have refused for so long to enforce the 
‘public use’ requirement in the state Constitution, the only hope Missouri home 
and business owners have is that courts will at least require government to meet 
high standards when the determination of ‘blight’ is concerned. If they do not, and 
local bureaucrats can not only take property whenever it’s ‘blighted’ but also 
determine without judicial oversight what property counts as blighted, then those 
officials will have limitless power to redistribute property at will” (ibid.). 
 
Ultimately, the case was disposed. The leaders guiding development decisions during this 
time frame reiterated the benefit of Chapter 353. One real estate developer stating that Cortex 
was respectful to the Alderman’s concerns about displacing individuals but that in many ways 
they have more power than him (real estate developer, personal interview, June 14, 2016): “They 
[Cortex] haven’t had to use eminent domain but the threat of it is powerful. They [Cortex] did 
flash the threat of it, though they [Cortex] never actually used it” (ibid). Though Cortex did not 
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forcibly remove individuals, the redevelopment did displace the individuals residing in the 38 
occupied units and businesses that did not meet the imagined definition of a tech utopia. 
In terms of job growth, the redevelopment plan states that the first positions created will 
be in construction. However, these jobs were never intended to be permanent. The aim of the 
redevelopment is to create higher quality jobs and tax rates. “By an expanding and sustainable 
base of high-quality permanent jobs. Likewise, a substantial new private investment in offices 
and research and development facilities will increase the taxable wealth of the 
community”(“Ordinance #66985,” 2006: p.9). Comments such as these demonstrate the targeted 
demographic for the area and the tight control Cortex necessitates on the development process to 
secure its vision. Of priming the pump Dubinsky said, "It's a free-market approach…We're 
trying to prime the pump. We're not trying to control it" (cited in Melcer, 2004). Yet, this stands 
diametrically opposed to actions taken to secure eminent domain and gain TIF status, as well as 
entrenched connections with the private and public sector and funders with the ‘deep pockets’ 
Dubinsky credits (Kurtovic, 2013). 
 
New Leadership, New Visions 
 
“What drives Cortex is real estate development. The people who represented the institutions on 
the board were the real estate people from the universities. The Chair of the board was a real 
estate banker his entire career. The focus was always on the development of the built 
environment” (CET executive, personal interview, 2016).20 
 
From 2002 - 2010, Cortex was operating without a staff. Essentially, Cortex was a 
bioresearch park with five founding partners and two buildings. With the recession halting 
development, it became clear that the strategy for attracting large firms to build within the Cortex 
boundary was no longer an effective or even viable solution (Cortex staff, personal interview, 
2016). In 2010, Cortex engaged a national search to hire a CEO to manage operations. After 
interviewing a sizeable population, Dennis Lower was hired. “Dennis was brought on to 
configure a live-work-play environment as a way to attract more companies rather than just 
provide buildings” (CET executive, personal interview, 2016). Lower brought with him the 
                                               
20 Between 2010 and 2014 five employees were hired. The fifth employee, Phyllis Ellison hired in 2014, was the first person 
without a real estate background. 
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experience of having previously built two other research communities and he contributed his 
background in assembling property, putting together deals, and bringing in partnerships.  
To combat the halt in development on account of the recession, when Lower arrived he 
shifted Cortex’s strategy to focus on the live-work-play model. Cortex was initially focused on 
the suburban real estate model and looking only at bioscience. Lower suggested diversifying the 
portfolio so to appeal to all technologies. In order to attract startup companies, he recognized the 
importance of mixed-use development to create a seamless flow between existing incubators and 
anchor institutions 
To fund this idea, Lower applied for $158M in TIF funding over 25 years to fund $2.2B 
in development under the creation of a new legal entity: Cortex Innovation District (St. Louis 
Innovation District Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Redevelopment Plan, 2012).21 The TIF plan, 
like the 2006 Cortex West Redevelopment Plan, was a long and detailed document submitted to 
and approved by the City of St. Louis. The aim of the plan was to overlay most of the Chapter 
353 boundary with a TIF in order to access funds for blight removal and redevelopment. The 
plan list 17 objectives: concrete plans such as establishing new metro stop, creating new jobs, 
building greenways and bicycle paths, to more ambiguous objectives such as removing blight to 
enhance “public health, safety, welfare, or morals” of the area. Ultimately, the underlying 
purpose of the 17 objectives is to “enhance the tax bases and the resulting tax revenues for the 
City and all other taxing districts that extend into the Redevelopment Area” (St. Louis Innovation 
District Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Redevelopment Plan, 2012: p.13-14). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
21 This was the first mention of Cortex as an innovation district, though later Lower would replace the word ‘district’ with 
‘community’, the name used today. 
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Figure 31: Cortex Tax Increment Finance Plan 
 
Source: (St. Louis Innovation District Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Redevelopment Plan, 
2012) 
The plan hit a major obstacle when minority leaders criticized Cortex for not meeting 
minority participation goals. When asked how many of the newly created jobs employed women 
and minorities, Lower answered, “We do not collect this data, as these are private employers 
who routinely do not report their workforce numbers” (cited in Rivas, 2012). When asked about 
minority inclusion policies, Lower responded, “Each company makes their own decisions about 
diversity inclusion. We have no say in these matters because they are private employers” (ibid). 
Advocates for increased minority and women presence in construction jobs cited a bill 
passed in 2009 requiring public works projects in St. Louis that cost more than $1M to hire a 
workforce of “25% minorities, 5% women, 20% residents, and 15% apprentices” (Kurtovic, 
2012). However, invoking their private developer categorization, Cortex argued that the law did 
not apply to them. Dubinsky diplomatically ensured that Cortex would abide by the regulation, 
but also said this: "Everybody wants to make sure that they get their fair share of the jobs, and 
we'll work with them to make sure that happens…But if anybody wants to say that they're 
against creating new jobs and more tax revenue for the city, I guess I would like them to tell us 
why that is in the public interest"(Kurtovic, 2012). 
What I want to highlight here is the opportunistic way the “public’ is invoked. When 
Cortex wants contributions from the city or the state government, be it in the form of TIF funds, 
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abatements, approving Chapter 353 status, etc., they mobilize a mission driven discourse. When 
they are under fire for not complying with regulations that benefit the community, they ridicule 
the public for not treating them as a private entity.  
Questions concerning the mission of the anchor institutions in relation to 
commercialization is necessary considering the investments they put into Cortex’s development. 
The ability for Cortex leadership to pay back the initial investment made by the area anchor 
institutions is dependent on Cortex’s financial success, which is based on increased capital 
investments and the rise of real estate values. University faculty are not in complete agreement 
about the role their institutions play in funding Cortex or similar spin-off ventures believing it 
can tarnish pure research and education, but they might concede in part because 
“commercialization is increasingly encouraged by the federal agencies that provide more than 
$400 million a year for its scientific research”(Melcer, 2006). Additionally, being off campus, 
even if in a nonprofit academic lab, means that intellectual property rights operate differently.  
University leaders are pressured to play an active role in the economic development of a 
region. This might happen through the strategic hiring of leaders who can direct resources in 
particular ways. At various points during my time interviewing Cortex stakeholders, I sensed a 
dissatisfaction with Saint Louis University’s approach to research. In late September of 2017, 
Saint Louis University hired a Ken Olliff as a new vice president for research to double their 
research budget to over $100M (Barker, 2017). Olliff was invited to sit on the Cortex board and 
has created a “Research Innovation Group,” located in the Cortex district, to enhance research 
commercialization. Commenting on Saint Louis University’s new direction, Lower says: "I'm 
thrilled that SLU is really doubling down to position itself as a stronger national and 
international institution. I think it elevates St. Louis" (ibid.). Once again, favoring Cortex’s 
mission of boosting the life sciences is couched under the larger importance of elevating St. 
Louis, which can then translate to increasing capital investments in the region. 
 
Park Center 
In 2012, the Research Triangle Foundation (Foundation) purchased 100-acres of land. 
The stated purpose for the land acquisition was to develop Park Center, a new space replete with 
facilities that reflected the evolving and diverse requirements of the contemporary workplace and 
that would allow them to better compete on a global and national scale (The Research Triangle 
Park: Master Plan, 2011). Executives of the Foundation promptly followed the land acquisition 
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with a series of meetings and consultations with developers, designers, and architects. From 
these meetings a renewed imaginary landscape emerged, one that would exemplify a vibrant 
ecosystem and project the antiquated RTP brand into the 21st century. 
 
Figure 32: Park Center envisioned by the RTP Foundation 
 
Source: (Park Center, Research Triangle Park, 2015) 
 
In the 1950s RTP was designed to span 7,000 acres in order to prevent employees from 
competing firms from fraternizing with each other. In addition to providing ample space for 
firms to develop their own campuses within RTP, zoning provision established an eight-acre 
minimum lot size, building set-backs of at least 150 feet from the road, and set-backs at least 100 
feet from the side and back property lines (Rohe, 2012) (see figure 35).  
 
Figure 33: Aerial view of Research Triangle Park 
 
Source: RTI International (“Aerial view of the Research Triangle Park campus,” 2009) 
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Today, the ambitions of the RTP Foundation focus on using design to distance 
themselves from the silo-like attitude of the science and research park to a newly collaborative 
phase that includes targeted amenities to attract and retain entrepreneurs and young professionals 
(“Park Center: This is not your grandfather’s RTP,” 2015; RTP Foundation executive, personal 
interview, 2016). To meet the conception of innovation’s inputs as collaborative, cross-sector, 
and high-tech, the design aim of the innovation district is one that prioritizes an open and 
convergent environment where face-to-face interaction is encouraged as a way to foster the 
ideation and commercialization of ideas and products (Chesbrough, 2003; Storper & Venables, 
2004).  
The challenge for the Research Triangle Foundation in conceiving a new plan is ensuring 
retention of existing tenants. The established corporations that populated the park 60 years ago 
when it first opened were initially drawn to the Park because of the ability to purchase multi-acre 
plots to build independent campuses and expand when necessary. Today, the Foundation wants 
to attract tenants it never attracted before—smaller entrepreneurial firms and startups.22 The 
increased spinoff potential from nearby universities creates a viable revenue stream for the 
Foundation. By creating the right environment -the right stage set- the Foundation can divert the 
burgeoning startups from locating in nearby Durham and Raleigh. In the past several years close 
to 400 companies have started in Durham. The American Underground, a private ‘campus 
community’ in downtown Durham that caters to entrepreneurs, startups, innovators, and 
investors, has invested almost $1.5 billion in successful exits (Malizia, 2017).  
 
Conclusion 
In all five cases, innovation district stakeholders juxtaposed the inefficiency of the land 
prior to its development with the envisioned potential for an innovation district. Various tools 
were used to create a parcel of land for development. The Boston Innovation District, positioned 
in close proximity to Boston’s financial district and across the bay from Logan International 
airport, was prime real estate for the expansion of the city. The purpose of the Big Dig was to 
connect the peninsula and open up space for boutique development. The recession seriously 
halted construction. It was then that the Mayor pushed forward the idea of an innovation district. 
                                               
22 Whereas Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route 128 succeed at attracting entrepreneurial ventures, Research Triangle Park never 
did. Only well established companies could afford to purchase and develop land in Research Triangle Park. Entrepreneurial 
ventures not only did not have the zoning for smaller lots that could accommodate them or short-term leases. The zoning 
requirements for Research Triangle Park specified that development was only allowed on 15% of the site (Malizia, 2017). 
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Cortex shares a similar story. At the heart of St. Louis there were 200 acres of blighted land 
between Washington University’s campus and St. Louis University campus. City leaders first 
pursued a Chapter 353 blight status on the targeted land for redevelopment and later a tax 
increment finance district to gain development governance and secure public financial backing to 
develop the land. The central business district of Detroit, hindered by countless blighted 
structures, provoked stakeholders to continuously expand the border of the Detroit Innovation 
District as a way to increase the area of land on which to project a new imaginary, and thus, 
trigger development. Local Dublin growth coalitions, wanting to capitalize on the momentum of 
the tech companies moving into the city, developed a strategic development zone to fast-track 
development and turnover abandoned structures from the building boom into a thriving 
innovation district. Finally, the Research Triangle Foundation, fearful of a max exodus of firms 
moving to nearby cities, recognized the need to replicate the ‘feel’ of the city and its inputs in 
order to cater to entrepreneurs in need of smaller real estate footprints –an effort they see as a 
double benefit as it will help them derive more profit from their land. These are examples of 
political mechanisms to derive territory. 
The space of the innovation district functions as a fresh start (Bach, 2011). It moves 
beyond the derelict structures of the past to present a city very much rooted in the present and 
future seeking. In my case studies, growth coalitions describe the land slated for development as 
wasted space that is not meeting its highest and best use. These ‘dead zones’ (Doron, 2008) are 
“used and conjured by the hegemony for political, social, and economic ends” (ibid; 204). 
Growth coalitions juxtaposition the imaginary of decay with a futuristic layer to elicit excitement 
for development.23 
In all four urban cases, the innovation district was slated on what was earlier industrial 
land. But that does not mean that the space was inactive or dead, only that growth coalitions did 
not feel the land was generating enough rents. Barcelona’s 22@bcn innovation district, the 
model on which the innovation district is based, was also slated for the Poble Nou industrial 
neighborhood. Scholars and activists documented the various artists factories and lofts located 
within the space and their slow demise as the innovation district was built out. The same applies 
to the maritime activity in the Silicon Docks and the Boston Innovation District, and the light-
manufacturing and low-income public service administration buildings in the Cortex Innovation 
                                               
23 Various scholars have documented the mobilization of such imaginaries to funnel development. See for example Smith (1996) 
on development of Lower East Manhattan and Fainstein (2001) on the development of New York and London. 
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Community. The Detroit Innovation District, encompassing the entire Downtown, Midtown, and 
New Center, was the only place in the city demonstrating growth. Yet, the presence of the many 
blighted structures made the adoption of the narrative of dead space possible. As for Research 
Triangle Park with its designer manicured landscapes, though terms such as ‘dead space’ do not 
appear in public accounts or personal interviews, the space is construed as not meeting its 
potential. More, in other words, can be extracted from the space. 
At the local level, the innovation district is a bounded space visible in policy documents 
through its boundary and legible to pedestrians through its architecture and design. As a ‘spatial 
capital accumulation machine’ (Bach, 2011; pg 100), it has a designated physical area and within 
this space it has special rules to govern the corporations that exist there, and by extension, the 
workers that live there. However, the innovation district extends beyond the boundary –though 
not necessarily to surrounding neighborhoods—as a space of flows, a permanently networked 
society is shaped around a logic of flows, such as resources, information, technology, and images 
(Castells, 1992).24 The space of flows is seen as a signature organization of power and efficiency 
under capitalism that compresses time and place (Harvey, 1989b, 1999). The innovation district 
elevates the geographically bound district and its concentration of firms and talent of a 
knowledge economy, into a node in a global network. As a contemporary zone, a zone that 
moves beyond the historic iteration of a zone, which was a space of exception that could attract 
and shape investment (i.e., a colonial free port), to a contemporary space that can attract and 
shape fantasies and aspirations of modernity, the zone becomes what Bach (2011) terms the ‘Ex-
City’. These spaces use the logic of exception to create the legal and political environment 
necessary to their survival that “allows for the re-territorialization of capital in a manner 
consonant with both the needs of nomadic capital and state development” (ibid: pg. 104). The 
Ex-City is a space not wholly separate from the city, such as an offshore banking center, but 
instead focuses on high-skilled workers to create direct linkages from the bounded space, to the 
host city, state, and region.  
 
                                               
24 As I demonstrate in the concluding chapter, what does extend beyond the border are the heightened real estate prices and lack 
of affordable housing. 
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Theme II: Facilitating Production  
Innovation district strategy places great emphasis on the role of urban design to create the 
right environment attractive to knowledge workers while also supporting of the demands of high-
tech infrastructure. But the organization of work is undergoing structural changes. Many of the 
changes are a direct result of sophistications in information and communication technologies 
(ICT). Since the end of World War II, the boundary of the firm has become increasingly 
permeable with the global scale of production and the extent of global supply chains (Davis, 
Ross, Whitman, & Zald, 2006). The difference between then and now is that today the greatest 
job growth is in jobs that move work beyond the walls of the firm (Kalleberg et al., 2000). The 
rise of ICTs has enabled contracting out tasks to employees linked across countries and time 
zones, resulting in firms hiring fewer people for full-time positions, while also challenging the 
conception that work is performed on a fixed schedule in a fixed location (Davis, 2016). Work is 
increasingly organized outside of employer-employee systems, beyond the traditional nine-five 
workday, and occurs in new spaces such as home offices, coworking spaces, warehouses, and 
public innovation centers (Garrett, Spreitzer, & Bacevice, n.d.). These rapid changes in the 
organization and experience of work challenge preconceived conceptions of the “office.” As 
such, designing for knowledge workers at the scale of a district requires sensitivity to new forms 
of work. 
Considering today’s growing mobile workforce (Martin-Brelot et al., 2010; Shearmur, 
2007), the changing dynamics of the firm (Davis, 2016), and the shift in production toward 
immaterial goods (Castells, 1996; Hardt & Negri, 2001), local actors are challenged in their 
ability to claim ownership and rents over production. The innovation district mitigates this 
challenge through two forms of extraction. The first is by increasing the value of the land. As the 
land increases in value, rents proportionally increase. The designation of an innovation district 
serves as a marker of incoming development paving the way for the future investment of 
property. This follows the classic theory of land use and rent theorized by Ricardo and Marx 
(Haila, 1990; Marx, 1992, 1993) and the role of prestige in the location of development in 
relation to rent (Harvey, 2009). 
More interesting, however, and what marks the difference between the innovation district 
and earlier spatial iterations for innovation capture, is understanding how the innovation district 
also serves as an extraction of rent in the form a new type of production, what Autonomous 
Marxists Maurizio Lazarato (1994) defines as immaterial labor. Lazzarato introduced the concept 
  111 
of immaterial labor as the labor that produces the informational and cultural content of the 
commodity. An example might help demonstrate the point. Categorizing immaterial labor as a 
contemporary form of capitalism, Boutang (2011) provides the example of the exchange value a 
pair of Nike shoes can command over and above the expenditure of human labor. What is 
immaterial is the added value the brand commands.  
Using examples from my cases, I aim to extend the concept of the brand for the 
innovation district by defining two components of the brand: the physical elements and the 
immaterial elements. The physical elements of the built environment (i.e., the incubators, coffee 
shops, anchor institutions, etc.) are an essential component of the innovation district. 
Confirmation of the opening of a respected incubator company, such as the Cambridge 
Innovation Center opening up in the Cortex Innovation Community, or that that a respected 
architect is designing a structure in the district, such as Santiago Calatrava’s bridge in Dublin, all 
bring a form of legitimacy that helps boost the physical element brand of the innovation district.  
The immaterial elements (i.e., the appearance of a networked space buzzing with activity) are an 
equally important component of innovation district strategy. Mayor Menino’s idea of creating a 
line item in his budget to fund an innovation district manager in charge of enlivening the space 
of the innovation district and ensuring constant connectivity is one example of efforts to program 
the space of the innovation to create a type of “buzz” and increase the value of the innovation 
district.25 
Following Lazzarato and other Autonomist Marxists such as Terranova (2000) and Mario 
Tronti, and Antonio Negri (Gill & Pratt, 2008), I conceive of the individual interactions to create 
buzz as a form of labor. The term buzz here implies the type of vibrancy that exists in a space as 
conceived by economic geographers as far back as Marshall (1890) in discussing the atmosphere 
of the industrial districts. The form of labor I am discussing differs from feminist scholars who 
argue that traditional conceptions of labor do not account for care work and affect (see for 
example, Boserup, Tan, & Toulmin, 2013; Frederici, 2012; Reid, 1934). I am discussing a form 
of labor that is facilitated in the built environment, in public space, through ICTs and mobile 
technologies. 
                                               
25 The idea of ‘buzz’ is ambiguous, yet it continuously appears in the literature on innovation ecosystems and cluster dynamics. 
Often there are variations in how the idea is expressed. Bell-Masterson and Stangler (2015) use the term ‘vibrancy’. Storper and 
Venables (2004) and Bathelt, Malmberg, and Maskell (2004) discuss it in relation to face-to-face contact and the knowledge 
exchange created from this activity. Even as far back as Alfred Marshall (1890) the concept of buzz is discussed as the ‘secret’ of 
industrial activity (cited in Storper & Venables, 2004:353). The growing recognition of its importance among practitioners and 
designers translates to policy prescriptions that attempt to build buzz into space. 
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To reiterate, there are two elements that facilitate the extraction of labor. The first is ICTs 
and mobile technologies. These sophistications play an important role in allowing activity to 
move beyond firm walls. The second is on the role of architectural and urban design. The activity 
of the firm permeates the space outside of the firm as work moves beyond firm walls.  
One need only look at the architectural renderings and master plans for each innovation 
district to understand the importance of design in attracting investment capital. Design has a long 
history in economic development of heightening the visibility of a location to attract investment 
capital through tourist attraction, place marketing, and culture-led economic development 
(Eisenschitz, 2010; Grodach & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2007; Klingmann, 2007). Well known 
examples in the fields of architecture, urban planning, and design include the use of museums to 
elevate the status of a city, such as the classical example of the Guggenheimin Bilbao 
(Rodriguez, Martinez, & Guenaga, 2001), revitalizing a waterfront, such as the “Rousefication” 
of Baltimore’s Inner Harbor (Levine, 1987), and multiple examples of stadium developments 
(Chapin, 2004; Robertson, 1995).  
Like city-wide economic development strategies, innovation district strategy also 
incorporates design to boost the image of its location. Stakeholders of innovation districts hire 
famous architects to create eye-catching buildings and reputable consultants to design 
masterplans to rival the attempts of other cities with innovation districts. This is evident from the 
recent announcement to build an overhead gondola connecting Boston’s Seaport Innovation 
District to Boston’s financial district (Vaccaro & Logan, 2017), from activating Santiago 
Calatrava’s harp shaped bridge at the heart of Dublin’s Silicon Docks as a playable instrument 
(Lynch, 2014), from the Cortex Innovation District board contracting with the globally 
recognized firm HOK to design their latest mixed-use expansion, and from Dan Gilbert, founder 
of Quicken Loans and Rock Ventures in Detroit (Deem, 2018), decorating empty street level 
storefronts to hide indications of decay (Gannes, 2015). 
Efforts to use design to attract a certain demographic, control the space, and project 
futuristic visions are not isolated to innovation district strategy. Indeed, the City Beautiful 
movement is an example of scientific progress in urban design and development through its 
focus on monument, ordered grid, and landscaping (Hall, 1998). The same applies to the heavily 
landscaped corporate estates of the General Motors, Ford, and Deer companies following WWII 
(Bethesda, Tumentang, Institutes, & Blvd, 2014). There is an abundant literature on designing 
for worker productivity at the office/corporation scale. The convergence between factory design 
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and scientific management were of critical consideration (Braverman, 1998). Similarly, hiring 
architects and designers to increase worker productivity, satisfaction, and comfort remain as 
prevalent today as they were in the 1950s with the design of the office cubicle, the transition to 
open floor plans, coffee-culture aesthetic, retrograde warehouse, and bright colorful designs 
(Saval, 2014).  
Innovation district strategy takes these design practices and scales them to the district 
level. No longer is it about ensuring worker productivity within the confines of the office but 
encouraging production spills beyond office walls into the urban realm (Stehlin, 2016). This 
difference is critical as the productive expectations of the individual are now also managed by 
the various stakeholders building innovation districts.  
Contemporary tech giants such as Facebook and Google, like the powerful company 
towns before them, moved beyond the internal design of their company operations to include 
housing, transportation infrastructure, and recreation amenities (Streitfield, 2018). A few 
company towns also incorporated civic amenities (Green, 2010). These examples demonstrate 
how individual corporations used design to boost productivity and profit. What is different about 
innovation districts is that similar design endeavors are used, but now the governance of the 
innovation district occurs through an amalgamation of public, private, non-profit, and 
educational institutions. This has implications for the public spaces engulfed within the border of 
the innovation district and the people who inhabit them. Using my cases, I demonstrate the role 
design plays in ensuring the space of the innovation district is continuously humming with 
activity. 
 
Boston: District Hall 
Billing itself as a first public-private partnership focused on creating a civic space 
targeting innovation, District Hall in Boston’s Seaport Innovation District is a dedicated civic 
space where the innovation community can gather and exchange ideas, its homepage proudly 
haling it as “a new home for innovation in Boston” (“District Hall Webpage,” 2018) (see figure 
36). 
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Figure 34: Boston’s District Hall white board greeting, orienting, and directing people 
 
 
Supporters of Boston’s Innovation District hail District Hall as widely successful. As the 
first public innovation center in the United States, it put Boston on the map and today serves as a 
model for the development of public innovation centers. It is an established template where gig 
workers can constantly connect to the platform, where entrepreneurs can connect with other 
startups for resources, and where the general public can continuously access Wi-Fi connectivity 
(see figures 36 - 37). 
 
Figure 35: Front of District Hall 
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Figure 36: Height of District Hall in comparison to its surroundings 
 
 
District Hall, its name a prominent representation of civic centrality, serves as a branding 
mechanism to heighten the reputation of the Boston Innovation District. In addition to its 
monumentality, District Hall is a good example of the centrality of innovation in society, as well 
as what design reveals about the new world of work. The trajectory, thus far, of District Hall, 
also demonstrates the strength of the market in determining highest and best use land values. 
The benefits provided by District Hall include social connectivity, blazing fast WiFi and 
Internet access, and easy access to transportation (government official, personal interview, 
2016). District Hall both serves as a space to congregates a nexus of activity in cheap space 
while also marketing and framing the vision for the Boston Innovation District. 
According to Hacin + Associates, the architect firm behind District Hall, the design of 
District Hall seeks to convey the feeling of a “public library meeting a community center” 
(designer, personal interview, 2016). Shaped by conversations with Kahn Pederson Fox, the lead 
designers behind the Seaport Innovation District’s master plan, the design of District Hall 
required flexibility to accommodate a number of possible eventualities. The aim was for the 
architecture to provide a ‘hack aspect’ feeling, come across as an enclosed outdoor space, 
capture people’s imagination in ways other spaces around town had not done, and had to be 
correctly calibrated to the millennials.  
Classrooms and assembly spaces line the front structure of the building leaving the back 
structure available to accommodate an open floor plan co-working space. Clusters of two-person 
or four-person tables, couches with low lying coffee tables, and a long rectangular table to 
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accommodate eight people is positioned in the center of the room. Additional workspaces line 
windows that look out into the backyard. All the furniture is moveable and the plethora of floor 
or wall electrical outlets ensure batteries are constantly charged. The walls are lined with 
writeable material and the free Wi-Fi password (Innovation!) are there for convenience. Two 
retail establishments located in the building serve to keep the space open for 16 hours per day: 
Brew, a coffee shop that opens its business at 8 am and Gather, a full-service restaurant and bar 
that closes its doors at 2 am. 
District Hall’s BRA agreement states that the purpose of a public innovation center is to 
make the city more competitive in attracting emerging innovations, businesses, and jobs to 
Boston, retaining starts and innovations, and promoting innovation in existing Boston-based 
businesses (District Hall 121B Agreement, 2013). Within the agreement, activities that qualify as 
innovation related and are accepted on premise include: 
• Storytelling, idea generation, research, design, product development/improvement, 
demonstration, entrepreneurship, new business formation, access to business and market 
opportunities; 
• Create opportunities for conversation, mutual learning, interdisciplinary collaboration, 
open-ended exploration, problem-solving, and networking; 
• Improve access to and development of talent and access to capital; 
• Create or improve opportunities for collaboration within or across the education, 
business, government, and civil society sectors; 
• Seek to improve the cultural, urban, physical, institutional, and policy environment for 
innovation. 
 
To date, District Hall has hosted events such as Rock Band competitions, parties on the 
street, weddings and receptions, and galas (“District Hall Webpage,” 2018). That these events 
meet the specifications for the use of space either points to the complication of pinning down the 
inputs of innovation or it represents how public space is adapted to market demand. 
 
Detroit 
“Place-making is critical to create the culture and reviving the density for the people 
doing the innovating. The innovating itself comes from the creativity of the individual 
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doing the work. But without the place-making they don’t want to be in that space to do 
the work. So that is why you’re seeing growth in the region happen in areas that have 
superior place-making” Foundation Head, personal interview, Detroit, 2015 
“[T]he most important thing is not so much the development of the individual patent or 
issue, but can the culture of the district be one where it is walkable, bikeable, and hyper 
caffeinated? Cause that is where creativity happens.” 
 University Executive, personal interview, Detroit, 2015. 
Many efforts to reverse decline in Detroit focus on remaking the built environment 
though placemaking, many of which targeted the revitalization of the greater downtown. 
Adopted tactics, such as waterfront redevelopment, casino construction, and sport-led 
regeneration, are congruent with urban revitalization efforts to harness a tourist economy 
(Eisenschitz, 2010; Grodach & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2007; Klingmann, 2007). In the 1970s, 
beginning with the five-term tenure of Mayor Coleman Young and continued throughout Mayor 
Dennis Archer’s two terms in office, revitalization was always closely tied with the physical 
environment. When Young entered office in 1974, Detroit-based corporations were in the 
process of building coalitions to address causes ailing the city. Two influential organizations 
included the New Detroit Committee of 1967 and the Detroit Renaissance Inc., of 1973 (Benyon 
& Solomos, 1987). Mayor Young leveraged support of the business community through these 
coalitions, particularly under his initiative, Moving Detroit Forward: A Plan for Urban Economic 
Revitalization (Manning Thomas, 1990). This bold initiative sought to finance $3 billion worth 
of improvements through federal and state funds allocated over a five-year period (Neill, 1995). 
From this fund, Detroit’s riverfront slowly developed through flagship projects such as the 
Renaissance Center, a collection of towers for office, hotel, and retail use, funded through 
private-public partnership with the Detroit Renaissance Inc.; the Joe Luis (Hockey) Arena; the 
extension to Cobo Hall, Detroit’s convention center; and other smaller projects such as the Max 
Fisher Riverfront Apartments and Hart Plaza. To connect the major riverfront establishments to 
the entertainment neighborhood known as Greektown, Young secured funding for the Detroit 
People Mover, a two-mile ring light railway (Eisinger, 2000).  
During Mayor Young’s tenure, the Michigan legislature developed state-based 
intervention approaches focused on targeting delineated boundaries. A series of public acts were 
enacted to create boundaries with jurisdictional authorities (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1999). PA 
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198 enacted the Plant Rehabilitation and Industrial Development District. PA 575 enacted 
Downtown Development Districts, Development Authorities, and Tax Increment Finance 
Districts (Bieri & Kayanan, 2014). Three additional legislative acts created the Economic 
Development Corporation, the Downtown Development Corporation, and the Detroit Economic 
Growth Corporation (DEGC). The establishment of the DEGC ushered in an era of project-led 
approach to development with tax breaks and incentive packages (McCarthy, 2002). In 1994, 
President Bill Clinton implemented empowerment zone policies specifically to address issues 
that produce economic, environmental, and social improvements. That same year, under the 
Dennis Archer Mayoral Administration, Detroit secured $100 million in federal funding over ten 
years dedicated to increase economic development within a geographic span of 18 square miles, 
an overlay that includes the property of the Big Three automakers, financial institutions, and an 
additional 80 programs scattered across the space (Boyle & Eisinger, 2001). 
These efforts contributed to the beautification of the downtown core, but they could not 
stop population decline. Facing increased levels of poverty within the central city, higher taxes 
were imposed to compensate for the eroding tax base. These were not sufficient to compensate 
for the loss of population and income and resulted in a decline in services. This cycle of 
disinvestment and Detroit’s ongoing borrowing practices to pay off debts reached its climax in 
2013, the year Detroit filed for bankruptcy, the largest filing in US history. One direct connection 
between bankruptcy and the strategic aims of the Detroit Innovation District was the focus 
generated on blight removal. The final Plan of Adjustment prepared by Emergency Manager 
Kevin Orr secured $1.4 billion for public services and blight removal (Bomey, Helms, & 
Guillen, 2014). This reinvestment of unsecured debt funded Detroit’s Blight Removal Task 
Force Plan, a multilevel strategy to address and/or demolish the 84,641 blighted structures and 
vacant lots (Blight Removal Task Force Plan, 2014). 
The re-envisioning and remapping of Detroit through the Blight Removal Task Force 
Plan, as well as other extremely detailed documents, such as the Detroit Future City Strategic 
Framework Plan (Detroit Future City: 2012 Detroit Strategic Framework Plan, 2013), build on 
the momentum of collaboration and influenced the siting for the innovation district in a pre-
imagined boundary already targeting growth strategies and increased land values. The Detroit 
Future City Strategic Framework influenced concentrating on the neighborhoods which were 
ultimately included within the border of the Detroit Innovation District. Detroit Future City, an 
extensive report that served for many years as a strategic framework for the city, divides the city 
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into five planning elements: economic growth, land use, city systems, neighborhoods, land and 
building assets. The report does not remove the focus on manufacturing, but it does suggest 
diversifying the economic base to include food processing sector, medical technology, education 
and digital/creative industries, while emphasizing the need for targeted education and training 
programs. Within the plan is a specific focus on increasing the value of land and investments in 
the city in places with the highest potential of jobs. This undergirds reasoning to focus on the 
central business district for the Detroit Innovation District but also leads to critiques that 
economic development efforts target the downtown while the remainder of the city continues to 
shrink (Moskowitz, 2015).  
Stakeholders for Detroit’s Innovation District face the uphill battle of converting a 
declining city into a thriving innovation district. Encompassing all the central business district 
plus two residing neighborhoods, the 2,750-acre landscape of the innovation district features 
large gaps between developments, derelict infrastructure, expansive parking lots, and wide 
thoroughfares built to accommodate the heavy flow of daily suburban commuters. Not only must 
stakeholders build the right infrastructure into the innovation district, they must also demonstrate 
that the district is humming with activity. Only in this way, will the concept succeed in 
rebranding Detroit as an attractive place to do business. 
Guidelines for the Detroit Innovation District demonstrate recognition of steps to convert 
a historically post-industrial economy into a tech-economy. Skills training, investment in 
research and development, fostering university tech-transfers, and strengthening emerging 
clusters are featured prominently in drafts circulated by the advisory committee and working 
groups. However, the lack of density in the district overshadows these aims. Detroit’s lack of 
basic infrastructure is a considerable obstacle for building a tech economy. Questioning the 
feasibility of the successful implementation, one tech consultant expressed, “[I]t is possible to 
discuss tech transfer failures from Wayne State University, but it is also necessary to discuss 
basic city issues, safety issues, and car vehicle insurance issues” (2015, personal 
communication). To date, Detroit Innovation District stakeholders do not distinguish between 
investing in the tech economy versus investing in place. Instead, stakeholders latch on to this 
economic development strategy to fund blight removal and rebrand Detroit. 
Amongst stakeholders, there is an acute awareness of the passing of time and Detroit’s 
inability to compete against other cities for global city status. The pressure to compete with other 
cities is readily acknowledged in comments such as, “this is a war for talent” (economic 
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developer, 2015, personal interview) and, “they [city officials] need to be running but are 
actually moving at a very slow pace” (venture capitalist, 2015, personal communication). The 
result of this concern manifests into a focus on efforts that yield immediate results: namely, 
placemaking. Highlighting the importance of placemaking, one executive for a private tech 
company stated, “place-making should lead it [the innovation district strategy] because you can 
do what they call ‘lighter, quicker, cheaper26.’ You can do things very quickly to change the 
perception about Detroit, what is going in Detroit” (personal communication, 2015). 
This sentiment on the importance of place-making and design is a reoccurring theme 
amongst stakeholders and it translates to a problem of visibility and funding. If the Detroit 
Innovation District Advisory Group and the sub-working groups cannot demonstrate they are 
succeeding in implementing the strategy, then they can no longer secure funding. But, providing 
evidence of innovation is tricky. Frequently, respondents describe implementing the innovation 
layer as “squishy,” meaning not concrete enough to develop tangible measures. As expressed by 
an executive of a foundation heavily involved in the implementation of the Detroit Innovation 
District, “among government officials the strategy became about activating blighted areas and 
less about the innovation piece for the city” (2015, personal communication). This switch is 
justified by the fervent belief and blind faith in place-making as the primary tool to attract and 
retain talent. In the eyes of the stakeholders, creating a welcoming, safe, but also “cool” place is 
the first step in attracting talent and firms of the tech economy. As one respondent vehemently 
argued: 
“[P]eople aren’t going to decide to live here because it is an innovation district. I 
mean, they are going to decide to live here cause it’s like a cool, classic, mixed-use 
district. They want the bars and restaurants, they’re not moving here because there 
is some worker space on the corner” (Planning and development nonprofit 
executive, personal interview, 2015).  
Based on the contemporary rhetoric on the inputs for innovation and based on current 
forms of capitalist extraction, the Detroit Innovation District stakeholders are not misguided in 
their assessments and in their faith of place-making impacts. If innovation requires an open, 
networked, and activated environment, then design is one tool to achieve this. Local government, 
                                               
26 The Project for Public Spaces adopted and popularized this phrase, which was originally coined by Eric Reynolds of the Urban 
Space Management firm. The phrase symbolizes an inexpensive and immediate solution to make public spaces more dynamic for 
everyday use. 
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private, university, and nonprofit leaders champion the opportunity to invest in a wide-range of 
efforts within their jurisdictions that may result in a heightened marketability of place. The 
booster promotion of innovation district strategy empowers local leaders faced with growing 
austerity. 
 
St. Louis: Thursday night’s Venture Café 
St. Louis entrepreneurs are well aware that the Cambridge Innovation Center located in 
the Cortex Innovation Community is the place to be on a Thursday evening. Every Thursday, the 
Venture Café Foundation, a non-profit organization, holds programs and lecture series targeted at 
entrepreneurs (see figure 39). Bringing over 500 people together on any given Thursday, St. 
Louis’ Venture Café in St. Louis brands itself as the ‘Largest weekly event for innovators in the 
world’ (“St. Louis Venture Cafe Homepage,” n.d.). The mere size of the event means that the 
space within Cambridge Innovation Center bustles with activity.  
 
Figure 37: Typical Program for Thursday’s Venture Café 
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Venture Café is managed by Cambridge Innovation Center, a co-working and incubator 
space headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts with additional locations in Boston, Miami, 
Philadelphia, and Rotterdam.27 One executive for CIC discussed the role of Venture Café and 
District Hall as providing the “glue.” The glue is an unmeasurable connection between humans 
that is abetted by the surrounding physical infrastructure. Glue is functioning when a person can 
show up, meet others, and get connected into the network of support. The rise in ubiquitous 
technology and the reduced size of computers contributes to the ability to concentrate a large 
amount of people within a closely confined space. This speaks generally to the overarching aim 
of the innovation district, but it also applies to the incubators and accelerators that host 
entrepreneurs in their buildings and provide them with administrative support.  
The weekly Venture Cafés are entirely voluntary. At the same time, registration is 
required to receive a free drink ticket and a name tag. Every week Venture Café staff send 
reminders to people in the database to remind them of upcoming events. In addition, attendees 
accrue points for each visit. This number is displayed prominently on a name badge and becomes 
a point of conversation. The number also serves as a signal. If someone does not have a number 
because it is their first time attending the event or if they have a low number this indicates others 
to approach them to guide newbies through the networking process. Those that accumulated a 
larger number are considered more experienced and are tapped by Venture Café staff (or social 
contract) to mentor new attendees. 
 
Figure 38: Inside the CIC during the Thursday Venture Café nights 
 
Sources: St. Louis Venture Café website (“St. Louis Venture Cafe Homepage,” n.d.) and Crain’s 
(Elder, 2016) 
That the Thursday night Venture Café event draws such large numbers of people is 
telling of the support structures entrepreneurs need to grow their business, and conversely then, 
                                               
27 One executive from the CIC in Cambridge refuses to call the institution an incubator as “incubators are for babies” (personal 
interview, 2016). Despite this, the CIC operates in the exact manner as other incubators in its class. 
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the amount of risk they take on as individuals. Not only are entrepreneurs reliant on the 
‘product,’ but they also need the tacit knowledge transmitted through connections and networks 
and the support services incubators and accelerators provide.28 This demonstrates the amount of 
risk individuals take on and is also indicative of the social pressure placed on individuals to 
succeed as entrepreneurs. 
 
Park Center, Stage Set 
In a presentation on the master plan for Park Center, the Foundation, in conjunction with 
Gensler (a global architecture, planning, design, and consulting firm), and Hines (a real estate 
investor), profile the ideal resident of Park Center. Her name is Sarah:  
“Sarah holds a master’s degree from Duke, she remained in the Research Triangle 
Park region for a professional position in life sciences. She lives in a townhouse 
in Durham, a few miles from her office and prefers to bike to work. While her 
current income limits potential spending, her career prospects and earning 
potential are strong. She is health conscious, eating organic and exercising—after 
work yoga classes keep her centered. As a young professional, she is often too 
busy to prepare food at home and relies on healthy, prepared meals. The 
competitive cost of living affords her discretionary income to spend on clothes, 
share after work drinks with colleagues and go out with friends on the weekend” 
(Park Center, Research Triangle Park, 2015, emphasis mine) 
Sarah is a knowledge-worker and her imagined live-work-play lifestyle drives design 
decisions for Park Center. Tellingly, the master plan for Park Center identifies the following 21st 
Century space needs to attract and retain knowledge workers:  
 
• Improved Park visibility within the region and clear entryways 
• Creation of a vibrant central district  
• Active retail focused on food and beverage 
• High quality, attractive multifamily housing at key nodes 
• More integral and defining university presence 
                                               
28 The greatest difference between an incubator and an accelerator is the amount of time spent within the walls of  
the structure; an incubator will host startups during gestation periods and for longer periods of time, while an accelerator will host 
startups at later stages in the scaling cycle. 
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• Space for business support services 
 
All these are presented in at a walkable scale and include street-level retail and 
entertainment, designated open recreation spaces, and housing in walkable proximity to work 
within a pedestrian and bicycle friendly environment. The primary focus is an urban fabric that 
encourages a density of people within their physical environment. The master plan for Park 
Center, in addition to two other neighborhoods that will be built after Park Center nods to 
environmental sustainability by integrating a regional transit framework that includes commuter 
and light rail transit to discourage an over reliance on vehicular transportation. It also seeks to 
balance the connection between humans and nature by building in spaces for recreation, and 
sustainability measures such as wetlands, carefully considered landscapes, and natural systems 
(The Research Triangle Park: Master Plan, 2011).  
 
Figure 39: Park Center master plan 
 
Source: Park Center site plan (Surface, 2018) 
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Figure 40: Park Center machete 
 
The Anne T and Robert M. Bass Initiative on Innovation and Placemaking, and 
organization that has partnered with the Brookings Institution and the Project for Public Spaces 
to derive a design companion for their innovation district recommendations, label this 
aspirational type of environment a ‘social test bed’ (Eight Placemaking Principles for Innovation 
Districts, 2016). 
The concept of the social test bed, an entirely activated environment to foster innovation, 
closely resembles what Autonomist Marxists call the ‘social factory’ (Negri, 1989; Terranova, 
2000). The social factory shifts the centrality of the industrial factory and the form of production 
created within the factory beyond the factory walls and into the fabric of our daily lives.  
The idea of the social factory as of the all-encompassing space that incentivizes workers 
to stay and work through play closely parallels the rhetoric undergirded in innovation district 
strategy. The design for Park Center ensures seamless movement between work and play for an 
affluent professional class through the inclusion of a horseshoes field, yoga garden, tai chi lawn, 
outdoor alternative work charging stations, artisanal garden, and bbq pits. Example eating 
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options include an artisan creamery, gourmet grocery, a juice express, taqueria/Mexican, and 
retro homestyle restaurants” (Park Center, Research Triangle Park, 2015:55) (see figure 28). 
 
Figure 41: Park Center marketplace amenities 
 
Source: Park Center Masterplan (Park Center, Research Triangle Park, 2015) 
 
In addition to ensuring the right diversity of product is in place, land use changes will 
also support linkages with local universities and international research centers and provide 
commercialization support. Place is implicated in all these transactions. The master plan aims to 
“Provide a distinctive, vibrant, mixed-use nexus for research in one or more areas of the park to 
foster innovation, promote social interaction, and create signature destinations for the RTP” (The 
Research Triangle Park: Master Plan, 2011:20). Theorizing the role of the brand, Klingman 
(2007) states that the brand is not about perfecting the object, but of transforming the subject. 
This transformation of the subject is of critical importance because it is a larger reason for the 
existence of the innovation district. It is this transformation that the executive from the 
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Foundation emphasizes when discussing the importance of providing the right product to create 
the stage: 
“[W]hen we developed Park Center, we were looking at the structures for 
innovation. But I think about the structures for these kinds of experiences as being 
like the structure you create in the theater. It is a stage set. You want to make sure 
that all the pieces of the stage set are there so that the actors can go out on to the 
stage and make it a great experience. And if they own that experience then you 
are going to hear about it” (foundation head, personal interview, 2016). 
The stage set for Sarah, and similar Park Center employees, residents, and visitors, must 
include the necessary elements to attract them and provide them with a unique experience. The 
perpetuation of construing individuals and their simple interactions or being in space as 
opportunistic catalysts for innovation and profit speaks to scholarship on the economization of 
humans and the reduction of people to the financial (Brown, 2015; Murphy, 2017). 
 
Dublin 
 “The success of Smart Dublin will depend on your input” (“Smart Docklands 
Homepage,” 2018) 
Embedded on the homepage of Smart Docklands is a 3:12 minute video magnificently 
featuring the Silicon Docks. An inspirational instrumental score plays in the background 
throughout the entirety of the clip while on the foreground a montage of colorful images with 
captions that boast of the presence of global tech companies such as Google, Accenture, Yahoo, 
Facebook, to name only a few; the co-location of workers, businesses, and residents; a vibrant 
startup scene; multiple wireless connections to include Dark Fiber, Wi-Fi, 4G, Lora, NB-IoT, 
SG, and Sigfox; a smart integrated transportation system; the concentration of people in the 
square; and even a wake boarder doing a back roll off a ramp on the Liffey river. All this 
activity, the video boasts, within the 1.25 mile sq walkable—or jogging, the video includes 
between parentheses to appeal to the health-conscious city dweller—density of the Docklands. A 
series of phrases appear on the screen throughout the video branding the Silicon Docks as “The 
most connected district in the world,” connecting the world’s “most advanced city port” to the 
home of “world leading tech companies” making it a testbed for “world leading connectivity” 
(“Smart Docklands Homepage: The world’s most connected business and living district,” n.d.).  
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These superlatives are not exclusive to Dubliners. On February of 2018, Harvard’s 
Technology and Entrepreneurship Center the Docklands convened the TECH Smart Cities 
Innovation Accelerator, a three-day learning event. The event was held at the Silicon Docks, 
selected as an exemplar model for innovation. This application-only ‘immersion accelerator’ 
brought together 23 Chief Technology Officers from across the globe. Together with Harvard 
leadership, they derived the ‘Dublin Principles,’ an agreed upon definition of what a ‘Smart 
District’ in a city should be and one that emphasizes the success of Smart Dublin efforts (2018 
TECH Smart Cities Innovation Accelerator, 2018; Kelly, 2018; SmartCitiesWorld, 2018). 
Urban governance institutions in Dublin have endorsed efforts to turn Dublin into a so-
called ‘Smart City’. The pilot, called Smart Arena, was a project led by Dublin City Council in 
collaboration with representatives of area universities and tech companies such as Google, IBM, 
and Cisco. Smart Arena is based on the premise that arenas are a microcosm of urban life. 
During an event, the layout and management of an arena must facilitate ease of mobility amongst 
large crowds, ensure safety and security of the customers, accommodate customer consumption 
and waste disposal needs, and provide seamless, high-speed Wi-Fi access to all mobile carrying 
individuals, while also serving as the source of entertainment. The arena environment was 
envisioned as a ‘work bench,’ an optimal space to experiment with new technologies and data 
tracking devices, which can later scale to the remainder of the city.  
In 2018, Smart Arena strategy transferred over to the Silicon Docks (“Smart Docklands 
webpage: Ecosystem,” 2018). Dublin City Council selected Silicon Docks in part because it 
houses the largest concentration of tech companies and their employees in Dublin. More 
importantly, Dublin City Council and corporate collaborators, operate on the collective 
understanding that the culture of the people residing in the Docklands is such that they would 
tolerate the nuisance of designing a space with urban interventions for cutting edge outcomes. 
The overarching assumption is that the technologically literate demographic of the Silicon Docks 
can withstand change and disruption. As an international trade consultant in Dublin put it: 
“We’ll get them [infrastructure developments] sorted out on the small space where 
there is a tech population and a community that would recognize a) the value of it 
and b) probably tolerate any disruption to pavement being dug up to put a new cable 
or whatever.” – (personal interview, September 7, 2016) 
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The demographics of Silicon Docks contribute to a collective understanding that the 
innovation district stands as a separate entity from Dublin City. The potential for new 
development to be met with critique and resistance is a hidden benefit of designated an exclusive 
space for the people and the firms of the innovation sector. In fact, partners in the Smart 
Docklands endeavor are primarily private companies heavily invested in prosumption activities. 
Private partners include Accenture, Connect, Enable, Google, Huawai, Vodafone, Microsoft, 
Deloitte, IBM, intel, AT&T, 3, Ericsson, Dell, and Cisco. All these companies stand to benefit 
from data collected from users in space, in addition to using the Docklands as a test bed for their 
innovations.  
Dublin’s Smart City strategy resembles what Kitchin and Dodge (2011) have termed 
code/space, that is: configurations in which software and the spatiality of everyday life become 
mutually constituted. For example, in a recent event, Dublin City Council partnered up with 
analytics company, ThinkSmarter, to embed a perimeter of the Docklands hosting Oktoberfest 
with monitors to track the movement of over 66,000 visitors. As declared on the Smart 
Docklands website, one benefit of this pilot project was the ability to “monitor dwell time” and 
tackle “anti-social behavior” (“Smart Docklands webpage: Oktoberfest WiFi Analytics,” 2018). 
The small concentrated space of the Silicon Docks, the branding mechanisms that promote the 
district as a space of the future, and the constructed subjectivity of people’s responsibility in 
participating in the project of future making all contribute in legitimizing smart city efforts. At 
all points in the day, subjects are expected to conform to socially accepted behavior. Thus, not 
only does policing (of the self and of the surveillance system) occur, but these companies can 
also monitor consumer behavior and exploit that for profit. The concentration of space assists in 
deriving data for analytics. That over 40,000 people work in the Silicon Docks and 26,000 
individuals reside there is not lost on the tech companies involved in Smart Docklands 
leadership. 
The Smart Docklands initiatives do not conceal attempts to globally scale innovations 
derived from their Silicon Docks real-life testbed. They position these potentialities as improving 
the lives of those who live and work in the Docklands. A recent report by Mirvac, an Australian 
property owner and manager, in partnership with WORKTECH Academy, a global knowledge 
online network based out of the United Kingdom, highlights the rise of a new subjectivity in this 
way, “[A]n alternative perspective is emerging which positions the users of the innovation 
precinct as ‘creative citizens’, not just passive consumers of smart services…it must depend on 
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having active participants, not compliant observers” (pg 12). This sentiment mirrors the quote at 
the start of this Dublin section, that is, that the success of the Smart Dublin initiative depends on 
on the activity of individuals. Whether or not this activity is passive or active matters less than 
having presence in place. 
 
Discussion 
Designing an innovation district, a space to house today’s tech workforce, requires two layers: 
the material and the immaterial. What I label as material are the physical and tangible 
infrastructural elements discussed by stakeholders as necessary for innovation. In interviews, the 
following items were listed as the material elements of the innovation district. 
 
Figure 42: Material elements of the innovation district 
  131 
However, these material artifacts alone will not active the space. Activation depends on 
interaction between the material infrastructure and the flow of activity. This additional layer is 
the immaterial. Whereas earlier economic development efforts (i.e., Olympic bids, stadium 
construction, convention centers, etc.) succeeded simply by providing the right product to secure 
consumption from users, the innovation district depends on creating an activated environment to 
foment the right experience.  
Considerations of the innovation district must incorporate the amenities considered 
essential for a supportive innovation ecosystem (i.e., incubators, residential amenities, boutique 
hotels, and craft breweries) in addition to demonstrating the presence of buzz. Designing for 
buzz is what distinguishes the way design is implicated to activate the environment to derive 
profit from place and from the individuals within that space. In order for the design of the 
innovation district to promote an experience, space must be activated in a particular manner. 
Considering that the rhetoric for innovation today emphasizes the importance of collaboration, 
openness, and interaction, then the existence of people in place is of critical importance. Below 
are terms interviewees used to describe the immaterial layer of the innovation district: 
 
Figure 43: Immaterial inputs for the innovation district 
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Importantly, this layer \ approaches the individuals’ needs and cognitive capital 
differently from earlier productive landscapes. The landscape of the innovation district points to 
the construction of the individual as a producer/consumer –what Toffler (1984) originally termed 
a ‘prosumer.’ 29  For Toffler, the diffusion and access to technology shifted the power of the 
production process into the hands of ordinary people.30 Optimistically, Toffler believed that the 
prosumer would be the outcome and agent of a new civilization, what he termed the Third Wave. 
Whereas the Second Wave, tied to the factory and the nation state, was characterized by 
standardization, specialization, synchronization, concentration, maximization, and centralization, 
Toffler conceive of the Third Wave as a disintegration of this through flexible work 
arrangements, the ability to command where and work will take place through contractual work 
with companies.31 These are the new work arrangements that innovation district strategy 
attempts to accommodate so to further extract value from space and prosumers.32  
Stakeholders building innovation districts base their decisions on the idea that innovation 
requires a dynamic physical realm that encourages proximity and knowledge spillovers. It 
follows that the innovation district must display this. If in the eyes of an entrepreneur the 
innovation district does not provide the right product to scale a business or the right brand as a 
networked and activated environment, then the innovation district will not sell.  
The design of the innovation district demonstrates that tech culture is permeating the 
urban realm through reconstructed landscapes that purposely employ design to create a seamless 
flow of production and make the urban fabric of space a generator of innovation (Stehlin, 2016). 
As discussed, work today occurs outside of the office more so than inside firm walls. The 
innovation district aims to concentrate these flexible workers within the actual offices and firms, 
                                               
29 The capitalist economy has always been dominated by prosumption (Ritzer & Jurgenson, 2010). Indeed, for Marx the 
Industrial Revolution’s pre-eminent economy was focused on production, though Marx did not negate that production involved 
consumption. The differences in contemporary capitalism are threefold. The first is that the rise of internet and Web 2.0 has 
increased the number of prosumers so that today there are more prosumers than consumers and producers; the second is that the 
consumer is now more conscious and consensual in their participation (Comor, 2011); and the third is that under ‘prosumer 
capitalism’ control and exploitation take on a different character and there is a trend toward unpaid labor (Ritzer & Jurgenson, 
2010). 
30 Though Toffler coined the term ‘prosumer,’ Marshall McLuhan and Barrington Nevitt’s Take Today (1972) was perhaps the 
first to connect the idea that consumers are becoming producers because of electric technologies. 
31 Countless scholars have also documented this economic shift. For a select few see Scott (2008), Piore and Sable (1984), and 
Bell (1973). 
32 Here, the work of digital scholars on prosumption is important. Digital scholars adapt the concept of the consumer, making its 
definition and application more robust by applying the term to Web 2.0 and the role of individual labor in platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (Fuchs, 2014; Scholz, 2016; Terranova, 2000). Through activity on platforms, the individual 
both produces the content for the platforms while also consuming the advertisements tailored to that individual based on their 
activity. In this way, the user is at once the producer and the consumer. Consumer scholars also leverage this concept, critiquing 
Toffler for neglecting to notice that the prosumer still acts within the confines of the market system and through the exchange of 
commodities, thus negating Toffler’s hope for change (Comor, 2011). 
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in addition to residential spaces, places of entertainment, and the public space of the plazas, the 
streets, and the sidewalks. In this sense, the space of the innovation district is a social factory 
(Gill & Pratt, 2008). 
The role of technology in the growth of complex, networked, global supply chain 
capitalism has resulted in the monitoring of workers and machines and in ensuring optimized 
performance and production (Kanngieser, 2013). As a type of social factory, it is not illogical to 
extend the management techniques outside of firm walls to ensure optimized performance and 
production of the people in all domains of the innovation district. Further exacerbating this 
constant production of work, advanced information communication technologies are 
implemented for rapid and continuous information exchanges, amenities and housing 
opportunities in proximity to work enforce the live-work-play mentality; place-making principles 
are applied to manage (and blur) the public/private realm creating spaces where people can 
comfortably extend networks and generate new insights outside of the office; and the rise of 
smart city applications serve to track everyday people in public space.  
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Chapter 5: What is at Stake? 
 “It becomes crucial to know what is being built in the city and how the newly built spaces are 
endowed with hegemonic meaning, in order to understand how individuals and collectives are 
ideologically interpellated as citizens” (Balibrea, 2001; pg 188). 
 
Innovation districts contribute to the splintering of the city. This is evident primarily from 
the changing demographics in the space of the innovation district. Following the work of 
Foucauldian scholars such as Murphy (2017), Lindtner (2017), McRobbie (2016), and Brown 
(2015), I demonstrate how an assemblage of actors, from the state level to local growth 
coalitions, eagerly encourage ‘entrepreneurial living’ (Lindtner, 2017), a practice of self-
provisioning that shifts risk from the state to the individual and exacerbates issues of precarity 
for the entrepreneur sitting squarely within the concentrated space of the live-work-laboratory. 
 
Innovation Districts as Citadels 
Innovation districts, particularly Park Center, are in early stages of implementation. It is 
not possible to draw firm conclusions on their outcomes, not that measuring outcomes against 
stated aims was ever the intention of my research. Despite this, it is possible to point to certain 
trends that demonstrate a shift in demographics and a rise of land value and occupancy rents 
within the space of the innovation district. Collectively, these data points support the claim I 
make that the space of the innovation district is a citadel for a young, childless, educated, 
professional, likely-white individual. Coupled with data on rising real estate prices in the area, it 
becomes evident that the gap will widen between the individuals living and working in the space 
of the innovation district and those who do not have the skills to work or finances to afford living 
there. 
The changing demographics within the space of the innovation district are consistent in 
all four urban cases. Park Center remains in too early stages to track shifts in demographics (see 
tables 5 - 8). 
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Table 3: Demographics of Silicon Docks compared to Dublin City 
Dublin Silicon Docks Dublin City 
Age 65+ 3% 13% 
Age 20-44 75% 42% 
Childless Households 85% 64% 
Non-Irish Residents 47% 20% 
<15mins to work 25% 19% 
Occupy Professional Jobs 53% 36% 
3rd level (from bach onwards) 63% 35% 
 
Table 4: Demographics of Boston Innovation District compared to Boston City 
Boston Boston Innovation District Boston City 
Race   
White alone 88% 53% 
Black or AA alone 2% 26% 
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone 0% 0% 
Asian Alone 8% 9% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone 0% 0% 
Some other Race Alone 0%% 7% 
Two or more races 2% 5% 
Age   
18-44 67% 52% 
65+ 6% 11% 
Education   
Bach or more 79% 46% 
Occupation   
Male 68% 45% 
Female 72% 50% 
Households with no people under 18 94% 77% 
Family 27% 25% 
Nonfamily 68% 52% 
Travel Time to Work for Workers 16 Years and Over  
Less than 10 min 12% 7% 
Worked at home 4% 3% 
Car, Truck, or Van 45% 45% 
Public transportation 26% 34% 
Motorcycle 1% 0% 
Bicycle 1% 2% 
Walked 23% 15% 
 
Table 5: Demographics of Detroit Innovation District compared to Detroit City 
Detroit Detroit Innovation District Detroit City 
Race   
White alone 32% 13% 
Black or AA alone 56% 81% 
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone 0% 0% 
Asian Alone 8% 1% 
Some other Race Alone 1% 3% 
Two or more races 3% 2% 
Age   
18-44 56% 36% 
65+ 11% 13% 
Education   
Bach or more 37% 13% 
Occupation   
Male 50% 17% 
Female 50% 25% 
Households with no people under 18 90% 68% 
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Family 12% 26% 
Nonfamily 78% 42% 
Travel Time to Work for Workers 16 Years and Over  
Less than 10 minutes 24% 6% 
Worked at home 4% 4% 
Car, Truck, or Van 59% 83% 
Public transportation 8% 9% 
Motorcycle 0% 0% 
Bicycle 3% 1% 
Walked 25% 3% 
 
Table 6: Demographics of Cortex Innovation Community compared to St. Louis City 
St. Louis 
Cortex 
Innovation 
Community 
St. Louis City 
Race 
 
  
White alone 68% 45% 
Black or AA alone 18% 48% 
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone 0% 0% 
Asian Alone 9% 3% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone 0% 0% 
Some other Race Alone 2% 1% 
Two or more races 3% 2% 
Age   
18-44 82% 83% 
65+ 3% 11% 
Education   
Bach or more 60% 33% 
Occupation   
Male 54% 36% 
Female 57% 43% 
Households with no people under 18 96% 77% 
Family 28% 23% 
Nonfamily 68% 54% 
Travel Time to Work for Workers 16 Years and Over  
Less than 10 minutes 27% 9% 
Worked at home 7% 4% 
Car, Truck, or Van 65% 80% 
Public transportation 2% 10% 
Motorcycle 0% 0% 
Bicycle 1% 1% 
Walked 25% 4% 
 
Most significant for both Detroit and St. Louis is the increase of white people and drop in 
black people within the space of the innovation district. For Detroit, between the 2000 and 2016, 
the white population within the space of the innovation district jumped from 19% to 32%, 
whereas the black population dropped from 72% to 56%. In comparison to the remainder of the 
city, in 2016 the white population of the innovation district comprised 32% versus 13% for the 
remainder of the city. For the same year, the black population in the space of the innovation 
district was 56% versus 81% for the remainder of the city. Both innovation districts have seen 
increases in their Asian populations since 2000 and sharp increases in the space of the innovation 
districts in relation to the remainder of the city, a demographic trend that is reflected in raising 
rates of Asian populations in Silicon Valley startups (Saxenian, 2002). 
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The changing demographics in the Detroit Innovation District in relation to the rest of the 
city shifted in expected ways. There are now more young, childless, educated, professionals in 
the Detroit Innovation District. Of the people 16 years and over who work in the Detroit 
Innovation District, there is an increase in proximity to work with more people commuting less 
than ten minutes to reach their site of employment, a drop in commuting time with an car, truck, 
or van, and an increase in bicyclists and walkers. Increasingly, more people are working from 
home. 
St. Louis is similar to Detroit in regard to an increase of younger people living in the 
Cortex Innovation Community from 2000-2016, but the percentage of young people in the 
Cortex Innovation Community is less than the total for the city of St. Louis. This is explained by 
the availability of housing in the surrounding neighborhoods and the limited housing availability 
within the Cortex Innovation Community—an issue the Cortex Foundation is seeking to address. 
Still, of those living within the Cortex Innovation Community, more households are childless 
(96%) than the rest of the city (77%), more educated (60%) than the rest of the city (33%), and 
with people holding more professional jobs (54% male and 57% female) than the rest of the city 
(36% male and 43% female). Both of these categories have seen an upward trend for the Cortex 
Innovation Community since 2000. As it relates to commuting times, more people commute less 
than 10 minutes to work, there is an increase in people working from home, and an increase in 
bicyclers and walkers. Commuters using public transportation, cars, trucks, or vans has dropped 
both over time and in relation to the remainder of the city. 
Boston and Dublin’s innovation district demonstrate consistency in the growth of a 
young, childless, educated, professional demographic living in close proximity to work. The 
challenge with these two strong market economies is comparing racial demographics. Boston’s 
Seaport Innovation District, like Detroit and St. Louis, represents a whiter, Asian, and less black 
population than the remainder of the city. This last point raised harsh critique by Spotlight, the 
Boston Globe’s investigative team, in a study on the absence of black people in the history of the 
Seaport Innovation District—from development decisions, to leadership, to residential 
accommodations (A. Ryan, 2017). Dublin’s most similar comparison is in relation to the increase 
of non-Irish residents within the space of their innovation district. This reflects the presence of an 
international professional class (Sassen, 2001) locating in Dublin to work in the multinational 
corporations, many of which are concentrated in the Silicon Docks. For the tech-workers in 
Dublin who can afford to live in the new condominiums, this concentration of expensive housing 
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and their places of employment contributes to an increase in the percentage of people who live in 
close proximity to work. 
In Boston’s Seaport Innovation District, modes of travel and commuting times have 
fluctuated. Whereas since 2000, more people are commuting less than 10 minutes to work, more 
people are walking, and more people are working from home, there have been less people using 
public transportation and biking over time and in relation to the remainder of the city. Changes in 
car, truck, or van use to arrive at work over time and in relation to the remainder of the city are 
insignificant, though this is the predominant mode of transportation for almost 50% of the 
individuals in the Seaport Innovation District and the remainder of the city. These commuting 
trends reflect challenges the Massachusetts Department of Transportation faces in connecting a 
peninsula with arteries for delivery truck traffic and existing dockland infrastructure, in addition 
to congested public transportation lines, and main thoroughfares that once used to accommodate 
the acres of parking lots for car commuters working in the financial district (Ramos, 2017; 
Vaccaro & Logan, 2017). 
The Brookings report on innovation districts discusses the proximity of innovation 
districts to low-income neighborhoods as a “focus on expanding opportunities to disadvantaged 
populations” (Katz & Wagner, 2014). Gesturing to side-by-side co-location invokes the image of 
trickle-down economics, the image that benefits accrued within the bordered space of the 
innovation district will spill-over to the remaining neighborhoods, already less fortunate for their 
lack of inclusivity within the boundary. The problem is that real estate prices in close proximity 
to the innovation district are rising. The low-income neighborhoods purported to house the 
service labor are slowly becoming unaffordable to that demographic (see Appendix E). 
What is evident in all five cases is the way innovation district strategy worked to target 
development and create jobs for a particular demographic within its boundary. This strategy was 
employed during a period of construction standstill due to the 2008 global housing crisis. There 
were earlier attempts of innovation-led development in cities before the recession, but the 
strategy worked well after the recession as a way to jump start development after construction 
was halted and large companies paused on their intentions to develop property in the city. To 
generate some form of growth, urban actors shifted their attention on entrepreneurs and small 
startups. However, once the economy picked up, these same actors refocus the strategy on 
attracting larger companies, which slowly start to displace the entrepreneurs who were once the 
focal point of innovation district strategy.  
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Entrepreneurial Living and the Withdrawal of the State 
In an opening letter in the 2016 report to President Obama from his Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology, the council writes: 
 
Combined, the innovations that are increasingly within reach provide an 
opportunity to revamp how cities operate at all levels and for all stakeholders. 
Transforming cities around the world in this way is already a race―one that the 
United States cannot afford to lose. It is generating demand for new products, new 
companies, and new skilled jobs in the effort to produce the best urban 
environments (v). 
 
Earlier, in a 2013 State of the Union Address, Obama said:  
 
‘‘We’re Americans. We are inventors. We are builders. We’re Thomas Edison 
and we’re the Wright Brothers and we are Steven Jobs. That’s who we are. That’s 
what we do. We invent stuff, we build it” (cited in Lindtner, 2017; “Remarks by 
the President on Manufacturing and the Economy,” 2012) 
 
The success stories of innovators are a continuous source of fascination for policymakers 
and planning practitioners. Silicon Valley’s history of growing from an agricultural landscape to 
the prime global destination for startups permeates as an exemplar beyond the boundaries of the 
United States. This is physically evident from the various cluster developments across the globe, 
many named aspirationally, such as Silicon Wadi, in Israel, Silicon Docks in Dublin, Silicon 
Cape, in South Africa, Silicon Beach, in Melbourne, Silicon Alley in NYC, Silicon Gulf, in the 
Philippines, and Silicon Fjord, in Norway to name only a select few (Kit, 2012; “List of 
Technology Centers,” n.d.). 
The allure of Silicon Valley and the mythical garage tinkerer turned millionaire is so 
pervasive that it is actually influencing the way we build and govern our cities and citizens. Part 
of what the allure embodies is a language of incentivizing risk, testing and scaling ideas, and 
destigmatizing failure. It is also about the romanticized idea of the entrepreneur as renegade 
savior, disrupting social conventions to break new ground. This ‘entrepreneurial turn’  is critical 
to innovation district strategy. It is critical in terms of securing territory, funding, and attracting 
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bodies into the profession of entrepreneurship. Furthermore, this ideology perceives individuals 
as market subjects (Murphy, 2017) and causes individuals to see themselves and each of their 
interactions as market transactions resulting in an overall sense of ‘entrepreneurial living’ 
(Lindtner, 2017). 
To begin explaining this, it is necessary to step back and discuss my use of the contested 
term “neoliberalism”. Despite the pushback on the use of the term, I find it useful to extend the 
concept here. Scholarship on neoliberalism is crudely tied to two strands of reasoning. David 
Harvey (2005), exemplifying the orthodox view of neoliberalism, defined it as an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade that 
liberated entrepreneurial freedom. The second is rooted in Foucauldian theory that construes 
neoliberalism as a governing rationality. The two strands for understanding neoliberalism are not 
opposing lines of inquiry (for a good distinction between these strands of thought see Brown, 
2015). Rather, both strands seek to explain contemporary capitalist processes and to understand 
how different actors, policies, and institutions interact. Furthermore, in relation to outcomes of 
neoliberal rationality, both formulations focus on growth, expansion of the market, and a 
diminishing welfare state.  
Whereas for some scholars a direct genealogy can be traced to either a Marxist or 
Foucauldian understanding of neoliberalism, many scholars mobilize both. This ad hoc 
borrowing plays a contributing factor in the critique on the adoption of a neoliberal framework as 
an overused concept (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009). At the same time, both frameworks are useful 
for understanding the various permutations and configurations of neoliberalism as it is a loose 
and shifting signifier with historical contingencies and spatial variances (Brenner et al., 2010; 
Peck, 2010).  
The type of entrepreneurial urbanism that Harvey (Harvey, 1989a) detailed is deeply 
situated in the development of the innovation district. That is to say, the role of the growth 
machine ( Logan & Molotch, 2007) remains in place, public private partnerships dominate 
development (Sagalyn, 2007), tax exemptions and deregulatory mechanisms undergird the 
financing of these spaces (Weber, 2002). What is categorized as an orthodox classification of 
neoliberalism is deeply entrenched in the innovation district and this body of literature informs 
my understanding of the macro level elements at play in innovation district strategy. 
At the same time, it is also helpful to adopt the Foucauldian perspective. The Foucauldian 
perspective of neoliberalism as an order of normative reason that takes shape as a governing 
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rationality extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, and metrics to every 
dimension of human life (see Brown, 2003, 2015). The techniques used in this “art of governing” 
are implemented in a wide variety of ways with spatially distinct and contextually situated 
expressions. What scholars building on the work of Foucault share is the inquiry of how 
government is redesigned and reshaped through a retheorization of thinking through how to act. 
This conduct of the self forms the basis of Foucauldian biopolitics and is demonstrated in 
practice from its effect on democracy (Brown, 2015), creating a dialogue around a girl’s human 
capital as a form of birth-control (Murphy, 2017), and issues of bio-life in genetics (Rajan, 
2006), to name a few recent studies.33  
The economization of life means that individuals are seen, and see themselves, as what 
Foucault termed homo-economicus (Read, 2009). Homo-economicus, an entrepreneur of 
himself, his/er own capital, his/er own producer, invests time on future returns. The creation of 
homo-economicus and the management of this human capital is construed in particular ways by 
local governments (Tadiar, 2013). This is a way for the state ideology to permeate and be 
enforced at lower scales – to be governed at a distance (Rose, 1999). 
The promise of the innovation district, both as a space for the invention of new products 
and as a source of regional economic growth, is internalized by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are 
made to interpellate the ideology of entrepreneurship because their efforts contribute to raising 
the value of the city and the welfare of the city. This is the act of subjectivity. Subjectivity is the 
process of internalizing certain modes and values, the process of turning the self into a 
productive individual (Rose, 1999). This is evident in campaigns created by innovation district 
stakeholders to attract entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the idea of deriving a campaign focused on 
attracting the entrepreneurs is based on an interpellated ideology that in innovators and 
entrepreneurs as catalysts for positive change. One respondent in St. Louis explained that 
entrepreneurs are best known for the ability to think outside the box and are thus post-race, post-
class, and post-gender (personal interview, 2016). As an example, the tagline on the homepage of 
St. Louis’ Venture Café exemplifies the glorification of the entrepreneur and innovator: “The 
future of the world is at stake: You can totally be part of the team that saves society” (St. Louis' 
                                               
33 Harvey (2005) also defines neoliberalism, but he defines it from the perspective of the state. The state, under neoliberalism, 
liberates entrepreneurial freedom by removing restrictions on the market and increasing private property rights, free markets, free 
trade. At the other end of the continuum, Foucault’s definition of neoliberalism is liberated through the economizing individual. 
Both strands, however, define relations and reactions in relation to the market. 
 
 
 
 
142 
Venture Café homepage, “A Community of Colliders: Innovators Connecting to Innovators,” 
n.d.). 
 
Figure 44: Image of Venture Café promotional web banner 
 
Source: St. Louis Venture Café homepage (“St. Louis Venture Cafe Homepage,” n.d.) 
 
This focus on subjectivity suggests we are no longer in a Taylorist form of management 
where managers controlled all aspects of production and complete control of the employee is no 
longer the dominant logic in management. Instead, post-Taylorist production represents a type of 
‘participative management’ where workers become active subjects in coordinating different 
functions of production.34 This inculcation of individuals in the production process forces 
individuals to control themselves in new ways so that command “arises from the subject itself” 
(Lazzarato, 1994). Considering that a growing source of production today is immaterial, the 
purpose of subjectivity of the individual is to actively produce the cultural content of a 
commodity. If we extend the concept of the commodity to the innovation district, we see the 
importance of individuals in the branding of the innovation district. The innovation district 
serves as a ‘basin of immaterial labor’ (ibid.) where work permeates the entire space of the 
innovation district. 
                                               
34 In his Lectures at the College de France Foucault discusses the concept of the panopticon as a direct supervisory technique and 
this shift of that from total surveillance to subjective forms of surveillance. 
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Innovation districts represents a new era of economic development –one that moves 
beyond state-science and technology-based strategies to individual-science and tech-startup 
based strategies. Though the state is not removed, it is present in ways Block (2008) calls the 
hidden development state or Mazzucato (2014) calls the entrepreneurial state. Whereas in earlier 
iterations the state played a visible and prominent role in shaping economic development policies 
through massive infrastructural development on which the industrial revolution hinged or 
through a military industrial complex funding science and tech research and warfare, the position 
of the state in the contemporary era is hidden. Though funding channels demonstrate that the 
federal government continues to support small business development and research, today’s 
entrepreneurs and tech firms work to distance themselves from a bureaucratic state to maintain 
the image of efficiency (Mazzucato, 2014). The state takes on the management of human capital 
to manage and ensure the success of the economy (Brown, 2015; p. 84). This ideology is evident 
in from the tax exemptions received by firms in the innovation sector, to the marketing materials 
used to attract innovators to the innovation district, to the growth of entrepreneurship studies in 
universities, to name only a few examples. 
The concept of the innovation district as a bottom-up and seemingly inclusive form of 
development also coincides with austerity urbanism (Peck, 2012; Tonkiss, 2013). The focus on 
self-entrepreneurship, particularly following the 2007/8 recession, provides the state temporarily 
relief from direct provision of welfare. Innovation district strategy as an economic development 
policy reliant on a ‘bootstrap mentality’ means that individual take on risk, a risk that was 
previously mediated through the welfare state but not any longer. With the rise of the various 
forms of contractual labor and the governance techniques inserted to ensure constant work-
readiness (Mitropolous, 2012), the post-Fordist workplace outsources risk to the individual. This 
risk is taken on not only in the signing of the contract, but also in the time between the signing of 
the contract when the individual is in a precarious state of employment. Within labor 
outsourcing, the contracting out of services, and the rise of human capital theory, “workers are 
constituted as entrepreneurs of their own productive, and indeed reproductive, capacity” (Cooper 
& Waldby, 2014:15). 
Another reason for the increase in this form of governance is due to the reorganization of 
the firm and the increase in a mobile workforce. In other words, governance of individual 
subjects increases in difficulty due to the shifting of people and firms. The inability of the 
national boundary to contain people, that is, the flows that move beyond the nation-state 
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problematize issues of sovereignty. Creating a bounded territory, where individuals live-work-
and play while in the space, serves as a container. And though flows continue, tech workers are 
often global nomads, governance is facilitated through governable subjects (Lindtner & Avle, 
2017). The innovation district facilitates the process as a node within a global network where 
individuals, determined by their purchasing power—these spaces are expensive—can travel from 
one space to the next and still have similar experiences.35  
In summary, the innovation district as a space formed to concentrate entrepreneurs assists 
in perpetuating self-governance. The success of the strategy depends on the excitement of 
budding entrepreneurs built on a narrative on the adventure of entrepreneurialism, inherently 
attached to the image of a free-spirited, unhinged, risk-seeking individual. What is at stake for 
this individual is the amount of precarity assumed. Neither the corporation nor the state provide a 
safety net for the entrepreneur or the individuals that comprise the contractual workforce. This is 
the reality faced at the scale of the individual. At a larger scale, what is at stake with innovation 
district strategy is the emergence of a wealthy citadel amongst landscapes of disinvestment. 
                                               
35 Foucault’s notion of governmentality works best through the production and the control of space (Discipline and Punish, 1977) 
Foucault used the prison to demonstrate its function in creating a certain type of individual. In the case of the innovation district, 
the use of design and brand assists in conscripting pre-established norms that are understood and acted upon by the subjects. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
For decades, economic geographers have sought to derive a science on the inputs of 
innovation and economic developers and policymakers have used some of this literature to 
inform their strategies. Ultimately, despite attempts on both sides—theory and practice—there is 
no agreed upon template for how to create a productive and wealth generating economy. Despite 
this, innovation district strategy proliferates as an economic development tool to generate 
regional wealth. 
Based on a comparison of five innovation districts, in this dissertation I demonstrate that 
within the rhetoric of the innovation district, that of an alleged openness for talented individuals 
who will create new apps for the platform economy, entrepreneurs will ideate and scale, and 
research laboratories will propel a healthier future, a narrowness exists. The compression of time 
and space (Harvey, 1989b) amongst knowledge workers works best through the creation of a 
seamless environment so that at all stages of the day individuals are encouraged to work. Social 
events are programed to ensure continuous interaction with the end goal of spurring innovative 
ideas. Public space is managed and programmed for additional spontaneous interactions. The 
design of the innovation district recognizes and builds the amenities to meet the needs of the 
target audience –the highly educated and skilled workforce—while at the same time, stripping 
individuals of their freedom by creating an environment that demands constant productivity. This 
is the logic of the innovation district and its relationship to a constant stream of individuals from 
whom to derive productivity. 
In practice, innovation district strategy in all five case sites suffers from a disagreement 
on how to define innovation and, therefore, how to operate on a definition that guides the 
strategy. Is it about accelerating products to the market? Is it about creating a space to try out 
innovative policies, such as form-based codes, pink zones, and smart city applications? Is an 
innovation district an attempt for cities to transition into a tech-economy based on a new 
workforce economists, sociologists, and organizational scholars are trying to comprehend?   
The ambiguity of the strategy has problematic outcomes for cities with both declining 
and growing economies. Cities that have a robust entrepreneurial ecosystem can adapt this 
strategy to extend their already existing ecosystem. In Dublin and in Boston, the shortage of 
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affordable space for entrepreneurs drove the decision to refurbish dilapidated post-industrial 
infrastructure to accommodate small startups. Many of these small startups benefitted from 
proximity to an established ecosystem where venture capital and C-suite mentorship was readily 
available. However, a problem arises when larger companies also want to move into the new 
innovation district—companies such as General Electric in Boston and Detroit, Facebook in 
Dublin, an IKEA in St. Louis. These companies demand larger footprints to accommodate their 
employees. The relocation of a large company to the heart of a city is not necessarily a bad 
problem for urban actors and residents. The presence of large companies can generate non-
quantifiable benefits, such as brand recognition, cache, investment security. These elements 
create path dependence for other firms and future employees. This was the case in Boston when 
Vertex Pharmaceuticals, LogMeIn, and ZipCar all moved to the Boston Innovation District 
(Kirsner, 2014). At the same time, these factors undergird decisions by urban actors and 
politicians to favor established firms over continued support of smaller ventures.36 The pressure 
to ensure the availability of flexible spaces for startups rather than price them out for the location 
preferences of the larger corporations increases when considering the amount of jobs a larger 
company may create and taxable income. In principle, larger companies will generate more 
income for the city. It should be noted, however, that these gains are negated when governments 
are overly generous with incentive packages and subsidies.37 
Katz’s prescriptions for creating innovation districts refrains from asking and addressing 
this tipping point. Economic developers and growth machine coalitions willingly embrace 
innovation district strategy because of the opportunities it presents to transition into a tech 
economy, create jobs, promote vibrancy, and, through spillovers, generate regional wealth. 
Whether or not innovation district strategy will meet these objectives remains to be seen. 
However, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, what is already evident is the role innovation 
districts are playing in increasing land values that cater to a wealthier demographic and deriving 
profit from the livelihoods of the people who live within its boundaries. In addition, 
contextualizing the emergence of innovation districts from a neoliberal perspective, an 
ideological apparatus stemming from growth coalitions is clear in the development of the tech 
sector and, by extension, new landscapes of technology. The assemblage of actors that make up 
                                               
36 Parallel arguments on the rent-gap theory and causes of gentrification (N. Smith, 2005, 2008) exist though rather than focusing 
on the tech sector, they examine creative workers (see for example (G. Evans, 2009; Lloyd, 2008; Zimmerman, 2008). 
37 For an excellent example of how much public governments give in subsidies, see Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker (Tracking 
Subsidies, Promoting Accountability in Economic Development, 2018). 
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the growth coalitions for each respective innovation district plays an important role in creating a 
market driven ideology focused on entrepreneurship. This ideology originates from federal 
policy championing the role of the entrepreneur and his/her responsibility to society and stems 
down to local actors. Individuals are made to understand their connection as entrepreneurs and 
the role they play in actualizing the growth objectives of the innovation district stakeholders. 
Messaging of this sort operates on the tall tales of garage tinkers turned millionaires who create 
job opportunities for the region and positively impact the community, the region, and society. 
This is a message delivered by various actors at various scales, from the human resource and 
marketing departments of global companies, to federal policy on entrepreneurship, to the 
motivational speeches for innovators prominent in networking events for entrepreneurs and 
innovators. What it also does is cause individuals to formulate him/herself as a human capital 
agent focused on competition. The creation of the precarious market-subject is a governance 
technique in this new state of insecurity (Lorey, 2015). As an established territory with 
governance structure focused on entrepreneurship, the space of the innovation district is a great 
place to practice this entrepreneurial ideology.  
Innovation districts built in both the urban and non-urban sphere are changing 
landscapes. These new landscapes will create challenges for urban residents at the individual 
scale. The increased work demands due to mobile technologies allow workers to work 
everywhere and all the time (Mazmanian et al., 2013). Innovation districts, through their 
connected infrastructure and concentrated design, help accelerate continuous on-demand work. 
My interest in this scholarship is the acceptance of an all-encompassing nature of labor that 
extends beyond the 9 – 5 work day. This exemplifies the live-work-play mentality that 
undergirds innovation district strategy. The benefit of alternative work arrangements provide 
individuals with a sense of autonomy, but more and more scholars are reporting negative 
consequences, such as elevated levels of stress and anger from always being ‘on,’ feelings of 
loneliness resulting from the loss of a work community, and family conflicts due to blurring 
boundaries between work and family life (Allen, Golden, & Shockley, 2015; Bloom, Liang, 
Roberts, & Ying, 2015; Caillier, 2011; Rockman & Pratt, 2015; Schieman & Young, 2010).  
My interest in focusing economic development practice on humans translates to seriously 
interrogating how today’s tech-environments are affecting people. As I demonstrate in this 
dissertation, innovation district strategy affects the way we conceive of the public good. This is 
problematic when we enclose large tracks of public land to seemingly private ownership and 
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capital extraction. The processes of transforming public space into constant sites of production 
through subversive tactics of command and control demand critical attention. 
Sociologist Hans Joas (cited in Welz, 2003) argues that creative innovation happens 
when established notions of action fail because they encounter resistance thus resulting in the 
emergence of new forms. By extension then, fabricating spaces devoid of contact between 
difference cultures (i.e., socio-economic status, mixed use, aging structures), may ultimately 
deplete the conditions necessary for innovation production. Historic and seminal research on this 
topic shows that the opposite is more important: creative activity requires physical structures that 
are aging, mixed use, and can handle instability that is then conducive to change and innovation 
(Jacobs, 1992; Stevens, 2015). 
Such as in the practice of ecological conservation, neighborhoods should put efforts to 
protect and maintain all typologies including informal economies and small bottom-up ventures 
as part of an urban ecosystem. The eradication of such occupants to make way for larger 
institutions and gentrification does not create a complete neighborhood viable for the productive 
evolution of all economy types.38 
My concerns with the contemporary focus on building a tech economy are manifold. The 
first issue is that tech companies are fabled job creators (Davis, 2015). At the startup stage, tech 
companies consist of a small team of people. If they are deemed high value, a larger company 
quickly absorbs them (Jacobs, 1969). The second issue that concerns me in building a tech 
economy is the massive changes to the built environment required to see it through. Policies 
guiding the development of innovation ecosystems emphasize the importance of a dense, 
walkable, amenity rich fabric within a tightly integrated contiguous space as the catalyst for 
spontaneous and synergistic interactions. In and of itself, creating denser, more compact 
developments might not be a bad form of development.39 In fact, the physical degradation to the 
ecosystem as a result of the sprawl that epitomized much of the 1950s and beyond is an 
argument in favor of urban concentration. However, my research demonstrates that the outcome 
occurring in cities as a result of these developments is a segregation between the individuals, 
institutions, and forms of knowledge and expertise that are considered innovative and those that 
do not fit the definition.  
                                               
38 Even the earliest documenters of new economic structuring foresaw the possibilities of inter and intra region divergence in 
spaces that seek to boost their economy by targeting knowledge based economies (Castells, 1992; Harvey, 1989a; Scott, 2008). 
39 However, recent studies on density point to problems associated with issues of health (Feintzeig, 2014). 
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Finally, this dissertation uses innovation districts as a lens to study how advances in 
technology shape economic development strategies. However, these changes are occurring 
outside the space of the innovation district. Changes in the role technology plays in 
reconceptualizing urban governance and the management of human capital bleed beyond the 
boundary of the innovation district into all spaces of the city. The space of the innovation district 
serves as a laboratory to experiment with these new forms of governance before extending the 
policies to the remainder of the region (J. Evans & Karvonen, 2014). The innovation district is 
one bounded space from which to draw observations on the extractive logics of contemporary 
capitalism, but any other places to study these same phenomenon exit. In this way, the claims in 
this dissertation can be made stronger by extending the study into places outside of the 
innovation district. 
There are other directions for research that would strengthen the claims I make in this 
dissertation that I want to point out. In chapter 5, I gesture to studies on the mobile workforce 
and growing health issues related to the pressure of non-stop performance and accommodating 
work around the clock. This research would benefit from an ethnographic study of the lives of 
the entrepreneurs working within the space of the innovation district or in similar fast-paced and 
continuous work environments. Though I did hold interviews with some of the entrepreneurs of 
the innovation district, a study dedicated solely to them and their livelihoods would be 
informative. 
Tracing the citizenship status of the people who live in the innovation district would 
inform fluctuations in democracy and citizen participation in local politics. This assumption 
stems from the idea that innovation districts function as a node along a globally interconnected 
network of firms. As one Facebook employee relayed, Facebook strategically positions offices to 
“follow the sun” so that at all times of the 24-hour day, at least one office is operating (personal 
interview, 2017). This is particularly important for the employees who are responsible for 
ensuring the acceptability of content on their platform. Though many of these employees are 
rooted in one location, many of the managers do transition from one satellite to the next. In 
addition, individuals use the satellites in one location as a way to move up the ladder, eventually 
making it to a Dublin office or a, for a select few, Silicon Valley. The question that arises from 
this constant stream of relocation is the rootedness of the innovation district. While it is place-
bound within a jurisdiction, inhabitants are less likely to be invested in local politics and 
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happenings. This has implications for any attempts to build communities and the role that local 
coalitions can have on the welfare of non-transitory residents. 
A follow-up study analyzing the performance of innovation districts ten to twenty years 
from now would be informative. By then, provided the plans move forward as intended, Cortex 
Innovation District will have completed Phase 3.0 and Park Center would be far beyond laying 
underground tubes and piping. Likely, Detroit’s Innovation District and Boston’s Innovation 
District would be less revealing considering that excitement for the Detroit Innovation District 
declined before majority of the city knew about it and that the targeted activity for Boston’s 
Innovation District has transitioned to the Financial District. As Dublin’s Silicon Docks stands to 
benefit from the Brexit referendum, should the UK succeed in separating from the European 
Union, many UK based foreign tech-companies might move their operations to nearby Dublin. 
For now, these are the three future research engagements that come to mind.  
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Appendix A: Example interview guide 
My interview guide is based off of Weiss’ (1994; p 49-50) example. He states that four to six 
areas of an interview guide can be covered adequately in a two-hour interview. My interview 
guide (below) consists of three sections. I hope to complete my guide in 45 minutes to one-hour 
interviews. 
 
My plan is to begin each interview by informing the respondent that I researched these 
developments while at the Brookings Institution and I continue to research them for my 
dissertation as a doctoral student in urban and regional planning at the University of Michigan.  
 
At the end of the interview I will ask the respondent if he/she would be willing to keep me 
abreast of any new developments and/or if it would be acceptable for me to sit in on meetings 
regarding the development of their innovation district. If I am invited to attend, I will participate 
only as an observer, and not as a collaborator. 
 
I will interview respondents in their offices (or in a nearby coffee shop if they have time and are 
willing to leave their offices), I will not pay the respondents, and I will request tape-recording the 
interviews. 
 
Interview Questions 
1. History of innovation district 
a. When did R first hear about the innovation district concept? 
b. When did R first hear about the innovation district for their city/location? 
c. When and how did R and R’s organization become involved? 
d. Who determined what other organizations would be involved and which ones 
would not? How was consensus on this issue reached? How did each invited 
organization respond? How was a point person for each organization selected? 
Were there any organizations that rejected participation? Where there any 
organizations that requested participation? 
e. How is the innovation district financed? 
2. Definition of innovation district 
a. What was R’s initial thought when the leaders proposed an innovation district for 
their jurisdiction? What type of image developed? Is there a similar development 
R can point to that may be worth replicating or that at least points in the desired 
direction? 
b. What are the necessary amenities for the innovation district to succeed?40 
c. What does the “ideal” innovation district look like?41 
                                               
40 Here I am looking for items such as schools (pre-K – research university-technical university), incubators or accelerators, 
parks, entertainment amenities, etc. 
41 I am not looking for the outcomes of the innovation district. I am trying to gauge an idea of the aesthetic vision of the 
innovation district (i.e., ground plan, urban fabric, monuments, parks, wired technology, modern buildings, open public space, 
etc.) 
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d. What are R’s hopes for the innovation district?42 
e. Does R have experience in other similar development projects? 
3. Possible roadblocks to implementation of the innovation district 
a. What is currently happening with the development of the innovation district? 
b. What are the hurdles to implementation? 
c. Have there been any discrepancies in the visions for the innovation district 
amongst the various stakeholders? 
                                               
42 This question is based on an interest in whether or not the focus is district specific versus city/region specific; the creation of 
marketable products vs revitalizing the community; respective organization vs innovation district as an entity, etc. I recognize 
that these are hard binaries and that likely the answers will fall somewhere within the continuum. 
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Appendix B: Interviews completed 
Table 7: Breakdown of interviews based on type of actors 
City Type of actor Total 
Bo
st
on
 
City government representative 5 
Economic developer 0 
Federal government representative 0 
Non-profit representative 3 
Private sector representative 7 
State government representative 3 
Tech entrepreneur 0 
D
et
ro
i t 
City government representative 2 
Economic developer 8 
Federal government representative 0 
Non-profit representative 12 
Private sector representative 8 
State government representative 3 
Tech entrepreneur 2 
D
ub
lin
 
City government representative 6 
Economic developer 0 
Federal government representative 2 
Non-profit representative 6 
Private sector representative 11 
State government representative 0 
Tech entrepreneur 0 
Pa
rk
 C
en
te
r 
City government representative 0 
Economic developer 1 
Federal government representative 0 
Non-profit representative 7 
Private sector representative 0 
State government representative 0 
Tech entrepreneur 0 
St
. L
ou
is  
City government representative 4 
Economic developer 0 
Federal government representative 0 
Non-profit representative 15 
Private sector representative 12 
State government representative 1 
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Tech entrepreneur 6   
124 
 
Table 8: Categorization of actors 
Type of actor Categories 
Boston 
D
etroit 
D
ublin  
Park 
C
enter  
St. Louis  
City government representative elected officials, appointed public servants, government employees 5 2 6 0 4 
Economic developer public and private interests 0 8 0 1 0 
Federal government representative elected officials, appointed public servants, government employees 0 0 2 0 0 
Non-profit representative Think tanks, universities, hospitals, foundations 3 12 6 7 15 
Private sector representative Company executives & staff, consultants, real estate developers 7 8 11 0 12 
State government representative elected officials, appointed public servants, government employees 3 3 0 0 1 
Tech entrepreneur startup owners 0 2 0 0 0 
TOTAL 
 
18 35 25 8 32 
 
Table 9: List of people interviewed by employer 
City Type of actor Employer 
Boston City government representative Boston City  
Boston City government representative Director of Strategic Partnerships, MassIT 
Boston City government representative City of Boston 
Boston City government representative New Urban Mechanics 
Boston City government representative New Urban Mechanics 
Boston Non-profit representative The Institute of Contemporary Art/Boston  
Boston Non-profit representative Artists for Humanity Epicenter 
Boston Non-profit representative Design Museum Foundation 
Boston Private sector representative Space with a Soul/ CIC-Boston 
Boston Private sector representative Hacin + Associates 
Boston Private sector representative Drydock Center 
Boston Private sector representative Boston Convention & Exhibition Center 
Boston Private sector representative CIC 
Boston Private sector representative Boston Convention & Exhibition Center 
Boston Private sector representative Former Executive Director of Venture Café at the Cambridge Innovation Center and 
helped develop and run District Hall in the innovation district. 
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Boston State government representative Redgate 
Boston State government representative MassChallenge 
Boston State government representative Transit-Oriented Development 
Transportation, Americas 
Detroit City government representative City of Detroit 
Detroit City government representative City of Detroit 
Detroit Economic developer Detroit Economic Growth Corporation 
Detroit Economic developer Detroit Economic Growth Corporation 
Detroit Economic developer Detroit Economic Growth Corporation 
Detroit Economic developer Detroit Economic Growth Corporation 
Detroit Economic developer Downtown Detroit Partnership 
Detroit Economic developer Detroit Riverfront Conservancy 
Detroit Economic developer Downtown Detroit Partnership 
Detroit Economic developer TechTown, WSU 
Detroit Non-profit representative Hudson Webber Foundation 
Detroit Non-profit representative Henry Ford Health System 
Detroit Non-profit representative Allied Media Projects 
Detroit Non-profit representative University Research Corridor 
Detroit Non-profit representative New Economy Initiative 
Detroit Non-profit representative Henry Ford Health System 
Detroit Non-profit representative Midtown, Inc. 
Detroit Non-profit representative Hudson Webber Foundation 
Detroit Non-profit representative Hudson Webber Foundation 
Detroit Non-profit representative TechTown 
Detroit Non-profit representative University of Michigan 
Detroit Non-profit representative University of Michigan 
Detroit Private sector representative TechTown 
Detroit Private sector representative Rock Ventures 
Detroit Private sector representative 313 Creative 
Detroit Private sector representative Mass Economics 
Detroit Private sector representative Rock Ventures 
Detroit Private sector representative Invest Detroit 
Detroit Private sector representative 313 Creative 
Detroit Private sector representative Invest Detroit 
Detroit State government representative Public Sector Consultants 
Detroit State government representative Michigan State Housing Development Authority 
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Detroit State government representative Michigan Economic Development Corporation 
Detroit Tech entrepreneur Utility Boost LLC 
Detroit Tech entrepreneur Rocket Fiber 
Dublin City government representative Dublin City Council 
Dublin City government representative Dublin City Council 
Dublin City government representative Dublin City Council 
Dublin City government representative Master planner of Silicon Docks 
Dublin City government representative Dublin City Council 
Dublin City government representative Startup Commissioner 
Dublin Federal government representative Public Affairs, American Chamber of Commerce 
Dublin Federal government representative US Department of Commerce 
Dublin Non-profit representative Maynooth University 
Dublin Non-profit representative Maynooth University 
Dublin Non-profit representative University College Dublin 
Dublin Non-profit representative Maynooth University 
Dublin Non-profit representative Maynooth University 
Dublin Non-profit representative Trinity College 
Dublin Private sector representative Ryan Academy 
Dublin Private sector representative Liffey Trust 
Dublin Private sector representative Guinness Enterprise Center 
Dublin Private sector representative Inward Investment Consultant, Connect Ireland 
Dublin Private sector representative Bennett Property Ltd 
Dublin Private sector representative Facebook 
Dublin Private sector representative Accenture 
Dublin Private sector representative Salesforce 
Dublin Private sector representative Facebook 
Dublin Private sector representative Oracle 
Dublin Private sector representative Facebook 
General Non-profit representative Brookings Institution 
Park Center Economic developer Durham Chamber of Commerce 
Park Center Non-profit representative NC Justice Center 
Park Center Non-profit representative Research Triangle Park Foundation 
Park Center Non-profit representative Research Triangle Park Foundation 
Park Center Non-profit representative Research Triangle Park Foundation 
Park Center Non-profit representative Triangle J Council of Governments 
Park Center Non-profit representative Research Triangle Park Foundation 
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St. Louis Non-profit representative Cortex 
Park Center Non-profit representative University of North Carolina Chapel Hill 
St. Louis City government representative Arch Grants 
St. Louis City government representative St. Louis Development Corporation, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership 
St. Louis City government representative St. Louis Development Corporation, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership 
St. Louis City government representative St. Louis Alderman 
St. Louis Non-profit representative Park Central Development 
St. Louis Non-profit representative BJC Healthcare 
St. Louis Non-profit representative Missouri Botanical Garden 
St. Louis Non-profit representative Washington University 
St. Louis Non-profit representative St. Louis University 
St. Louis Non-profit representative St. Louis University 
St. Louis Non-profit representative University of Missouri St. Louis 
St. Louis Non-profit representative University of Missouri St. Louis 
St. Louis Non-profit representative Washington University 
St. Louis Non-profit representative Center for Emerging Technologies 
St. Louis Non-profit representative Washington University, Center for Emerging Technologies 
St. Louis Non-profit representative Washington University 
St. Louis Non-profit representative St. Louis Community College 
St. Louis Non-profit representative Washington University 
St. Louis Private sector representative Enhanced Value Strategies 
St. Louis Private sector representative BioSTL 
St. Louis Private sector representative BioGenerator 
St. Louis Private sector representative Cambridge Innovation Center (CIC) 
St. Louis Private sector representative Capital Innovators 
St. Louis Private sector representative TechShop 
St. Louis Private sector representative Venture Café  
St. Louis Private sector representative Venture Café  
St. Louis Private sector representative Bayberry Group Inc. 
St. Louis Private sector representative Express Scripts 
St. Louis Private sector representative Lawrence Group 
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St. Louis Private sector representative Maritz 
St. Louis State government representative Regional Chamber 
St. Louis Tech entrepreneur Gateway VMS 
St. Louis Tech entrepreneur Gateway VMS 
St. Louis Tech entrepreneur IDEA Labs 
St. Louis Tech entrepreneur Kypha 
St. Louis Tech entrepreneur GlobalHack 
St. Louis Tech entrepreneur Mission Center L3C 
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Appendix C: Emergent themes from coding 
Table 10: Themes from Detroit interviews 
Main theme Sub-theme 
Location specifics   
Brand   
Definition of innovation Brand 
Definition of placemaking Brand 
Exclusions Border 
Goals Brand 
Governance Border 
Infrastructure Border Brand 
Obstacles Border Brand 
Origin stories Brand 
Imagery 
Brand 
Counter imaginary 
Cultural change 
Problem with prior system 
Time   
Legacy Border Brand 
 
Table 11: Themes from Dublin interviews 
Main theme Sub-theme 
Aesthetics   
Benefits   
Boosterism   
Challenges   
Civic realm   
Cultural character   
Definition of innovation   
Desires   
Economic Development   
Expertise   
Flexibility   
Governance   
History   
Housing   
Imaginary   
International connections   
Location specifics   
Market fundamentalism   
Place-marketing   
Real estate   
Regionalism   
Shared responsibility   
Size   
Speed   
Splintering urbanism   
Technology   
Urban planning versus innovation   
US-centrism   
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Table 12: Themes from St. Louis interviews 
Main theme Sub-theme 
Anchor   
Benefits   
Boundaries   
Brand   
Challenge   
Contrast   
Definition of innovation   
Economic Development   
Finance   
Goals   
Governance   
History   
Location specifics   
Millennials   
Neighborhood   
Organization   
Placemaking   
Real Estate   
Reason for success   
Region   
Structure   
Technology   
 
Table 13: Themes from Park Center interviews 
Main theme Sub-theme 
Border   
Challenges 
Housing 
Real estate 
Regionalism 
Non-city 
Structure 
Technology 
Metrics 
Flexibility 
Competition 
Control 
Covenants 
Finance 
Governance 
HOA 
Surveillance 
Corporate culture   
Definition of innovation   
Design 
Accessibility 
Affordability 
Anchors 
Authentic experience 
Challenges 
Civic amenities 
Collaborative 
Connectivity 
Convergence 
Density 
Diversity 
Expenses 
Flexibility 
Housing 
Imaginary 
Inspiring 
Live-work-play 
Knowledge-based economy 
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Non-city 
Organic 
Brookings 
Placemaking 
Programming 
Technology 
Economic Development 
Brookings 
Network 
Leadership 
Live-work-play 
Entrepreneurs   
Finance   
Growth   
Housing   
Imaginary   
Location 
Acquisitions 
Benefits of non-city 
Border 
Branding 
Centrality 
Diversity of choices 
Growth of region 
Real estate 
Location specifics   
New working patterns   
Obstacles 
Growth boundaries 
Space requirements 
Zoning 
Partnerships   
Planning 
Business 
Civic amenities 
Economic development 
Planning 
Communications 
Finance 
Flexibility 
Governance 
Housing 
Timeline 
Transit 
Real Estate   
Regionalism   
Small industries   
Speed   
Transit   
Technology Skills 
Automation 
Strategy 
New working patterns 
Travelling mobilities Katz 
  New working patterns 
Travelling mobilities Katz 
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Appendix D: Demographics in innovation district cases across time  
Table 14: Boston Innovation District demographics 
Boston Innovation District 2000 2007-2011 2012-2016 (ACS) 
Population 1857 3401 5412 
Race    
White alone 90% 89% 88% 
Black or AA alone 2% 2% 2% 
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone 0% 0% 0% 
Asian Alone 5% 7% 8% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone 0% 0% 0% 
Some other Race Alone 1% 0% 0% 
Two or more races 2% 2% 2% 
Age    
18-44 59% 64% 67% 
65+ 9% 6% 6% 
Education    
Bach or more 39% 80% 79% 
Occupation    
Male 49% 70% 68% 
Female 43% 71% 72% 
Households with no people under 18 87% 93% 94% 
Family 20% 20% 27% 
Nonfamily 66% 73% 68% 
Travel Time to Work for Workers 16 Years and Over    
Less than 10 min 39% 10% 12% 
Worked at home 3% 8% 4% 
Car, Truck, or Van 46% 42% 45% 
Public transportation 31% 26% 26% 
Motorcycle 0% 0% 1% 
Bicycle 0% 1% 1% 
Walked 18% 21% 23% 
 
Table 15: Detroit Innovation District demographics 
Detroit Innovation District 2000 2007-2011 2012-2016 (ACS) 
Population 27,688 20236 25,586 
Race    
White alone 19% 24% 32% 
Black or AA alone 72% 65% 56% 
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone 0% 0% 0% 
Asian Alone 6% 8% 8% 
Some other Race Alone 1% 1% 1% 
Two or more races 2% 2% 3% 
Age    
18-44 51% 50% 56% 
65+ 11% 11% 11% 
Education    
Bach or more 22% 27% 37% 
Occupation    
Male 41% 39% 50% 
Female 35% 42% 50% 
Households with no people under 18 83% 90% 90% 
Family 12% 13% 12% 
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Nonfamily 71% 77% 78% 
Travel Time to Work for Workers 16 Years and Over    
Less than 10 minutes 20% 21% 24% 
Worked at home 3% 4% 4% 
Car, Truck, or Van 56% 54% 59% 
Public transportation 18% 17% 8% 
Motorcycle 0% 0% 0% 
Bicycle 1% 1% 3% 
Walked 22% 23% 25% 
 
Table 16: St. Louis innovation district demographics 
St. Louis: Cortex Innovation Community 2000 2007-2011 2012-2016 (ACS) 
Population 135 1546 2092 
Race    
White alone 76% 63% 68% 
Black or AA alone 19% 19% 18% 
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone 1% 0% 0% 
Asian Alone 3% 14% 9% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone 0% 0% 0% 
Some other Race Alone 1% 4% 2% 
Two or more races 0% 0% 3% 
Age    
18-44 44% 80% 82% 
65+ 5% 3% 3% 
Education    
Bach or more 38% 42% 60% 
Occupation    
Male 59% 36% 54% 
Female 100% 43% 57% 
Households with no people under 18 82% 88% 96% 
Family 25% 28% 28% 
Nonfamily 57% 61% 68% 
Travel Time to Work for Workers 16 Years and Over    
Less than 10 minutes 59% 28% 27% 
Worked at home 10% 9% 7% 
Car, Truck, or Van 80% 48% 65% 
Public transportation 0% 9% 2% 
Motorcycle 0% 0% 0% 
Bicycle 0% 3% 1% 
Walked 10% 31% 25% 
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Appendix E: Real estate price increases in US-based innovation district cases 
Boston Innovation District 
2010 – 2018 
Notes: The industrial category covers transactions in the Bronstein Center. This is a flexible 
interpretation of industrial use as the space has housed a wide variety of uses over time – from 
maritime related activities, to wet labs, to furniture maker spaces, to office uses for companies 
such as Reebok and Adobe. 
 
In 2010 four transactions were made. The sale of one office building at $208/sf, the refinancing 
of another office building, the sale of an apartment selling at $416,774 per unit, and the 
refinancing of an industrial building. One for an office building and one for an industrial 
building. 
 
In 2011,11 transactions occurred. Five industrial sales, one hotel sale, three development site 
sales, and one development site refinance. One office build sold for $28/sf. 
 
In 2012, 25 transactions occurred. Three industrial sales, five development site sales, two 
development site refinances, three office refinancings, nine office sales, one office transfer, two 
retail sales. For the office sales, the highest rate was $318/sf for a building built in 2010 and the 
lowest reported was $199/sf for a building remodeled in 1989. 
 
In 2013, 22 transactions occurred. Five development site sales, three development sites 
refinanced, four industrial sales, seven office sales, and three office refinances. For the office 
sales, the highest rate was $393/sq ft for a building remodeled in 2010 and the lowest reported 
was $137/sq ft for a building remodeled in 2009. 
 
In 2014, 17 transactions occurred. Five office site sales, three office sites refinanced, one 
industrial sale, one industrial refinance, two development site sales, four development sites 
refinanced, and one apartment sale. For the office sales, the highest rate was $994/sq ft for a new 
2011 building and the lowest was $224/sq ft for a building remodeled in 2010. The apartment 
units sold at $224,719. 
 
In 2015, 27 transactions occurred. One retail site was sold, twelve office sales, four office builds 
refinanced, one industrial site refinanced, one hotel sale, one hotel refinance, four development 
site sales, two apartment sales, and one apartment refinanced. For the office sales, the highest 
rate was $514/sq ft for a building remodeled in 2010 and the lowest reported was $359/sq ft for a 
building remodeled in 2007. The apartment units sold for $644,957. 
 
In 2016, 14 transactions occurred. One retail refinanced, one retail sold, two office builds 
refinanced, six office sales, one industrial sale (the future site of the GE HQ sold for $522/sq ft), 
one hotel sale, and two development sites sales. For the office sales, the highest rate was 
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$1029/sq ft for a new 2015 building and the lowest was $479/sq ft for a building remodeled in 
2008. 
 
In 2017, there were 18 transactions. A sale by WS Development for the assemblage of the future 
Boston Seaport sold for $5,601/sq ft. There were also six office sales, three office builds 
refinanced, two industrial sales, three hotels refinanced, one co-op refinanced (an artist building 
at 300 Summer Cooperative Corporation), one apartment refinance, and one apartment sale. For 
the office sales, the highest rate was $1,734/sq ft for a new 2016 building and the lowest was 
$561/sq ft for a building remodeled in 2012. The apartment units sold for $351,715. 
 
As of mid-July 2018, there were seven transactions. Two office sales, two office refinancings, 
one industrial refinancing, and one apartment sale. For the office sales, the highest rate (pending) 
was $1,162/sq ft for a new 2018 building and the lowest $578/sq ft for a building remodeled in 
2012. The apartment units sold for $693,175. 
 
Cortex Innovation Community 
2006 - 201743 
2002 Cortex 501c3 established 
2006 Chapter 353 established 
2014 TIF established 
 
In 2006, two industrial sale transactions happened, one for $115/sq ft and the other for $33/sq ft. 
 
In 2007, one industrial sale and one office sale occurred. The rate for the office was $256/sq ft 
for a new building built in 2007 for Solae’s headquarters and the rate of the industrial site was 
$27/sq ft. 
 
In 2008, only one sale on for a development site occurred. 
 
In 2009 and 2010 no transactions occurred. 
 
In 2011, two office sales occurred. Rates were not reported. 
 
In 2012, two industrial sales occurred. The only reported rate was $171/sq ft thought the prices 
of the building (Cortex 1) was $26,000,000.00 
 
In 2013, five transactions occurred. Two industrial sales, one office refinancing, and three 
industrial entity transactions with Wexford Science and Technology selling to BioMed Realty 
Trust. The industrial sale rate was $33/sq ft. 
 
In 2014, three development site sales occurred, all for the building of the future IKEA. All three 
sales totaled $15,303,030.00. 
 
In 2015, one industrial sale and one office sale occurred. The office rate was $346/sq ft for a 
building built in 1978. The highest rate for industrial uses was $43/sq ft. 
 
                                               
43 The data for Real Capital Analytics on the Cortex Innovation Community border only reaches as far back as 2006 and ends in 
2017. 
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In 2016, eight transactions occurred. Four industrial sales, one office refinancing, and three 
industrial entity transactions from BioMed Realty Trust to BioMed Realty. The highest rate for 
industrial uses was $246/sq ft. 
 
In 2017, two transactions occurred. One industrial sale and one office sale. Rates were not 
reported. 
 
Detroit Innovation District 
2014 - 2018 
In 2014, 24 transactions occurred. Fourteen office sales, four office refinancings, one 
development site transfer, one development site sale, three apartment refinancings, and one 
apartment sale. For the office sales, the highest rate was $129/sq ft for a building built in 2003 
and the lowest reported was $12/sq ft for a building built in 1917. The highest apartment unit rate 
was $122,928. 
 
In 2015, 33 transactions occurred. Two retail sales, eighteen office sales, three office build 
refinancings, one office transfer, one hotel sale, one development site sale, four apartments 
refinanced, and three apartments sold. For the office sales, the highest rate was $120/sq ft for a 
building built in 1911 and the lowest reported was $16/sq ft for a building built in 1929 (the 
Fisher Buliding and Albert Kahn Building). The highest apartment units went for $206,667. 
 
In 2016, 26 transactions occurred. One retail sale, nine office sales, three office builds 
refinanced, one hotel sale, and three hotels refinanced, one sale of a development site, four 
apartments refinanced, and three apartments sold. For the office sales, the highest rate was 
$161/sq ft for a building built in 1989 and the lowest was $12/sq ft for a building built in 1920 
(the former Wayne State Criminal Justice Building). The highest apartment units are rated at 
$332,143. 
 
In 2017, 32 transactions occurred. One retail sale, twelve office sales, five office builds 
refinanced, two industrial sales, one development site sale, five apartments refinanced, and six 
apartments sold. For the office sales, the highest rate was $124/sq ft for a building built in 1997 
and the lowest reported was $59/sq ft. The highest apartment units (for a refinanced apartment) 
are rated at $152,756. 
 
As of March of 2018, 23 transactions occurred. Three retail sales, five office sales, five office 
builds refinanced, one industrial sale, two hotel sales, six apartment builds refinanced, and one 
apartment sale. For the office sales, the highest rate was $147/sq ft for a building built in 2004 
and the lowest report was $29/sq ft for a building built in 1929. The highest apartment units (for 
a refinanced apartment) are rated at $83,333. 
 
Park Center 
Park Center only has a total of three transactions from 2013 – 2018. One office sale (2014), one 
retail sale (2013), and one hotel sale (2013). All are on existing buildings from the 70s and 80s. 
The office sold for $6,223,000.00, the retail space for $4,975,000.00, and the hotel for 
$6,750,000.00. As Park Center remains in a state of imagination, tracking transactions for the 
next decade will be more revealing. 
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Appendix F: Use of human subjects in doctoral research 
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